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Sum m ary
Literature about command and control, i.e. the direction and coordination of military 
forces, traditionally deals with technology and procedures. The underlying domestic 
conditions, including cultural, personal and political relations, are rarely the focus for 
command and control theory. This thesis’ main assumption is that the conceptualising of 
command and control has to take such underlying conditions into account. At times, 
especially in crisis, some fundamental preconceptions are in conflict with each other, 
causing dangerous friction. The thesis analyses two instances, where several tacit, but still 
fundamental, assumptions were at loggerheads. The study is based on theoretical ‘nuts and 
bolts’, provided in the opening chapter.
The first case, the appointment of General Foch as ‘strategic director’ of the alHed 
forces in 1918, involves coalition warfai'e and looks at the conditions that hampered the 
realisation of a much extolled principle in command and control, ‘unity of command’. In 
March 1918, the ‘luxury’ of having several armies present in the field, without any central 
military authority, became too expensive, as the Gemians threatened to destroy the allied 
forces piecemeal. The thesis shows how internal British disagreements over strategy 
initially weakened the British Expeditionary Force, and then how Field-Marshal Haig 
made matters worse by relentlessly fighting for his prerogatives as their supreme 
commander. The thesis also shows how Haig after the war-, forged his ovyn account of the 
incident, to disguise the intolerable ‘surrender’ to a French general, and how this sham has 
coloured historians’ accounts of the episode, until today.
The second case analyses how Norway tumbled into war in 1940. The Norwegian 
government had a tacit, incoherent and ill-coordinated plan for how they should once again 
keep Norway out of war. Parts of the plan were secret, even to the generals, as it probably 
had to be given Norway’s status as neutral. The problems of secrecy were enlianced by the 
fact that some of the precautionary measmes run counter to common military sense. As a 
consequence, the de facto decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a 
rather insignificant colonel. The case demonstrates how the underlying conditions of 
command and control, and not the actual directives from the government, which have 
traditionally been the historians’ focus, determined Norway’s destiny.
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1 Introduction
'if you wish for peace, understand war” 
■ L iddell H art
The object of command and control is to carry into effect those military actions that will 
lead to the fulfilment of policy. In no place is it more imperative to get this right, than in 
international crises, where a dissonance between the field of cerebration and the field of 
military mechanics may end in a catastrophe. Hence, in this essay I will malce command 
and control in crisis management scenarios the topic of discussion. I will carry out an in- 
depth analysis of two crucial events in militaiy history, where a crisis and a given layout of 
command and control aiTangements converged and added up to something no one had 
foreseen.
In the first case we will find several nations involved, though our focus will be on 
the British view, and a crisis well inside a hot war. At 12 noon, 26 March 1918, the Allies 
met in the little town of Doullens. The outcome of the meeting was somewhat surprising 
given the parties’ earlier views. At the conference Britain finally agreed to subordinate its 
generals to an officer fi'om another countiy. Generals seldom hand over their prerogatives, 
unless forced to do so. And it is correspondingly rare that a nation, which in this case had 
fought a dreadful war for almost four years, hands over the ultimate responsibility for 
wimiing it to anotlier state. The reason why they did it was that they faced an imminent 
crisis, which could cost them the war anyway.
The second crisis is cleaner cut. It involves only one nation, and the crisis is 
squeezed in between lopsided neutrality and a dubious war. In April 1940 Norway faced an 
abmpt and lethal thi*eat fi*om Geiinany. The Norwegian government was unwittingly on the 
blink of war. Due to the existing command and control airangements in Norway the 
decisive decision to commit the first act of war was left to a colonel, far from the political 
maze in the capital. Had the layout of command and control in Norway been any different, 
the outcome of the crisis would arguably have been the opposite of what it actually was.
In the first case, command and control played a significant part both in  the 
generation and the solution of the crisis. In the second case the command and control 
layout moulded the crisis, being neither cause nor effect. Hence, the case from 1918 will be
a before-and-after analysis, while the case from 1940 will focus on the ‘before’, as there 
was no ‘after’ so to speak, since Norway tumbled into war* and occupation where much 
more than command and control had to be rebuilt from the ground. Consequently the first 
case will occupy the greater part of tlie thesis.
For some years now, the rather simple ‘equation’ of has been challenged by 
allegedly more ‘advanced’ equations, as for instance: C ,^ C^I, or C"^ !,  ^ or even more 
luscious still: C'^ISR og Thomas Coaldey’s book gives what I tliinlc to be the
prevailing world record, which is C^^E, where ‘E’ stands for etc.^ I can see no reason why 
it should stop there; alas he forgot ‘confusion’. I will not add just another letter to the 
‘bulimic’ equitation of command and control. I am going tlie other way. In the next chapter 
I will look at the phenomena that hide beneath the acron^nns and buzzwords of command 
and controh^
The concept of crisis will be used in a slightly different way in this essay from what 
is usual in literature covering international crises. I will utilise it in accordance with the 
medical concept of ‘crisis’, where ‘crisis’ describes the point in the course o f  a serious 
disease at which a decisive change occurs, leading either to recovery or to death. 
Accordingly, crises can occur well inside a war, as in 1918. In chapter 3 I will elaborate 
more on the phenomena of crises.
The cases will be spelled out in chapter 4 and 5, and I will bring the essay to a close 
by the conclusion in chapter 6.
 ^Command, control, communications (computers) (intelligence).
 ^James M. Liepman, ‘C"‘'’N^xyz, TACS, and Air Battle Management, The Search for Operational Doctrine’, 
AirpowerJournal (Spring 1999); C '^lSR = command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; BM/C^ = Battle management/command and control.
 ^ ‘C^ :^ command, control, communications, computer, cohesion, counterintelligence, crypto analysis, 
conformance, collaboration, conceptualization, coirespondence, camaraderie, commissaries, camuflage, 
calculators, cannon, caissons, canteens, canoes, catapults, carpetbaggers, caddies, carabineeris, carrier 
pigeons, corn whiskey, camp followers and calamine lotion.’ Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for  
War and Peace (Washington, 1992), 9,
It is not clear whether command and control refers to one thing, 'command and control', or two things, 
'command' and 'control', Is it a singular or is it a plural? Should we say that 'command and control' is one 
thing, or that tliey are something else? (Most writers tend to phrase it ’command and control is')
Command and contre!
'Com m and and con tro l eq u ip m en t is ju s t  ra d io s  and o th er devices so ld ie rs  use to  
ta lk  to each o th e r in com bat, w e  don 't w a n t com m and and con tro l in com bat.'
- Senator Gary Hart
111 the summer of 1263, the Nomegian king Haalcon Haakonson gathered an armada just 
off shore by the city of Bergen. With 160 seagoing vessels he headed for Scotland. He was, 
according to the clironicles, very upset by the rumours of Scottish raids of terror, which 
threatened the Norwegian rule of the Hebrides and Isle of Man. In December 1262 tlie 
king died in Kirkwall, after what the Scots characterised as a downright fiasco.^ Norway 
had been at its peak as a gi'eat power in Northwest Europe. Some generations later Norv^ay 
did not exist as an independent nation.
On 22 June 1941, the first Gemian Panzer crossed the Soviet border. 138 German 
divisions participated in Operation Barbarossa, and they confronted 148 Soviet divisions, 
which made this the largest land operation in histoiy. Before the year of 1941 had come to 
an end, the Soviets had 2,5 million casualties, and in addition to that, one million of their 
troops were POWs of their fomier allies. A total of about 20 million people were slain in 
the hoiTendous war between the dictators, before the fighting was brought to an end in the 
streets of Berlin.
Why did the allegedly foolhai*dy Norsemen and the meticulous Germans embark 
upon such dangerous adventures? The authorities’ motives, and the inducements to the 
soldiers, differed eonsiderably in the situations mentioned, but the cases share something 
very important. Haakon and Hitler were both able to extend their authority over distance, at 
times over vast distances indeed. Hence Roger Beaumont defines ‘command and control’ 
just so: ‘Command and control, [is] an extension of authority over distance.’^
However, the most interesting question remains: how is such an auüiority produced, 
upheld and extended?
 ^Narve Bj0rgo, 0ystein Rian and Alf Kaaitvedt, Selvstendighet og union. Fra middelalderen til 1905 (Oslo, 
1995), 72.
 ^Roger A. Beaumont, The Nerves o f War: Emerging Issues in and References to Cotnmand and 
Control (Washington, 1986), 8.
2.1 The nerves of war
Authority over distance exists, so to spealc, within a triangle. One of the comers consists of 
the phenomenon of authority in itself. Why did millions of Gennans sacrifice eveiything 
they got, their own lives included, to an unemployed and futile artist, in the shape of an 
Austrian corporal? Another comer is made of intentions. The target group must know 
what the authority wants to accomplish, before it can do anything. The third comer is 
occupied by dissemination. Even if Haalcon had an intention to hammer the Scots, and the 
Norsemen had the motivation to follow him, it would not help him much if he was unable 
to disseminate his intention. Thousands of compatriots did not know where to meet, and 
what to bring. Haalcon had to tell them. In the following we will look a bit closer at each of 
the triangle’s comers.
2.1.1 Authority
We will not dig into all the connotations and philosophical implications connected to the 
concept of ‘authority’, saving establishing that military cohesion has to be based on 
psychological and sociological conditions. It is always possible to force some soldiers to 
follow suit, but the leader cannot coerce them all. A great majority of them have to choose 
voluntarily to comply.  ^The second point is that some societies have managed to restrict 
the privilege of issuing military orders to only one office, the political executive’s. It is 
important to notice that the restriction of the military prerogatives is not without hazards of 
its own, something the Norwegian case below will show.® Hence, the first prerequisite for 
expanding authority over distance is that a relatively large portion of the target group wants 
to abide by an established authority.
 ^ ‘Once Üie number of lawbreakers is more than tiny, the police typically retreat to tlie station house, or put on 
a ceremonial show of acting as if they were enforcing the law[.]The point for our present discussion is that we 
cannot assume that tlie system of acceptance is backed by a credible system of force. For on e  thing the system 
of force is itself a system of acceptance. Police forces and armies, for example, are systems o f status- 
functions. But more important for our present purposes, the system of force presupposes the other systems of 
status-functions. We cannot assume that Leviathan will come to our aid in a genuine crisis; o n  the contrary, 
we are in a state of nature all the time, but the state of nature is precisely one in which people do in fact accept 
systems of constitutive rules, at least nearly aU tlie time.’ Jolm R. Searle, The Construction o f  Social Reality’ 
(London, 1995), 91.
® General MacAithur has given an extraordinary articulated view in this matter: T find in existence a new and 
heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe prinaary allegiance or 
loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Goveniment rather than to 
the countiy and its Constitution which tliey are sworn to defend. No proposition could be m ore dangerous.’ 
MacArthur to the Massachusetts legislature after his dismissal. Quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, Between 
Peace and War. The Nature o f International Crisis (Baltimore, 1981), 289.
82.1.2 Intentions
It is important to keep in mind that one intention is just a part of a huge web of intentions.
If I have an intention to play golf with my brother on Tuesday, I also have intentions of 
having my bag ready, and the car available. Most of our intentions are not part of our train 
of thought, nevertheless they decide where that train is going. I am not able to reconsider 
all my intentions all the time: my mental capability is simply not sufficient, and moreover it 
is paramount that I do not do it. It would be impossible to reach complex goals if all my 
intentions were constantly up for revision, and it would likewise be impossible to co­
ordinate my actions with others. What is really profound, regarding command and control, 
is that the politicians and the generals at the top have a much wider picture o f that ‘web of 
intentions’ than the soldiers in the field. The misfoitune of General Jolm D. Lavelle 
testifies how serious the tension can be between the ‘internal’ and ‘extemaT apprehension 
of an intention.
General Lavelle assumed command of Seventh Air Force in Saigon in 1971, He 
believed that North Vietnam had integi'ated their early warning, surveillance, and AAA 
radars with the SAM sites, in a way that constituted a deadly threat to the Americans.^ The 
imles of engagement that he had inherited forbade engagement unless Vietnamese weapon 
systems had gone ‘active against’ US aircraft. The enemy’s netting of several radai's 
therefore posed a tlmeat that Lavelle had no opportunity to counteract, within the prevailing 
rules of engagement (ROE), because the weapon system that actually engaged US aircraft 
did not need to ‘go active’. He desperately tried to change the ROB, a futile attempt. 
Consequently he had to make a difficult decision, ‘What took priority: the ROE or the 
safety and effectiveness of Iris command?’ Lavelle chose the latter. From the external 
perspective, Lavelle’s decision was the rational one, 1 guess. The overall American 
intention was to win the war in Vietnam, and you camiot win a war by letting the enemy 
decimate your ainnen. From the internal perspective though, the decision was fatally 
wrong. What Lavelle did not know was that Henry Kissinger was in Paris conducting secret 
peace talks with the North Vietnamese. Kissinger did not know that Lavelle had violated 
the ROE. As a consequence Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam broke the talks o ff  abruptly,
® This passage is based on Major Lee E. DeRemer, USAF ‘Leadership between a Rock and a  Hai’d Place’ 
A irpower Journa / (Fall 1996),
because Kissinger either was lying or very poorly informed about the activities of Seventh 
Air Force. From the internal perspective of Kissinger, Lavelle’s decision was irrational. A 
negotiator who lies unashamedly, or does not know the realities, is not worth talking to.
Lavelle was caught between a rock and a hard place, or between the crossfire of 
internal and external views on intentions. The two perspectives can at times be radically 
different, and can cause severe problem s.Lavelle was court-martialled, and his retirement 
rank was reduced to major general: ‘Never before had such an action occurred in American 
military history. ’
There is a close connection between intentions and plans: ‘intentions are the 
building blocks of larger plans.’ But sometimes plans resemble the monster of 
Frankenstein. Initially a plan is an aid to fulfil your intentions, but rather soon your 
intentions will be to carry out the plan, regardless of whether the plan still leads to the 
fulfilment of your intention. The Schlieffen plan, the most monstrous of them all, is outside 
our scope, but we shall meet some of his smaller siblings in our cases.
2.1.3 Dissemination.
Given that the executive has an intention ready for use, how should he tell others about it? 
There are thi'ee ways to disseminate an intention. You could invite the recipients to a 
conversation. That is, you can use two-way communication. The benefit is that the 
recipient can ask questions and thereby get a much more comprehensive understanding of 
your intentions. A danger though is that the original intention can change during the 
dialogue. If I approach my spouse with an intention to convince her that our next holiday 
should be in London, I may end up with my intention totally altered. Maybe Copenhagen is 
a better choice after all? I will call this way of disseminating intentions ‘reciprocal 
influence’, to distinguish it from the other two.
The next option is merely to give an order, or broadcast it by radio waves or 
runners. This time the communication goes one way only. One-way communication is 
much faster tlian two-ways, and we are not in danger of being converted by th e  addressee, 
at least not overtly. The actions that follow are supervenient upon the intentions, that is, the
‘In most crises, tensions exist between the actions that appear to be most militarily prudent to officers in the 
field and those that are considered diplomatically appropriate by senior political officials.’ Scott D. Sagan 
‘Rules of Engagement’ in Alexander L. George (ed.), Avoiding War. Problems o f Crisis Management 
(Boulder, 1991), 444.
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action is influenced by the intention, but not vice versa. Hence, I label this way of 
disseminating intentions, ‘supervenient influence’. Additionally, it is the subordinated who 
decides whether the person in chai'ge has control over the organisation or not, when 
‘supervenient influence’ is in use. If he simply does not comply, or deliberately returns 
biased reports to distort the foundation for new decisions at the top, the authority can be 
lulled into delusions, and lose control.
The third possibility is to let tlie addressee guess what your intentions are without 
communication at all, based on his previous knowledge of how things used to be done. He 
has to infer what to do, based on what he thinlcs the authoritative intention would be if  the 
authorities had laiown, given what other members in the organisation do. I will call such 
actions isomorphic.'^
In the old ‘pre-digitaT times, all telephone users had first-hand experience with 
coordination problems. If a telephone conversation was cut off unexpectedly, and both 
wanted the connection restored immediately, they had each to choose whether to call back, 
or wait. If both chose the same, the conversation was not restored. Whom to call back can 
be decided by previous agi'eement, or by salience. For instance, if  only the one who made 
the original telephone call Icnows the number to call, the solution is evident. Likewise, if it 
is regarded as good manners that the one who made the original call calls again, so that the 
expenses stay with the originator, there will no longer be a problem. You infer the other’s 
intentions, due to a valid convention. The purpose of militaiy doctrines and standing 
operational procedures is exactly to prepare the ground for military conventions to take 
place. Actions based on isomorphism are swift and cost-effective: you do not use your time 
waiting on the telephone line. But the process is difficult, and it carries great risk.
Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reas or (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 32.
The relation between a correct map and tire terrain it couespoiids to is isomorphic, i.e. there is a 
relationship between them, but a change in one of them wall not automatically result in a corresponding 
change in the other.
David K. Lewis, Convention A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 52.
Convention is defined as: ‘A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S' is a convention if and only if it is true drat, and it is common knowledge in P 
that, in almost any instance of S  among members of P, (1) almost everyone conforms to R; (2) almost 
everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R; (3) almost everyone has approximately the same 
preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions; (4) almost everyone prefers that any one more 
conform to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R; (5) almost everyone would prefer that any one 
more conform to R on condition tlrat almost everyone conform to R ’, where R ’ is some possible regularity 
in the behavior of members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instances of S among members of 
P could conform both to R ‘ and to R. ' Lewis, Convention, 78.
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2.1.3.1 The Gamut
Reciprocal influence is only possible within a small group. Supervenient influences can 
occur within a much larger group of people, containing millions. Isomorphic influence has 
an infinite reach, it can work around the world, instantaneously. We can illustrate this with 
a simple model.
Figure 2-1 The Gamut
Isomorphic
Supei’venient
Reciprocal
iHimm.
■ s m . I #
intensity
The figure gives an idea about the relationship between the intensity and extension of 
command and control. The intensity^ describes the degree of control, i.e. how tight the reins 
are, while the extension denotes the geographic or organisational expansion. If a general 
wants a very intensive type of command and control he has to see his subordinates and talk 
directly to them: ‘There is no alternative to looking into a subordinate’s eyes, listening to 
his tone of voice’. T h a t ’s possible only for a small group, hence the extensions have to be 
modest.
Napoleon was able to extend his authority over almost the whole o f  Europe, just by 
reducing the traditional desire for close control, and allowing his generals to do much of 
the thinking. It was effective, but risky:
Thus Napoleon at Jena had known nothing about the main action that 
took place on that day; had forgotten all about two of his corps; did not 
issue orders to a third, and possibly to a fourth; was taken by surprise by 
the action of the fifth; and, to cap it all, had one of his principal
The Israeli General Yshayah'or Gavish, quoted in Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcdp6/toc.htm
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subordinates display the kind of disobedience that would have brought a 
lesser mortal before a firing squad. Despite all these faults in command,
Napoleon won what was probably the gi'eatest single triumph in his 
entire cai'eer.'^
I am not sure that there were any ‘faults’ in Napoleon’s command at all. All he did was to 
relinquish control, by making a bet on the powerful but fragile isomorphic way of 
extending his authority.'^
By enhancing the troops’ skills and competence, or investing in new technology, the 
total ‘amount’ of command and conti'ol will increase, and one can reach further with tlie 
same intensity. It is not only the particular working skill that increases the extension, but 
also the troops’ skill in cooperation. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have noticed these 
phenomena through their studies of militaiy misfortunes; ‘Self-organization in the face of 
the unforeseen or the unexpected is at an especially high premium. Units and small groups 
must achieve levels of cooperation and mutual self-help that surpass tliose commonly 
expected of them or for wliich they have been prepared. Unexpected tasks must be 
delegated quickly and efficiently and competing demands resolved speedily and wisely.’
By buying a cellular phone and a helmet-mounted online camera for every soldier, or by 
working with a sagacious and visionary doctrine, the ‘reservoir’ of command and control 
will flourish, and the organisations can reach more complex goals than before.'^
Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge Mass., 1985), 96.
The most serious chai'ge against the usefuhiess of the teim ‘command and control’ is that the concept of 
‘control’ is like a stowaway that clings to the concept of ‘command’ without being invited. It is possible to 
gain astonishingly victories without ‘control’: Napoleon did it. But he could not do it without ‘command’.
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch Militaiy Misfortunes, The Anatomy o f Failure in War (New York, 1991), 161.
Robert Leonhard has a similar experience of the relation between intensity and extension: ‘One of the 
lessons I canied away that day was not to let my platoons disperse too far from me. I had lost confidence m 
ray lieutenants’ ability to navigate and communicate, and I did not want to lose another platoon to lack of 
command and control. Fortunately, over the following two years, I got better at commanding, and my 
subordinates improved as well. By the fifth or sixth time we manoeuvred, we had developed all the right 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) to overcome the inevitable navigation and communication problems.
As our confidence in each other grew, our ability to manoeuvra effectively improved. But I learned a trend 
that I have observed ever since: Soldiers tend to concentrate in order to facilitate command and control. 
When all else fails, it is easier to control your men when they are within visual range or even better, shouting 
range. This is not just a fleeting obseiwation based on one poorly ti’ained company. It is a very old 
characteristic of tactics, and one of the tacit undeip innings of the principle of mass.’ Robert R. Leonhai'd, The 
Principles o f War for the Information Age (Novato CA, 1998), 109.
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Figure 2-2 The Gamut in use.
 ^  ^ comm and and control deficit  ^ ^ extension
i p
A
intensity
The figure above conveys several ideas. First, it illustrates a positive shift in the availability 
of command and control. If the organisation increases its technology or competence, it is 
possible to extend a degree of intensive command and control over a wider area than 
before. But still it is possible to have a surfeit. In what must have been one o f the darkest 
hours in the history of the Third Reich, the Allied landing on the beaches of Normandy, the 
Germans suffered a serious deficit in their command and control system. Field Marshal 
Gerd von Rundstedt initially ordered two panzer divisions, the Panzer Lehr Division and 
the 12^*^ Hitlerjugend Panzer Division, to speed toward Caen.^° Some hours later the 
divisions were halted by the OKW, and Rundstedt was harshly reprimanded for having 
assumed command of the two divisions without prior approval from Hitler. Rundstedt’s 
operations officer describes the situation: -
Throughout the morning and early aftemoon I, the Chief of Staff,
General Blumentritt, and Rundstedt himself repeatedly telephoned the 
OKW, in order to find out what Hitler had decided in the matter of these 
two divisions. Apparently he was asleep, and no one dared wake him. It 
was not until his usual conference, between three and four o’clock that 
afternoon, that Hitler decided to allow the commitment of the divisions.
They were immediately ordered to resume their advance. But by then it
was too late. 21
20 This section is based on James P. Duffy, Hitler slept late and other blunders that cost him the war (New 
York, 1991), 113-124.
Ibid. 122.
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Albert Speer reveals the suiTeal tranquillity that surrounded the Führer at this decisive 
moment: ‘On June 6 ,1 was at the Berghof about ten o’clock in the morning when one of 
Hitler’s military adjutants told me that the invasion had begun early that morning. ‘Has the 
Fuehrer been awakened?’ I asked. He shook his head. ‘No, he receives the news after he 
has eaten brealcfast.’^ ^
The situation can be described by the figure above. Hitler wanted tight control, i.e. 
his command and control were intensive. Let say Hitler’s demand was at A in the figure 
above. Given the valid teclinology and doctrine, that gave an extension I in the figure. The 
Allied landings, tliough, demanded a much larger extension. Also the panzer divisions 
needed command and control to fulfil the Führer’s overall intention, to hinder the Allies.
As an illustration, the divisions were at point 2 above. Remember, the axis also indicates 
the organisational extension, and to reach them Hitler should have relinquished control and 
opted for more isomorphic actions. He did not; ‘He [Hitler] decided from the outset to 
centralize decision-making at a point far from the front and thence to supervise the control 
of operations in the closest detail.’ He could not have both intensive control and forces 
spread over whole of Europe.
2.2 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to elucidate the concept of ‘command and control’. I stated that 
command and control rest on tliree pillai’s, authority, intention and dissemination.
In both case-studies that follow I will analyse the intention, the authority and the way of 
dissemination that were at work. Regarding the intention I will examine whether there were 
substantial differences in the perspective, that is, whether the ‘internal’ perspective from 
the government was significantly different than the ‘external’ perspectives o f  the officers 
on the spot, I will also comment on the possible dysfunctional prominence o f  plans over 
intentions. Regarding authority, I will explore the origin of the intentions that were brought 
to bear on the operations. And I will assess the political ‘dirigibility’, that is. the 
politicians’ ability to grasp the functional imperatives of military institutions, i.e. the 
vernacular and terminology of the military profession. It is increasingly hard for a modem 
party-political careerist, with little martial experience of his own, to master tlie  ‘nuts and
Ibid. 122.
Jolm Keegan, The Mask o f Command (London, 1987), 301.
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bolts’ of the increasingly complex military profession. Furthermore, a politician’s 
behaviour in a crisis is also highly influenced by his image of crisis dynamics. On 
dissemination, I will investigate the ‘sounding board’ of military improvisations, tJiat is, 
was there anything in the officers’s backgrounds or education that gave them an inclination 
to one kind of action rather than another. Then I will analyse ‘the gamut’, or whether there 
was a sound hannony between needs and possibilities in command and control. The figure 
below gives a broad overview of the cases’ framework.
Figure 2-3 Command and control in a nutshell.
L  In ten tio n  Conflicting perspectives?
E) Plan-fetishism?
2, Authority
A) JVhose intentions?
B) Political dirigibility?
.;■ Authority ;oyer. 
distance. '
3, Dissemination
A) Isomorphic resonance? 
B A gamut in harmony?
Before we go to the cases, we have to malce a short stop at the concept of crisis. A lot of 
books have been written about international crises, so I do not intend to build the concept 
from the ground. I will only outline my understanding of crisis, to show why both the 
German’s assault in 1940 and their breakthrough in 1918 were instances of crisis.
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Crisis
WIo staffer can manage crises. Once a crisis starts you can bet your fife that, i f  you are the crisis 
manager’s  staffer, you will be kicked aside and ail tbe principals, the President the Secretaries, will 
take over and run it, and you might as well go home. During tbe crisis -  that's the time to be away ~ 
that's your staff responsibility'
■ W i l l i a m  O d o m
Is not the term ‘Crisis Management’ an oxymoron? If it is a real crisis, how could it be 
managed, or if it could be managed, is it then a crisis? In this chapter we will first look at 
the concept of crisis. Thereafter we will look at the management of it, if  any.
3.1 Definition
The Greek word hisis  was originally used in medical science to denote the point in the 
course of a serious disease at which a decisive change occurs, leading either to recoveiy or 
to death. Used that way in political science, a hisis  can occur well inside a war. Ragnvald 
Rocher-Nielsen, a staff officer in General Ruge’s headquarters during the operations in 
Norway in 1940, told an illuminating story. General Paget, the commander of the British 
troops in Romsdal and Gudbrandsdalen, promised on 26 April that 2000 fresh troops 
would arrive in Ândalsnes each day. According to Rocher-Nielsen, Ruge estimated his 
future needs, and ^vrote in his diary for the 28 '^f ‘The crisis is over. ’ Rocher-Nielsen rather 
laconically adds: ‘Ruge was right, alas not the way he had anticipated.’ General Paget 
returned on the 28^ ,^ just to inform Ruge that he was to withdraw his forces from the area. 
The battle for southern Noiway was to all practical puiposes over. This little story spells 
out the significance of a genuine crisis, Ruge hoped that the ‘patient’ would start his 
recoveiy on the 28^ ^^ , hut instead he became incurable.
But would not any war be prolific in crises? Does not the possibility o f  sudden 
death hide in any skirmish? I will draw a discrete demarcation line: to call a situation an 
international crisis, the situation has to be so serious that it threatens the constitutive mles 
that international relations are based on.
Ragnvald Rocher-Nielsen in an interview in a documentaiy television program. (Norge i krig, program 3, 
overfall og motstand.)
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3.1.1 Constitutive rules
The philosopher John R. Searle distinguishes between regulative and constitutive rules.
The regulative rules regulate ‘antecedently existing activities’.^  ^ ‘Drive on the right-hand 
side of the road’, or ‘don not pick your nose’ or ‘do not forget to clean your marching 
boots’ are all examples of regulative rules. They can be in the form of judicial laws, rules 
of good manners, or rules of thumb, etc. What they all have in common is that they regulate 
activities that already exist. Constitutive rules on the other hand do not regulate already 
existing activities, but ‘create the very possibility of certain activities’.^  ^The game of 
football, as we Icnow it, could not exist without the rales that describe the pitch, the teams 
and the ball. A game with 150 players or 10 balls, played with the forehead only, would not 
be football. The constitutive rales constitute the activity.
I thinle it is reasonable to say that a genuine international crisis thi'eatens to alter the 
constitutive rules of the international conmiunity. The Gemian assault on Norway was a 
genuine crisis because Norway’s intercourse with Gennany would change considerably if 
Germany occupied the nation. It would be a totally new ballgame, so to spealc. Debilitation, 
that a state ceases to exist and disappear from the map, is the most extreme change in the 
constitutive rules of the international arena. The point is valid also in March 1918. The 
Allies feared that the war could be lost, if they did not manage to check the German 
offensive. It would be a totally new game, if the Germans won the war, or routed the allied 
forces. Hence, neither the catastrophe at the Somme nor the fall of Singapore in 1942 was a 
crisis in this respect. The UK would remain in the war, even with those losses.
1 do not think that the definition is all embracing or foolproof. The primary concern 
is not whether 1 have grasped the ‘essence’ of crisis, but whether my definition is wide 
enough to be useful, and narrow enough to have practical significance.^^
Seaile, The Construction o f Social Reality, 27.
Ibid. 27.
‘Some of [the descriptions] are, to be sure, better description that otlier. But this bettemess is a matter of 
being more useful tools -  tools which accomplish some human purpose better than do competing descriptions. 
All these purposes are, from a philosophical as opposed to a practical point of view, on a par, There is no 
over-riding purpose called ’discovering tire truth’ which takes precedence.’ Richart Korty Philosophy and 
Social Hope (London, 1999), 54,
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3.2 Crisis management
Can a crisis be managed at all, or is it just like sitting in a bairel going down the Niagara 
Falls? I thinle it is possible to handle crises. In fact most crises in the world have been 
handled. Unfoitunately those that got out of hand are usually those that make it into the 
history books. Chaos or turmoil is not an intrinsic part of a crisis. The Melian Dialogue, in 
the way Thucydides describes it, is for instance characterised by its calm and dignity, 
despite the fact that nothing less than the Melians’ right to exist was at stake.^^
In this essay I will not explore the generic origins of crisis. What is important, in 
this context, are the pitfalls that flourish in international crises. The subject o f my suiwey is 
command and control; hence generic shortcomings in our cerebration are of greatest 
concern, since the brain is the ‘biosphere’ of command and control.
3.2.1 R/lisapprehension, the rough ground ot command and control
People malce decisions, all the time, not just in crises, and decision-research shows that 
people in numerous fields tend to make the same kinds of decision-making mistakes. The 
shortfalls are of course valid also for crisis managers.
An international crisis is distinguished by its seriousness, and the fact that the 
decision-makers work against the clock, or at least have a feeling of urgency. Richard 
Lebow claims that such a feeling often is unwaiTanted: ‘The Berlin crisis lasted 311 days. It 
is accordingly wrong to speak of severe time pressure as a distinguishing characteristic of 
international crisis.’ Nevertheless, the feeling of severe time pressure is often present, 
and has an impact on the decision-makers. We Icnow that the combination o f  high risk and 
the feeling of time shortage can cause mental malfunctions such as ‘tmncated time span’, 
decisional closures, irrational procrastination, cognitive rigidity, reduced cognitive 
complexity, diminished creativity and a cripplingly biased view of the opponent. Still it is 
easy to forget these points, when we solve old crises in our armchair. Likewise, when we in 
retrospect talk about command and control in high-stress scenarios, it is important to 
remember the effect of numerous mental dysfunctions which ai'e impossible to recreate 
artificially. The historian’s privilege is not only that he knows the outcome, and the 
significance of variables, but that he is usually ‘cool, calm and collected’. Even if he should
28 Thucydides, Histoiy o f the Peloponnesian War (London 1972), 400.
reach the old dream of writing history wie es eigentlich gewesen ist he will never be able to 
recreate the mixture of mental distortions that handicapped the actor. Hence, some sort of 
leniency towards the actors is appropriate also when dealing with command and control.
Compromises, horse trading, and straightfoiward hanky-panlcy are all equipment in 
any ambitious politician’s toolbox. ‘Dirty tricks’ ai'e often indispensable in crisis 
management. The ethos for the professional officer is completely different: ‘The greatest 
misfortune which can befall an Amiy is to be involved in politics. Like the Crown, to 
whom our allegiance is due, we have nothing to do with po litics.H en ce , the tension 
between the civil authorities and the military professionals is likely to increase during a 
crisis. For politicians military professionalism can on occasion feel like a straitjacket.
In a crisis the armed forces will often find themselves in an uncomfortable twilight 
between peace and war, or war and peace. Military horse-sense is to prepare for war when 
the danger of a war lurks, a drive that can be counterproductive in a crisis. Soldiers 
traditionally dislike irregularities and peculiarities, despite the fact that the majority of 
military operations ai*e something other than war.^  ^A kind of military frustration is 
therefore an inseparable part of crisis.
All crises are extraordinary, and the cases that follow are as idiosyncratic as any. 
They are not there because they are representative, but because they are genuine.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, 12.
Major A. C. Graat-Duff during the ‘Curragli Incident’ in 1914. Quoted in Hew Strachaii, The Politics o f  the 
British Army (Oxford, 1997), 6.
‘While low-inten^ity conflict has most frequently been the actual practical soldiering experiences of the 
Western soldiers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is the di’eam of what French soldiers knew as la 
grande guerre that has commanded the attention of theorists and of historians in turn.’ Ian Heckett, ‘Low- 
Intensity Conflict: Its Place in the Study of War’ in David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson 
(eds.), Militaiy History and the Military Profession (Westport, 1992), 121.
‘Civilian-military conflict is therefore very likely to develop when political leaders, concerned with broader 
national objectives, make victory difficult, more costly, or even unattainable by putting restraints on the use 
of force.’ hehow Between Peace and War, 46.
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Case 1 : The tactical field marshal
'AH would bo so easy ! f i  only had to deal with the Germans!'
■ Field Marsha! Douglas Haig
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) will cut a peculiarly sad figure in this thesis, and its 
leader for most of the war, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, will appear almost as a failure. 
Undeniably it seems self-conti'adictory to claim that the wimiing side of a war had serious 
malfunctions. Before I dive into the subject matter I will therefore say something about the 
assessment of military perfoimance.
To compare the effectiveness of different belligerents is more difficult that it seems. 
The utterance ‘may the best team win!’ is superfluous in sti'ategy. The best team is best 
because it wins. When we say that the best team lost, as Martin Samuels does, we blur our 
yardstick.^^ In games of strategy, where the participants are measured against each other, as 
in Samuel’s book, the only yai'dstick is winning or losing.
On the other hand though, to most people the battles of Tannenberg and the 
Masurian Lakes in 1914 were gi'eat Gemian victories, even if Gennany eventually lost the 
war. Hence, waging war is also a ‘game of skills’, where an external yardstick, usually 
other’s expectations, also measures how good a perfoimance is. Hence the evaluation of 
Haig’s perfoimance is also based on people’s expectations, and not only relative to Gennan 
perfoimance. The problem arises when the two yardsticks am incommensurable.
The price Haig had to pay to win the game of strategy against the Kaiser exceeded 
what most people expected to pay. Many commanders, as for instance Sir Arthur Harris of 
Bomber Command and General Wesley Clark, have been stuck in the same dilemma. Their
‘The argument is not that the German Army was effective and the British Army was ineffective. It is that, in 
the given circumstances, the German Army’s combat effectiveness was gieater than that of the British Army.’ 
Martin Samuels, Command or Contra!? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and 
German Armies, 1888-1918 (London, 1995), 3.
Thomas Schelling distinguishes ‘games of skill’, ‘games of chance’ and ‘games of strategy’, where games 
of skill are like golf or bowling, games of chance like roulette, and games of strategy like chess, where: ‘the 
best course of action for each player depends on what the other players do.’ Thomas Schelling, The Strategy 
(Cambridge Mass., 1980; 1st pub. 1960), 3.
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political masters have asked them to deliver ‘goods’ deemed necessaiy but still 
uncomfortable. The way to restore ‘politicaT peace of mind after a regrettable battle is to 
blame the general.H ence, when evaluating Haig, one has to remember that he was caught 
on the horns of a ‘machiavellian’ dilemma.^^
Furthermore, saying that the combat effectiveness of the BEF was poor does not 
automatically impy that the Gennan or French proficiency was any better. Your skills in for 
instance golf can be esteemed extraordinarily low by bystanders, but still you can be best, if 
your competitors have a really bad day.
In this essay I will drag Haig through a stone breaker until there is almost nothing 
left of him. But when all is said and done, Haig still stands, because: ‘The critic, then, 
having analysed everything within the range of human calculation and belief, will let the 
outcome speak for that part whose deep, mysterious operation is never visible. The critic 
must protect this unspoken result of the workings of higher laws against the stream of 
uninformed opinion on the one hand, and against the gi'oss abuses to wliich it may be 
subjected on the o th e r .M a n y  have tried to explain Haig’s victoiy away, but they always 
fail in their duty to protect the unspoken result of Haig’s leadership.
British accounts of the war are often accused of being ‘entirely Britarmocentric’.^  ^
The scope of this essay does not allow me to do much to remedy that. I will consider the 
official French monographs and the biographies of the most prominent French participants 
in the meeting, but, as it is impossible within this thesis to reach the same depth of research 
on both sides of the table, my focus will be on the British side.
4.1 The British authority over distance in 1917/18
In this chapter I will focus on the meeting in the town of Doullens, on 26 March 1918, 
where General Foch made a startling comeback and became the Supreme Commander of
‘Harris and his men have a legitimate complaint: they did what they were told to do and what their leaders 
thought was necessary and right, but they are dishonored for doing it, and it is suddenly suggested (what else 
can the dishonor mean?) tliat what was necessary and right was also wrong’ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars. (New York, 1977), 324.
Niccolo Machiavelli asserted in his Discourses that; ‘one will find that it very rarely happens that someone 
good wishes to become prince by bad ways, even tliough his end be good... ’.Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses 
on Livy (Chicago, 1996), 51. Hence it is hard preserve your image as a ‘good man’ if forced to fight a ‘bad 
war’.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), 167.
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the Western fi'ont. Seeing it from the British point of view, I will start the chapter by 
analysing the British authority over distance in March 1918.1 will focus on 1917, and the 
first months of the ‘forgotten year-’ of the war, 1918. Thereafter I will narrow down on the 
days before the meeting, and the meeting itself. I will close the chapter by analysing the 
consequences of the meeting in ternis of command and conti'ol.
4.1.1 Authority
Seen from 10 Downing Street, the authority of the Prime Minister was severely threatened 
during the war. Lloyd George’s ability to empower the Prime Minister’s intentions, and 
carry them through to the soldiers in the field, will be our first point of interest.
4.1.1.1 Whose Intentions?
As one of the oldest democracies in the world, and the ‘inventor’ of the paidiamentary 
system, Great Britain laiew much about the advantages and disadvantages o f  being a 
democracy at war. A sufficient trade-off between parliamentary negotiations, based on 
representativeness and majority, and the secrecy and impetus of modem war was 
nevertheless hard to find. Lord Hankey gives a tragicomic description of the situation in the 
last days of Herbert Asquith’s Coalition: ‘The War Committee is hopelessly congested, 
gi'eat questions dealing with Man-Power, the Air Board, Food Supply, and Finance all 
urgently awaiting settlement. Yet I could not get a meeting for tomoirow, because X was 
going for a day’s shooting, Lord Y for a week-end, and Lord Z to address his former 
constituents. I managed to get a meeting for Monday, but the Prime Minister said ‘You 
won’t get anyone’. Today’s meeting had to end soon after 1 p.m. to enable Mmisters to 
attend official lun ch eo n s.T h is  way of doing business was maybe acceptable during the 
Crimean and Boer Wars, but not this time. The appalling casualty rate of the British Army 
forced the politicians to take a closer look both at the numbers of men assigned to the 
Army, and the use made of them by the generals. Witli the loss of 60,000 m en in 
employable age groups in just one day, military operations became just as much a question 
of economic suiwival, demographic disraption, and national husbandry, as o f  ethics and 
tactics. Leaving the rather complicated personal and political relationships aside, the
Correlli Barnett ‘Did they doctor the records?’ (A review of Denis Winter’s Haig's Command: A 
Reassessment)' Times Literature Supplement, (19 April 1991).
39 Lord Haiilcey, The Supreme Command (London, 1961), VolII, 557 (Diary entry, 10 November 1916)
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conclusion was that Asquith resigned on 5 December 1916, and Lloyd George formed a 
new government some days later. Provided that he operated in constitutional forms, and 
with reasonable deference to Parliament and public opinion, it was from then on Lloyd 
George’s intentions that should govern the country and the war.
The traditional view of British soldiers was that the politicians should pick which 
wars to fight, and then deliver sufficient numbers of men to the generals to win them. But 
this time the generals had asked for more than could be provided. Great Britain as a 
nation was at war, not only the British Army, hence the head of the nation should direct the 
war, not the head of the Army. According to Lord Beaverbrook the generals thought 
otherwise: ‘The generals were to claim a fi'cedom from restraint. They demanded the sole 
right to determine all military issues even though their decisions would have repercussions 
for the whole population of Britain, soldier and civilian, man and woman, shopkeeper and 
banker, financial and commercial, eveiy section of the com m unity.Consequently, on 
Christmas Eve 1916, just days after Lloyd George’s rise to power, General Sir William 
Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S), infonned Haig: ‘There is a very 
dangerous tendency becoming apparent for the War Cabinet to direct military operations. 
Lloyd George had apparently started his campaign to curb his own warlords, a dangerous 
and difficult battle, in the midst of a war. Lloyd George did not dare a coup de main, since 
his own political position was not secure enough to risk an open vote of confidence in 
competition with Haig.^^ His plan was a coup de grace. He would shortcut Haig through 
Paris, without disavowing him. Haig would have his cup of bitterness at the Calais 
conference, an Anglo-French meeting in February 1917.
Lloyd George was convinced that the French general, Nivelle, was the only man 
that could break the deadlock of the Western ffont.'^ '^  Some would turn this upside down.
‘[I am] not prepared to accept the position of a butcher’s boy driving cattle to tlie slaughter, [I will] not do 
it.’ Lloyd George to Repington in Febmary 1917. Quoted in Jolni Terraine, Douglas Haig, The Educated 
Soldier, (London, 2000; 1st pub. 1963), 242.
Lord Beavei’brook, Men and Power 1917-1918 (London, 1956), 46.
Keith Grieves ‘Haig and the Government, 1916-1918’ in Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (eds.) Haig A 
Reappraisal 70 Years on (Barnsley, 1999), 110.
‘His Conservative allies limited Lloyd George’s room for manoeuvre in dealing with the generals, 
especially Haig, who enjoyed Conservative support.’ Gaiy Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World 
War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001), 81.
‘I have complete confidence in him, and the deepest conviction that he is tire only man who is capable of 
bringing the operations to a successful conclusion tliis year, ‘ Lloyd George to Lord Hankey and the French
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and say that the main attraction of Nivelle’s plan was ‘the fact that Haig would temporarily 
be under the French general’s c o m m a n d T h e  main problem, though, envisaged by the 
Prime Minister, was that Haig would resist any kind of subordination to Nivelle, and that 
he probably would have the War Cabinet’s support in refusing it. Lloyd George’s plan was 
to inform the French of his intentions, leaving them ample time to prepare their arguments, 
whilst deceiving his own Cabinet, and keeping Robertson and Haig completely in the 
dark."^  ^ It is not necessaiy to go into details about what happened at the conference, just to 
say that both Robertson and Haig would have prefeired to be tried by court-martial or to 
resign rather than to follow orders from a French general."^  ^Lloyd George was prepared to 
let them both go."^  ^The crisis was solved by a compromise proposed by Hanlcey. What is 
important for us is not the wording of the compromise but the vehement resistance against 
paying the price for unity of command among the generals, and the bitterness the 
conference created among the participants. Terrain concludes: ‘One thing is certain: a 
cloud of mistmst was created at Calais which was never dispelled during the whole of the 
remainder of the War. Not only were new difficulties added to those (sufficiently 
formidable) which already existed in the relations of French and British Headquarters, but a 
special brand of poison was injected into the relations between the British Government and 
its leading soldiers.
Nivelle’s abrupt fall from grace, after his hyped push had dwindled away into just 
another deadlock, marked a setback in Lloyd George’s battle against his generals. ‘The 
Man’ whom the Prime Minister had supported so strongly, proved to be just another
Liaison Officer at the War Office, Commandant Bertier de Sauvigny, quoted in Terraine, Haig, 265. As a 
curiosity, Nivelle, speaking perfect English, had in fact an English mother. At first sight he would be the 
perfect supreme commander, being the incarnation o f ‘amalgamation’.
Anthony Bruce, An Illustrated Companion to the First World War (London, 1989), 226.
Tt is difficult to refrain from using emotive words like ’plot’ and ’conspiracy’!...] Lloyd George’s motives 
were complex, personal, and not all dishonourable; but he had embarked upon an underhand course, and the 
methods by which he sought to gain his ends were necessarily devious.’ John Terraine, Haig, 266.
Terraine, Haig, 270. Hankey gives an instinctive description of the encounter: ‘When Haig objected tliat 
tlie ‘Tommies’ wouldn’t stand being under a Frenchmen, Lloyd George said -  ‘Well, Field-Marshal, I larow 
the private soldier veiy well. He spealcs freely to me and there are people he criticises a good deal more 
strongly than Nivelle.’ He more than hinted that Haig would have to resign if he did not come to heel... ’ 
'H.dFk.ey Supreme Command, ii. 616.
' Ibid. 616.48
Terraine, Haig, 276.
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‘butcher’. When Haig asked for permission for a big push of his own (Third Battle of 
Ypres), Lloyd George was unable to refuse, though he deeply resented the idea.^^
When the shambles closed in November, 310,000 British casualties were left 
behind, leaving Haig with almost nothing to show for the effort. Such a number should 
nonnally have provided Haig with more than enough rope to hang himself.^ ^  If the Prime 
Minister wished to relieve his principal military subordinate, as he most likely did, the 
overt failure of Third Ypres offered a splendid opportunity. Why did he not do it? At least 
a part of the answer, beside the fact that Haig still had veiy powerful friends, is that Lloyd 
George’s problem was bigger than just Haig’s person. It was the orthodox military strategy 
and the poor prospects of further attrition warfare on the Western front that worried the 
Prime Minister. The loyalty of the Anny was the sine qua non for a new Commander-in- 
Chief, and such a man would probably be a spitting image of Haig. Haig survived in 
command due to the want of a better man or better plan.^^ Thus Lloyd George decided to 
curb Haig’s influence and keep him as the figurehead of the Army.
The conclusion is that Lloyd George had stmggled for more tlian a year to establish 
the authority of 10 Dovming Street in military affairs when we reach 1918, and had more or 
less succeeded: ‘By late 1917 the prime minister’s own position was much more secure.
The third battle of Ypres had turned both the conservatives and the press against the 
generals.’ It was his intentions that counted, but a serious problem remained. Lloyd 
George still had to steer his course ‘tlnough’ Haig. How could the Prime Minister secure 
his political dirigibility, when he could not get rid of the giudging general, who actually 
had to carry Lloyd George’s intentions into effect in the field?
Ten'aine states that Admiral Jellicoe’s warning that the threat of the Geraian submarines made it 
‘impossible to continue the war in 1918’, was probably decisive for the outcome of the controversy between 
Haig and the Prime Minister. Terraine, Haig, 333. Prior and Wilson’s explanation of why tire Third Ypres 
campaign was launched is more complex, but maybe less dramatic: ‘[T]he decision-malcers of Britain, little 
though they cared to recognise it, had no choices: the terrible logic of this war drove tliem to reach what was 
actually a predetermined decision.’ Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele, the untold story (New 
Haven, 1996), 35.
The metaphor is Henry Wilson’s, quoted in John Keegan, The First World War (New York, 2000; 1st pub. 
1998), 365.
In his War Memoirs Lloyd George wrote: ‘It is easy now to say: ‘You ought to have sacked him[...] Who 
could be put in his place? It is a sad reflection that not one amongst the visible military leaders would have 
been any better.’ Quoted in Terraine Haig, 389. In other words, the Army was in ‘the best possible hands’, 
but those hands were not good enough.
Hew Strachan, The Politics o f the British Army, 137.
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4.1 .1 .2  Po lit ica l  dirigibility
After the Third Battle of Ypres, Lloyd George built several safeguai'ds against his own 
Commander-in-Chief, to restrict his freedom of action.
Sir Henry Wilson, ‘universally distrusted tlii-oughout the Anny,. .our only military 
black-leg’, delivered one of them, by his suggestion of an inter-allied war c o u n c i l . ‘It 
became very clear to me tonight that Lloyd George means to get Robertson out, and means 
to curb the powers of the C.-in-C. in the field. This is what I have been advising for 2A 
years, and this is what the whole of my paper is directed at -  not to getting Robertson out, 
but to fonning a Superior Direction over all C.G.S.s and C.-in-C.s’^  ^ Lloyd George’s 
answer was The Supreme War Council. A Supreme War Council to coordinate the 
efforts of the British, French, Italians and later the Americans, and watch over the ‘general 
conduct of the war’, seemed long overdue when it was finally created in November 1917. 
Alas, the Council did not remedy the major problem, the disunity of co m m an d .N o t even 
Lloyd George, the instigator, was willing to curtail his own freedom of action. ‘Mr Lloyd 
George, with the unfoitunate result of the Calais Conference of 1917 in his mind, declared 
that he was opposed to unity of command, and when on his return to London he explained 
the reasons for the fonnation of the Supreme War Council and its functions to the House of 
Commons on November 19, he said that ‘unity of command’ would not work. It would 
produce real friction, and might really produce not merely friction between the Annies, but 
fi'iction between tire nations and the Government.Unfortunately the ‘new doctors’ at the 
Supreme War Council in Versailles lacked sufficient laiowledge to compete seriously with 
Haig’s judgement: ‘[T]he opinions of the independent British Military Representative at 
Versailles were often wrong, because he was independent and had not the latest and most 
accurate infbmration at his disposal. He could in fact only get his infonnation at second-
The unfavourable description of Wilson is Brig.-Gen John Chatteris’s (at G.H.Q) quoted in John Terraine, 
To Win a War. 1918 The Year ofVictoiy (London, 2000; 1st pub. 1978), 52.
From Wilson’s diary, 17 October 1917, quoted in Terraine, Haig, 374. Haig, needless to say, suspected tliat 
Wilson’s proposal was motivated by Wilson’s own wish for a military comeback as ‘head o f  the British Staff 
section’. Ibid.
‘Lloyd George favom'ed an allied co-ordinating council as it would entrance Britain’s political hrfluence, 
check increasing American influence, and break the military’s control over strategy.’ William J. Philpott, 
Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914-18 (London, 1996), 150.
‘Since each ally supported the Supreme War' Council for different reasons, and expected different things 
from it, its creation introduced more tensions into allied relations than it resolved.’ Ibid. 150,
Sir Frederick Maurice, Lessons o f Allied Co-operation: Naval Militaiy and Air 1914-1918 (London, 1942), 
105.
27
hand either from the War Office or from our General Staff in France. The remedy for a 
Prime Minister who does not like his military adviser is to change him, not to set up 
another to give conflicting advice.
Haig was deeply frustrated over the giemlin in Versailles, quite understandably. 
Robertson actually resigned, in February 1918, due to seri ous disagreement about the 
Supreme War CounciTs position in the British chain of command, and was substituted by 
Wilson, after the latter’s short interlude as Permanent Military Representative at Versailles. 
Robertson’s removal was not the only one that affected Haig. In the ‘purges” in the months 
preceding Mai’ch 1918 he also lost his Chief of Staff (Kiggell), his Deputy Cliief of Staff 
(Butler), and his intelligence officer (Charteris), with unpredictable consequences for his 
war effort.^’
Haig’s freedom of action was not only restricted tlnough new aiTangements of 
command and control. Lloyd George also choked the supply of manpower in  the last 
months before March 1918. In addition to sending five of Haig’s divisions to Italy to 
bolster that front against Austria-Hungaiy, Lloyd-George also agreed to take over more 
frontline fi-om French troops. On top of this Lloyd George kept huge numbers of soldiers 
back in Great Bri tain.Al l  this seems veiy hazai'dous, given the fact that Russia was on 
the verge of collapse, and that Gennany could concentrate within the near future on the 
Western fi'ont. Why did he still do it? First of all, Lloyd George probably did not tmst his 
ability to control Haig, despite the new dual-tracked command and control layout. In the 
words of Robert Blake: ‘The creation of the Versailles Committee was not the only or the 
most important move in Lloyd George’s campaign against Haig. In the autumn of 1917 he 
had come to a much more serious and fai'-reaching decision. Lloyd George was determined
Ibid. 106.
60 raises the whole question as to the status of die ‘Wai' Council’ in an acute form. T he Government
now have two advisers! Will they accept the advice of the Versailles gentlemen (who have no responsibility) 
or will they take my advice? Wilson has arrived at his conclusion (so he writes) as ‘the result of a War Game’ 
and on ‘mathematical calculations.’ The whole position would be laughable but for the seriousness of it.’ 
Robert Blake (ed.), The Private Papers o f Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (London, 1952), 279. (14 January, 1918.
‘[Wjas the absence of familiar faces and personalities a handicap to Haig in the crisis that was now so close 
upon him? The true answer is probably mixed; on balance the new team would appear to have been better. 
The result, certainly, did them all credit.’ Terraine, Haig, 389,
‘War- Office returns for 1 January 1918 show that no fewer than 38,225 officers and 607,403 men were in 
England, fit, fully trained and immediately available for service in France. Just 150,000 of these men would 
have brought Haig’s divisions up to full strength and provided a pool of reinforcements.’ M artin
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to avoid a repetition of the Passchendaele campaign. But he not only considered himself 
too weak to dismiss Haig, he even doubted bis own ability to ovenule Haig if  the letter 
were to propose a renewal of the offensive. He therefore decided that the only way of 
escaping this dilemma was to keep the Commander-in-Chief so short of troops that he 
could not even suggest a renewal of the British offensive.
Consequently, Haig was deliberately and severely weakened when the 
Kaiserschlacht hit him in March.Unfortunately, Lloyd George had not become 
comparatively stronger by weakening his means of ‘military production’. By tying Haig’s 
hands, he unwittingly helped Ludendorff to reach his goals.
4.1.2 intention
Lloyd George had become the strong man in British politics, almost strong enough to 
mould the British strategy into a shape of his own choosing. He had established his 
authority, even if the method he had chosen hampered the BEF’s ability to fight. But Lloyd 
George was absolutely not strong enough to dictate the strategy of the alliance. If Lloyd 
George restricted Haig’s freedom of action, the membership of the alliance restricted Lloyd 
George’s freedom of mind even more. He could not opt for optimal solutions, from the 
British point of view only. Before he formed his intentions he had to take the intentions of 
Paris and Washington, into account as well.
4.1.2.1 Conflicting perspectives
The generations that became used to the high-pitched American rhetoric of good and evil 
during the Cold War aru apt to see an alliance as a band, of brothers. Hence the phrase 
entente cordiale is prone to give the wrong impression. Coi'diality is rarely a feature of 
military alliances, as ‘military alliances were, and are not, the same as friendships’.^  ^
Modem readers expect alliances to be sincere, and it is hard to imagine that you could fight 
a war against your biggest enemy in a coalition with your second biggest enemy, or vice
Middlebrook, The Kaiser's Battle. 21 March 1918: The First Day o f the German Spring Offensive (London, 
1983; 1st pub. 1978), 25.
Blake, Haig, 46. Lloyd George’s fear was well founded, since Haig actually asked for a new  offensive in 
Flanders in 1918. Blake, Haig, 278. (7 January 1918)
The BEF was also weakened by the fact that a major reorganisation, dictated by the Cabinet, took place in 
February and eai'ly March 1918. Such ‘re-tailoring’ always causes temporary disorganisation and 
demoralisation, and takes time -  time tire BEF did not have.
Paul Kennedy ‘Military coalitions and coalition warfare over the past century’ in Keith Neilson and Roy A. 
Prete (eds.) Coalition Warfare, An Uneasy Accord (Ontario, 1983), 3.
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versa/^ The point is not that the relationship between Britain and France was especially 
tense; on the contrary.The relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the 
other side of the hill, was maybe even less cordial; ‘Germany became increasingly 
frustrated by Vierma’s refusal to subordinate itself to Berlin as fully as the economic and 
military realities suggested it should. For each power the description of its ally as ’the 
secret enemy’ was appl icable .The  interests of France and Great Britain were not 
congruent, although some of them were overlapping, as for instance the urge to crush the 
German bid for power. Lloyd George's fear was not only that Gennany would win if Haig 
broke the BEF’s back in another ‘Passchendaele’, but also that by doing so Britain would 
become the junior partner to France and tire American latecomers. That consideration was 
not new. Kitchener’s strategic plan, for instance, was probably to wait for the exhaustion of 
the continental armies before committing his own, probably in 1917. The challenge was 
to strike the right balance between national interests and common effort. Quite contrary to 
military horse sense, and the rough-and-ready logic to it, ‘unity of command’ was not the 
way to strike that balance.
The aim of every military coalition is unity o f effort, that’s why it sticks together. 
Regarding the effectiveness of military forces, unity of command is just a means to an end, 
not the end in itself To some this will look like semantic hair-splitting: their idea is 
presumably that unity of command will automatically lead to unity of effort, and in most 
cases that is a sound assumption. But given that the entente cordiale was ‘beset by
Lord Palmerston’s statement in 1848 highlights the perpetual motivation for military alliances; Tt is a 
narrow policy to suppose that this county or that is marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of 
England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no peipetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and 
perpetual.’ Quoted in Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 35.
General William Robertson asserted; T believe [tiie French] aie as good allies as any country could have. I 
merely wish to emphasise the great difficulty there as been and always will be in operations conducted by 
allied armies. It is only natural.’ Robertson to Stamfordham (1 Oct. 1915) quoted in Philpott, Ang/o-Fi'cnc/i 
Relations, 161.
Hew Strachan’s preface to Holger H. Heiwig, The FFst World War% Gennany and Austria-Hungary 1914- 
1915 (London, 1997), xiii.
^  ‘This would enable Britain to shape the subsequent peace process and make sure that the world that 
emerged after the war was in accordance with British interest. German militarism would have been broken, 
and a new balance of power constructed that would serve to keep the British Empire safe from  the attentions 
of her erstwhile allies France and Russia, who might otherwise re-emerge as colonial rivals. ’ Sheffield, 
Forgotten Victory, 66.
™ Politically, unity of command may be an end in itself (for instance for constitutional reasons), and be an 
internal security measure that deliberately hampers the effectiveness of militaiy forces.
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suspicion, antagonism and double-dealing’, unity of command would have caused 
insurmountable friction. The alliance had to find a way to coexist and co-operate despite 
the huge disagreements. The way to do it was simply not to talk about them. If pushed to 
talce a firai stand on controversial issues, the alliance would founder. Hence, a kind of 
‘mutual agi'eement of avoidance’ was soon developed on the Western front.
The philosopher John Rawls’ ideas about ‘Justice as Fairness’ give us a broader 
view on the method of avoidance: ‘To secure this agreement [justice as fairness] we tr}^ , so 
far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, 
questions. We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regai'ded with 
indifference, but because we thinlc them too important and recognise that there is no way to 
resolve them politically. The only alternative to a principle of toleration is the autocratic 
use of state power. Thus, justice as fairness deliberately stays on the surface, 
philosophically speaking!.. .]The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might 
call it, existing differences between contending political views can at least be moderated, 
even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can 
be maintained. ’ Coalition warfare is by definition devoid of ‘autocratic use of state 
power’, and militaiy and ‘social cooperation’ has to be based on toleration, and avoidance. 
The modus operandi of the entente was a wai' by compromise, where some o f  the 
presuppositions were kept secret, or at least ‘under-communicated’.^  ^The challenge was 
how to reap the finit of common effort among parties with incongruent agendas.
Given the endemic friction in coalition warfare, it is usually better to fight side by 
side, than to fight together. The hunt for celebrated synergy effects is often futile at best, if  
not bluntly counterproductive. That was how the entente cordiale prefened to fight the 
war.
To secure unity of effort the allies had to fine-tune the length of the frontline in 
accordance with the number of troops available, and their anticipation of German plans. To 
avoid ‘under-kills’ in one sector, and ‘over-kills’ in another, the generals had to reach an
William Philpott ‘Haig and Britain’s European Allies’ in Bond and Cave, Haig, 129.
John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness; Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 14 no. 3, 
1985), 230-231.
For instance, the full extent of the French Mutinies in spring 1917 was kept secret, for a number of reasons. 
For a supreme commander it was necessary to know that the French were afraid of further offensives, 
something the French were unwilling to admit.
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agreement on how many kilometres of front line each should hold. Although the idea was 
never formally adopted, Haig and Pétain had at the end of 1917 ‘solved’ the problem of 
divided command. Haig wrote in his diary; ‘Pétain showed me a short note which he had 
written on the question of an Allied Commander-in-Chief (à la Hindenburg). It was 
possible amongst Allies only when one Anny was really the dominant one as in the case of 
the Central Powers. Our case was different. The British and French Annies were now in his 
views on an equality. Therefore, he and I must exercise command, and if we disagree, our 
Governments alone can settle the point in dispute. The front should be divided from the 
coast in Flanders to some point to be fixed between us, S. of the Oise, under me; and fi-om 
that point to the Adriatic, under Pétain.’ As seen above, Haig with already more frontline 
than he wanted, was instmcted to extend his line further south by twenty-five miles in 
January 1918.^^
With too few men to cover an increasing fi'ont line, Haig had to take a calculated 
risk. The worst-case scenario for the BEF was to be cut off from the Channel ports. Hence 
Haig had to have sufficient troops north, to secure him against his worst nightmare, even if 
he did not expect the Germans to attack him tliere. The price he had to pay was to dilute his 
line in the south, where the attack probably would conie.^^ The main advantage of this 
oblique solution was that it virtually forced Pétain to help him if the Germans attacked at 
the junction.^^ But Haig could not know for certain that Pétain would volunteer to help if 
necessary. Just a week before Ludendorff s attack, Haig’s staff put down a ‘note on general 
reserves’ containing the following: Tt is recognised, however, that in the conditions which 
prevail in France, it may be well to vest in some central authority the power to order one or 
other of the Commanders-in-Chief to move a portion of his forces to the assistance of 
another Anny, or to attack as a means of relieving the pressure on his neighbour. In the 
case of a divergency of opinion between the Commanders-in-Chief, such an authority may 
be necessary, but to vest in a Committee the power to handle troops, even if such were 
available, which is not now the case, would be to create, in fact, a Generalissimo in the
Blake, Haig, 262 (1 November 1917).
Middlebrook, The Kaiser's Battle, 25.
Gough’s Fifth Amiy had 12 infantry and 3 cavahy divisions to cover 42 miles front. His neighbour, Byng’s 
Third Army, had 28 miles and 14 infantry divisions. General Home, First Army, had 33 miles and 14 infantry 
divisions, and General Plumer’s Second Army in north had 23 miles and 12 divisions. Ibid. 72.
‘The promise of immediate French assistance in the event of an attack had been part of the bargain struck 
when the Fifth Army had taken over the French line south of St Quentin in January.’ Ibid. 276.
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fonn of a Committee. History affords numerous examples of the failures o f such fonns of 
authority. ’ Haig’s fear was probably that Pétain would stand by and watch the BEF 
perish for too long, before coming to his assistance. Therefore, some person should have 
the authority to compel. On the other hand though, Haig fought hard against the idea of 
establishing such an authority before the crisis actually occurred.
Initially, the alliance wanted the Supreme War Council in Versailles to include an 
Executive Committee presiding over an eannarked Allied General Reseiwe, with General 
Foch as the nominated head. Haig resisted this, and thi-eaten to resign if he was forced to 
accept it: ‘Wilson [the new C.I.G.S.] pressed me to earmark certain Divisions as an ‘Inter- 
Allied General Reseiwe. ’ I pointed out that I had only six Divisions under m y hand, and 
with the prospect of an early attack by the enemy, I could not agree to place any of my 
Divisions under the hand of another person, without grave risk to the plans o f  defence 
which had been most cai'efully drawn up in accord with General Pétain and his Staff.
Rather than mn such risk at this time, I would prefer to be relieved of my Command.
Again Lloyd George’s deliberate parsimony had backfired, by giving Haig a good reason 
for declining the establisliment of a general reserve. The motivation for rejection was 
probably that without his own reserves Haig would be out of business. Due to the virtual 
absence of portable radios, all that commanders could do during battles was to commit 
their reseives at the right time and place: hence ‘whoever controlled the Reserves 
controlled the A r m i e s Pétain was also sceptical about making Foch a ‘Generalissimo 
with no troops’, probably because it would push him down the ladder too.
Furthennore, Haig loiew that modem campaigns, such as Third Ypres, took several 
weeks to caixy tlirough. Consequently he would have plenty time to regroup his own 
troops, and if necessary beg for help. In the ‘note on general resenres’ he stated: ‘The 
theory that a reserve should be maintained in the hands of every commander is correct[...] 
To weaken Armies in order to place a general reserve wanting in homogeneity in the hands
O.A.D.776, (12.3.1918), W.O 158/20 ‘General staff notes on operations’.
Blake, Haig, 290 (25 Febmar 1918).
Certainly, there were more substantial arguments against a general reserve. Maurice claims tliat the crisis of 
March 1918 would have been even more serious if there had been such a thing as unity of command over the 
general reserves. ‘[I]n view of Pétain’s contention that the Germans had not made their m ain  effort and that he 
was about to be attacked in force in Champagne, there would certainly have been discussion in the Executive 
War Board before the decision to release die General Reserve for the benefit of the British front was taken.’ 
Sir Frederick Maurice, Z,e5'5'o/î5' o f Allied Co-operation, 131.
Terraine, Haig, 402.
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of a Committee composed of members of different nationalities is a complete 
misunderstanding of the role of a reseive in great modem battles. The modem battle 
between Amiies equally trained and amied and of equal resolution is not generally an affair 
of two or tlrree days, but is a prolonged struggle lasting for weeks and perhaps for 
months .Yea i ' s  of experience told Haig that the next battle would be a ‘prolonged 
stmggle’. Hence, there would be plenty of time to improvise necessary.
In addition to the countemieasures mentioned above, i.e. preparing to regroup his 
own troops and to ‘borrow’ French divisions if necessary, Haig decided to introduce a 
novelty in the 5^  ^Anny, which held the southem section, called ‘defence in depth’. With a 
bit of luck it would enhance their resilience, and give Haig even more time to carry out the 
prepared countemioves. Unfortunately, as we shall see below, all three pillars of Haig’s 
plan were rotten.
Although close to an oxymoron, the conclusion of this chapter is simple. On the 
Western front, unity of effort was sought through disunity of command.
4.1.2.2 Plan Fetishism
One way to get one’s intentions adopted in an organisation is to pin them down in a written 
plan. Chapter 2 claimed that plans often resemble the monster of Frankenstein, as a plan 
initially is an aid to M fil your intentions, but soon your intentions will be to carry out the 
plan. It is easy to understand why the belligerents of the Great War focused on military 
plans. Literally mountains of supplies had to be moved in accordance with the movements 
of hundred of thousands of troops, and devastating artillery-, and later, air-support had to 
be coordinated with the infantry’s movement across no man’s land. The problem was not 
the multitude as such, but the fact that the generals lacked adequate means o f  directing it. 
That the BEF had the agility of a sledgehammer was mainly a consequence o f  the disparity 
between the ability to destroy and the ability to command. Without portable radios all 
armies in the Great War moved in syrup.Comprehensive plans, mostly worked out at 
subordinate levels, were the only feasible way through the dense fog of war.®"^
O.A.D, 776. (12.3.1918), W.O. 158/20 ‘General staff notes on operations’.
‘The era of tlie First World War stands as the only period in history in which high commanders were mute.’ 
Sheffield Forgoffen Victory, 99.
It is easy to be awe-struck by the high ambitions and courage of mind that the Germans showed tlrrough 
their trials m th Auftragstaktik, but the result was questionable. ‘Yet some Gemian officers w ere then 
concerned about the dysphasia that had appeared when microbattles fought by lower level commanders under
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Accordingly, Haig had obviously made his preparations to meet the anticipated 
attack in March 1918, In fact he was afraid that he was too well prepared for it. When the 
Intelligence Officer, Brigadier-General E, W. Cox, told him in early March that he expected 
the enemy to ‘attack the fronts of our Third and Fifth Armies’, Haig wrote in his diary: T 
was only afraid that the enemy would find our front so veiy strong that he will hesitate to 
commit his Army to the attack with the almost certainty of losing very h e a v i l y . W h e n  
the plan to meet the attack was finished, Haig’s duty as Commander-in-Chief was 
apparently over: ‘Not that my actual presence in France at the moment of attack is 
necessary because all reserves and other questions such as moving up troops to support 
have already been settled. But on general principles, I ought to be with the Anny when the 
battle is active.
It is common knowledge that while it is much more important to command than to 
control, most political and military leaders end up doing the latter, iiTespective of historic 
epoch, or their place in the chain of command.What  is more easily forgotten is that 
soldiering also presupposes authoritative plans and a recognised chain of command. No 
one has illustrated this point more convincingly than the soldier and philosopher J. Glenn 
Gray:
As an ‘arm’ and not the ‘head’ of the state, the professional soldier 
often prides himself on being nonpolitical. This fi'ees him, he feels, 
to act in war without regard for consequences other than the military.
Responsibility must be clearly defined and portioned out; it is always 
a matter for angry puzzlement on his part that such definition and 
appoitiomnent are rai'ely possible in actual combat. As a specialist in  
warfai'e, he wants none of the half-light and dubiety of morals and 
politics in his profession. He desires to be under orders and to know 
what is expected of him all the time. Since war is so much simpler i f
the principle of selbstandigkeit (independence of initiative) warped operations out of alignment with the 
intent of higher commanders and staffs, especially in placing unanticipated demands on reserves. Some of 
those Prussian military theorists anticipated the dilemma that unhinged von Schheffen’s grand maneuver 
scheme in 1914 as they grappled widi the tension between ‘ground truth’ and ‘the big picture*. They 
formulated a ’Law of the Situation,’ but did not resolve the basic quandary, nor could they foresee either the 
scale or the ramifications of the impending extension of combat in time, space, and velocity on land, at sea, 
and in the air.’ Roger A. Beaumont, War, Chaos, and History (London, 1994), 9.
Blake, Haig, 291 (2 March 1918)
Haig to Lady Haig 20 March, National Libraiy of Scotland (NLS) ACC 3155/164 ‘Extracts of letters to 
Lady Haig March F  1918 -  May T' 1918’
‘[It is] a tradition deeply ingrained in the whole Army.. .that the chief task of each rank is not the doing of 
the work of that rank, but the controlling of the work of the ranks below.’ L.S.Amery The Problem o f the 
Army (London, 1903) Quoted in Martin Samuels, Command or Control?, 94.
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played according to rules, he yearns for the security and stability of 
formal principles in fighting.^®
The conclusion of this section is that the chain of command is a kind of totem that eases 
the existential anguish of the bloodstained soldier. Plan fetishism is most often accounted 
for as the dysfunction of military control-ffealcs. The urge from below for something finn 
to stick to is often forgotten. Haig’s plan to meet the anticipated German attack became 
obsolete in a couple of hours. By default he had to hand over the initiative to lower 
echelons, as ‘Haig's headquarters broke down in an avalanche of orders and 
coun te rorde r sHow did the BEF cope with this newly acquired freedom of action?
4,1.3 Dissemination
So far we have seen how Lloyd George enhanced and preserved political authority in the 
midst of a war, and we have seen how heterogeneous interests within the entente cordiale 
curtailed the ingenuity of strategy, and how basic human needs restrict the elasticity of the 
military hierarchy. Much has been said about telephonitis and the vulnerability of 
entrenched wires during the Great War. I will not elaborate on such topics in this essay, 
even if they are highly relevant. I will first analyse the British Army’s ability for 
coordinated action on a larger scale, witliout communication or valid plans. Could they 
perfomi isomorphic actions'} Thereafter I will look at the ‘gamut’, or the relationship 
between the need for command and control, and what could actually be ‘delivered’.
4.1.3.1 Isomorphic actions
During civilian disasters, as for instance car crashes or derailments, a remarkably well- 
organised cooperation appears. Without any formal authority taking chai'ge, and without 
any published procedures, people who lack fonnal education, and who are strangers to each 
other, co-operate to rescue victims, support the injured, etc., until the professional rescuers
J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors, Reflections on Men in Battle (New York, 1998; 1st pub, 1959), 143.
Herwig, The First World War, 405.
Martin van Creveld argues that many officers ‘fell victim to telephonitis, a tendency by higher headquarters 
to interfere in every small detail simply because it was easily done’. Creveld, Command in War, 169. 
However, what they achieved by that was questionable: ‘While men were being mowed down by the 
thousands, the staff, immersed in their routine, found nothing better to do than to seiwe warning concerning 
the effect of verdigris on vennorel sprayers or the need to keep pets out of the trenches.’ Ibid. 166.
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arrive. Without diving into social psychology as such, we can conclude that most people 
have an ability to improvise cooperation and ‘self-organise’ on a lai'ge scale, based on some 
sort of inferred puipose of action. In an armed force, as for instance the British Army, 
where people ai'e laiown to each other, and standard operational procedures are prepared, 
one should expect that the sophistication of isomoiphic actions would outperfomi the 
improvised civilian group effort mentioned above. Strange as it may seem, one of the major 
purposes of a military hierarchy has traditionally been to eradicate that very ability. Too 
adventurous and self-reliant soldiers could be a bigger thi'eat to their own society and 
officers than to the enemy.
Regardless of whether the industrialised city dwellers of 1914 were untrustworthy 
or obtuse, or whether the army only needed simpletons due to mechanical ‘timetable 
tactics’, the consequence was that ‘individuality was systematically stamped out of the 
recmit’, and the ability to undertake isomoiphic actions, based on their own initiative, 
crumbled.Consequently, the British inability to adapt was a major cause o f  error during 
the first pait of the war.^^
In March 1918, the BEF had been in the field for almost four yeai's and Great 
Britain now used conscription to fill the ranks. The BEF of 1914 was irrevocably gone, and 
the ‘Anny of March 1918’ looked different: ‘[It] was an hybrid anny. There were a few 
Regulars, more New Anny volunteers, and many conscripts. It was a tired and war-weaiy 
army. The veterans in it had seen many of their friends die in past years -for what? Victoiy 
seemed as far away as ever.’^ "^ As a consequence of Lloyd George’s refusal to give Haig 
more men, Haig had to teach this bunch of soldiers to fight defensive battles; a new skill to 
most of them, as the BEF had not done it since the autumn of 1914.
Haig knew from first hand experience over the last three years how difficult it was 
to penetrate the Gennan lines. Hence he ‘decided that the BEF would use the German
Cohen and Gooch, Military) Misfortunes, 161.
‘The complete hypnotization of the soldiers by their officers was looked on as the ideal o f  training. 
Discipline supplied the place of courage, and intentionally superseded both reason and will. ’ Aniery, The 
Problem o f the Army, quoted in Samuels, Command or Control?, 118.
‘In military terms, ‘adapting’ can be defined as identifying and taking full advantage of the  opportunities 
offered by enemy actions or by chance combinations of circumstances to win success or to stave off failure.’ 
Cohen and Goodd, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy ofFaihme in War, 161.
Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, 338.
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doctrine against the Genuans t h e m s e l v e s I t  is outside the scope of this thesis to analyse 
how the BEF actually transformed the Gennans’ ‘defence in depth’ to meet British needs, 
or the built-in hazard of converting militaiy ideas across different military cultures. 
Nevertheless, the ‘re-education’ of the BEF was difficult as the ossification of the British 
amiy was almost beyond cure,^  ^hi fact it was not used to ‘prefabricated’ doctrines at all.
The word ‘doctrine’ is one of those words that can mean everything or nothing. 
Does, for instance, a doctrine imply prescription of military actions, or just a conceptual 
checklist for militaiy professionals? Does it actually have to be verbalised and authorised 
tlirough regulations, or could it just be an unconsidered but nevertheless shared tacit 
Icnowledge? On which military level does it operate, and does it imply all weapons? It is 
obviously impossible to give a comprehensive analysis of the use of a doctrine, or cognate 
devices, in the BEF during the early twentieth centuiy, but it is possible to make some 
statements.
On the tactical level the BEF had something resembling a prescriptive doctrine 
during the war, in tlie way that the daily life of British soldiers was relatively 
homogeneous, regardless of where they seived at the front. To be under command, and 
follow rules were not unique to militaiy servi ce. On a higher level there was also some 
sort of a doctrine that gave the commanders compai'able ways of thinldng about warfare. 
The problem, though, was that the British Army had evolved such a ‘frame o f  mind’ more 
by accident than by design, and it was difficult to change it deliberately as result of new 
experiences.^^ British generals’ tacit laiowledge about warfai'e was at least as good as their 
foreign colleagues’ after nearly four years of war, but their focal knowledge about their
Samuels, Command or Control?, 202.
‘The years of french warfare, the necessaiy issue of lengthy orders entering into meticulous detail, and the 
rehearsal of attacks over a marked-out practice course with fairly well-defined objectives, h ad  produced an 
army wliich was prepared to stand enomious losses uncomplainingly, but was practically de-void of real 
tactical sense.’ The Official History quoted in Teiraine, To Win a War, 202.
‘[Fjor the lad from a factory, the military society was not entirely unfamiliar. Its mles w ere enforced more 
sfrictly and for twenty four hours a day.’ Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham Fire-power : British Amiy 
Weapons and Theories o f War 1904-1945 (London, 1982), 119. To middle class men, though, the life in the 
Eirmy could certainly be hai'der to get accustomed to.
^  ‘The staff still [January 1918] thought of the Araiy as an infantry supported by other arm s. Unfortunately 
much of the infantry still fought in the frame of mind it had acquired in the earlier years.’Ibid. 139.
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practice was comparatively poor er . In  our case, to base isomorphic actions on a new 
doctrine was questionable, due to the British ambivalence towards the device, and their 
inability deliberately to change the rules. Tim Travers’ obseivations give us a convincing 
picture of the British attitudes towards formally elaborated doctrines; ‘The officer corps 
was traditionally conservative and often anti-intellectual, in line with Edwmdian upper 
middle-class prejudices, and this is reflected in a typical, although not total, rejection of 
doctrine. This anti-intellectualism had something to do with class attitudes, something to 
do with Social Darwinism, something to do with Victorian empiricism, and something to 
do with nineteenth-century colonial warfare.
The conclusion of this chapter is that despite the fact that the BEF obviously had 
improved its war fighting ability considerably during years of continuously fighting, its 
skills in the type of operations that loomed was dub i ous . Gi ven  tlrat the BEF was an 
apprentice in defensive operations, Haig’s role as master became more important than ever. 
How well did he cope?
4.1.3.2 A gamut in harmony?
Martin Samuels states that the British Army employed two ‘mutually contradictory’ 
command systems, termed ‘umpiring’ and ‘restrictive control’, where restrictive control is 
a ‘system in which subordinates are given orders which lay down their actions in detail and 
must be obeyed regardless of circumstances’, and umpiring is the ‘practice in  which an 
officer abdicates his command responsibilities’.^ ^^  The consequence o f ‘restrictive control’ 
is the loss of low-level adaptability, while the price o f ‘umpiring’ is deprivation of badly 
needed ‘triggers’ and steering signals.
A professional golf player has great tacit knowledge about how to play golf, he plays it w e ll But his focal 
knowledge, or his ability to put his tacit knowledge into words may be almost zero, as he cannot explain liis 
playing.
Tim Travers, The Killing Ground. The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence o f Modern 
Warfare 1900-1918 (London: 1987), 38.
‘[L]ower commanders were as unfamiliar with the problems of rapid movement to the rear as they had 
shown themselves to be with those rapid advance at Cambrai; the Army itself was utterly untrained and 
unprepared for this sort of fighting.’ Terraine, Haig, 414,
Samuels, Command or Control?, 49. As ‘umpiring’ and ‘directive control’ look similar' o n  the outside, 
they can be hard to distinguish: ‘While superficially similar, the decentralising inherent in umpiring is very 
different from tliat employed in directive control. The umpire often avoids ‘interfering’ out o f  an excessive 
respect for the feelings and reputation of the subordinate. The relationship between the umpire and his 
subordinate may be considered more important than the successful attainment of the objective. 
Decentralisation therefore becomes an end in itself. In directive command, tlie decentralisation of decision 
maldng is purely a means towards tlie end of fulfilling the higher intent most effectively.’ Ibid. 51.
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Haig vacillated between the two styles of command. The British Army 
commanders, or the ‘Wicked Barons’, subsequently become confused and at times 
paralysed by Haig’s unpredictable oscillation between the aloof setting of overall strategy 
and intervention in details at a tactical level. By that he unwittingly created a command 
vacuum that hampered military efficiency considerably. Nevertheless, his remoteness 
seems to have been a bigger problem than too restrictive control.
According to John Keegan, Haig’s aloofness was almost ridiculous: ‘Even at 
Montreuil he preseived an Olympian detachment fi'om the work of the staff; one of them 
recalls that, as a special concession, staff officers were allowed to leave their desks to 
watch him ride in and out fi'om his office provided they did not show themselves at the 
windows. Haig’s residence was not even in Montreuil; he prefeired to seclude himself from 
its relative hurly-burly at the château of Beaurepaire some ten miles away in the heart of 
the count ryside .Nei ther  Travers nor Keegan is a gi'eat admirer of Haig, but even John 
Terraine, his most distinguished ‘defence counsel’, questioned Haig’s seclusion: ‘[Haig 
was], if anything, over-scrupulous about the rights and responsibilities of subordinates; it 
was practically a sacred principle with him to leave to Ai-my and Corps commanders a fi-ee 
hand, and to interfere as little as possible once a course of action had been d e c i d e d . T h e  
inlierited impracticability of the umpiring system was amplified by the fact that the ‘chief 
umpire’, Douglas Haig, was extraordinarily tongue-tied. Given Haig’s style of laissez 
faire, his ‘inability to communicate’ could be fatal. It was easy to get on the wrong foot 
from the start, due to incoherence and lack of eloquence, and then to continue to stumble 
due to the insistence on the ‘rights of subordinates’. Lets look a bit closer at just one of 
those occasions, related to our case.
Haig assumed that a section of 5* Anny’s fi'ont was ‘impassable’ due to the 
obstacles of the River Oise and its mai'shes.^^  ^As a consequence Haig apportioned his 
troops based on the assumption that 12 miles of Gough’s 40 mile front were ‘not likely to
Tim Travers paraphrased in Peter Simkins, ‘Haig and his Army Commanders’ in Bond and  Cave, Haig,
94.
John Keegan, The Mask o f Command (London, 1987), 334.
Terraine. Haig, 179.
‘“ ibid. 179.
Ten-aine, Haig, 410.
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be the scene of a serious hostile attack’. But General Gough, commanding 5^  ^Army, no 
longer shared that interpretation. He understood the significance of the arrival of the 
Gennan General Oskar von Hutier on the other side of the front, and told his commanders: 
‘in view of the fact that the battle of Riga was opened by the enemy (von Hutier) forcing 
the passage of the Duna, that section of the line guarded by the Oise should not be 
considered as immune from a t t a c k . A s  Gough had predicted, but not managed to convey 
to his superior, an absolutely ‘serious attack’ did hit him in his soft underbelly, with a 
disastrous effect, as we will se below. Terraine explains: ‘Here again one meets one of 
those peculiar failures of communication which haunted relations between the Fifth Amiy 
and the G.,H.Q.[.]’ ’^^  How peculiar could that failure be, given Haig’s style of leadership?
To encapsulate: what did the British authority over distance look like when the 
Kaiserschlacht broke loose on 21 March 1918? First, the strong man on the British side 
was in London; the British Commander-in-Chief was severely weakened. Nevertheless, the 
political dirigibility was still dubious, because the militaiy arm itself had been relentlessly 
damaged in the ‘turf war’. Furthemiore, unity of command, which apparently eveiybody 
wanted, was out of reach, due to both incongment agendas and personal aspirations among 
the generals. Moreover, the obsession with plans among senior officers, and the addiction 
for them in the lower echelons, tightened a finn strait)acket around the BEF. The 
commanders who would handle this toipidity in a new condition of an unpredictable 
defensive warfare ought to have been clearly visible to troops in desperate need of 
guidance. But given the ominous aloofness of British generalship, they remained virtually 
invisible.^
The British command and control layout had during four years of trial and error 
been tailor-made for offensive attrition waiTare, more by accident than by design.
Suddenly, the ability to take low-level initiative, devoid of directions and pre-planned 
artillery schedules, became more important than to carry out orders. BEF was not
Ibid. 410.
Goagh to his Corps Commanders, 3 Febmaiy 1918. Ibid. 410.
Ibid. 410.
‘ ‘ * ‘Few men saw their commanding officer that day [21 March] and many never saw any officer at all[...] A 
sergeant or second lieutenant might have appeared for a mhiute, told them to ’hang on, lads’ , and disappeared 
again[.. .]No one had bothered to explain to him tlie finer points of ’defence in depth’; all h e  knew was that 
once the Germans got in behind him he was caught like a rat in a trap.’ Middlebrook, The K a iser’s Battle, 
335.
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accustomed to ‘a platoon commander’s war’.^ ^^  The consequence were inevitable; a 
horrendous German breakthrough.
4,2 Die Kaiserschlacht
hi this chapter we will first look at the short week between 21 and 26 March; thereafter we 
will naiTOw down on the meeting at Doullens.
As said earlier, the German offensive was expected. After the fall o f Russia 
everybody understood that Germany would tiy to win the wai* ‘before America can throw 
strong forces into the scale’.^ ^^  Based on the inteiTOgation of prisoners, air reconnaissance 
and ‘numerous successful raids’, Haig Imew almost exactly where and when the strike 
would fall, as did the Cabinet in London. Hence, Thursday 21 March, when the 
Kaiserschlacht started, was apparently just another day at the office for Haig, while Friday 
was a rather exciting one: ‘All reports show that our men are in gi'eat spirits. All speak of 
the wonderful targets they had to fire at yesterday. Enemy came on in great masses.
Haig sent telegi'ams of congratulations both to his men and to Pétain, who according to 
their agreement had come to his ass i s tance.But  he also heard from Gough that ‘parties 
of all aims of the enemy are thi'ough our Reseive Line’, and that ‘certain Msh units did 
very badly and gave way immediately the enemy showed’. W h e n  we reach Saturday 23 
Mai'ch, there was no longer any doubt about the seriousness of the Gennan attempt. 5^ ^
112 The plirase is Haig’s. Quoted in Terraine, To Win a War, 202.
Ludendorff quoted in Keegan, The Fi?‘sf World JVar, 393.
T am glad that the attack has begun at last, because our men are eager for it and have been expecting it for 
some time. I was beginning to be afraid if the attack did not come till later that our men might have become 
stale from expecting and preparing for so long. But they ai*e in the best spirits now, and I have eveiy 
confidence that the enemy will get more than he anticipates when his Infantiy does attack. The enemy’s 
attacks seem to be coming exactly against the points on our front which we expected, and where we ai'e 
prepared to meet him. Our information thanks to our numerous successful raids, has been veiy good.’ Haig’s 
letter to his wife March 21. NLS ACC 3155/164, ‘ Extracts of letters to Lady Haig March 1918 -  May 1 
1918’. On the 2 F ‘ General Wilson infonned the cabinet of the attack, and stated tliat the ‘front of attack was 
in general accord with the one anticipated by the British Staff at Versailles’. CAB 23 War Cabinet 369.
Blalce, Haig, 296. (22 March 1918). To his wife he wrote on the 22" :  ‘You will see we had a great battle 
yesterday and have done very well. Reports this morning state that our men are in great heart, and had very 
good targets yesterday. It was a case of ‘kill, kill, all day long[.. .]How absurd it seems tliat I  should have 
been troubled about forming a General Reserve last week, when events of such magnitude were so imminent. 
It is well that I remained fhm then. ’ NLS ACC 3155/164 ‘Extracts of letters to Lady Haig M arch F ‘ 1918 -  
May F  1918.’
‘My deal- General, I beg to thanlc you for the prompt manner in which you are despatching three divisions 
in support of the right flank of the British forces. I feel sure that tlie close and cordial co-operation of the 
French and the British troops in the great battle which has developed will have a decisive influence on the 
course of tlie operations and lead to the defeat of the enemy. Yours veiy tmly (sd. D.Haig) Field-Marshal’. 
PRO WO 256/28 (Haig’s diaiy March 1918.) O.A.D. 781, 22 March, 1918
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Army was apparently on the run, suddenly Gough’s troops were behind the Somme, and 
Haig could not ‘make out why the Fifth Anny has gone so far back without making some 
kind of stand
As mentioned above, all three of Haig’s assumptions were false. First of all, it 
would not be a ‘prolonged struggle’ after all. Haig had anticipated that Ludendorff would 
use ‘unconventional tactics’, in the fonn of Stofltrupptaktik and durchfrefien. But he did 
not expect him to break the ‘golden rule’ on the operational level, which was to feint an 
attack to connnit the enemy reserve before the launch of the ‘real’ attack, Haig particularly 
was not to blame for that mistake. Pétain did the same, waiting for the big push to come in 
Champagne, and Wilson’s lectures to the War Cabinet revealed the same stereotypic 
outlook.’ Hence, both Haig and Pétain were reluctant to move reserves towards Amiens 
in the early stage, because that would be the capital mistake to make, if only Ludendorff 
had played by the mles. But this time Ludendorff was forced to break the scheme. He 
decided to play the ‘last card’, against the advice from several of his high-ranking 
commanders, who seriously questioned the anny’s ability to sustain a major offensive in 
the coming year. He had neither time nor resources for more than one big push, before 
the presence of the Americans would be too ovei-whehning for the battle-weary 
Gennans.’^ ’ Ludendorff decided to focus on the tactics of the battle, and to let the strategy 
of the war* follow: ‘I object to the word ‘operation’. We will punch a hole into [their line]. 
For tire rest, we shall see.’ Ludendorff came with almost all he had on the first day, and 
thereby almost ‘managed to get through a revolving door held open for tlrem with sufficient 
force to burst the door clean off its pivot’. H a i g ’s eaidier concerns, of being too strong,
Blake, Haig, 296. (22 Mai'ch 1918)
"Ubid. 296. (23 March 1918)
‘ ‘[Wilson] was of opinion that the attack would develop into a long-drawn battle deliberately intended for a 
trial of strength, in order that a decisive result might be arrived at.’ CAB 23 WC 370, Marchi 22,
Herwig The First World War, 394.
‘Having heard his subordinates out, [Ludendorff] announced that Gennan sti'ength sufficed for only one 
great blow[.]’ Keegan, The First World War, 393.
Ludendorff quoted in Holger H. Herwig ‘The German Victories, 1917-1918’ in Hew Strachan (ed.), F/rrf 
World War, A History (Oxford, 1998), 260. In his Memoirs Ludendorff explained; ‘Tactics had to be placed 
above pure strategy. Witliout result on the tactical level, tliere is nothing left of strategy. A strategy that does 
not take the tactical results into account is bound to lead to nothing. The attacks of tlie enters te during the first 
three years of war give ample examples.’ Ludendorff s War memoir's. (Copenhagen, 1919), 408.
Denis Winter, iïb îg ’r Comma/riZ Fearrm m ent (Loudon, 1992; 1st pub. 1991), 182,
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proved to be ridiculous, and later caused Lord Beaverbrook to state that Haig committed 
suicide 25 years after his death, when Blake published his diary in 1952.’^ '’
As we know, Ludendorff eventually ended up by unleashing a number of attacks 
during the spring and early summer of 1918, but this was not his initial plan. Hence, the 
attack on the 2 1 ®^ was initially launched as a mammoth wai'-wimiing onslaught, far 
exceeding Haig’s expectation, but turned into just another battle, in a ‘conventional’ 
sequence of battles, due to Ludendorff s lack of a comprehensive strategic scheme.’’’^  
Haig’s second pillar, ‘defence in depth’, proved also to be a grave mistake. 
According to Martin Middlebrook the British defences were not strong enough, and had 
not been properly trained for it, with the result that the troops did not fully understand their 
new role.’^^  The BEF was used to fight in line, and did not cope well with the new 
redoubts, or ‘bird cages’, of the ‘ defence in depth.’ It was virtually impossible to make 
‘some kind of stand’. A platoon sergeant who was wounded and taken prisoner later stated: 
‘I must confess that the Gennan breakthrough on 21 March 1918 should never have 
occuired. There was no cohesion of command, no detennination, no will to fight, and no 
unity of companies or of bat tal ions.Obviously many soldiers fought bravely and with 
great determination, but the overall impression was that many were ‘rather ashamed of 
what had happened’.
Haig’s third pillar, French support, broke as well. As mentioned earlier, French 
assistance in the event of an attack was a part of the bargain struck when the Fifth Anny 
took over the lines. Subsequently some French divisions came ‘surprisingly quickly’ to 
British aid, but not as many as expected.’"^  By Saturday, the 23’^’, it was obvious that 
France had to take a bigger share of the burden. They had taken over the line as far as St. 
Simon, but it was ‘hoped that they would take over very shortly along the line of the
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, ‘Book review of Winter’s Haig’s Command', Journal o f  the Australian 
War Memorial, 23 (October 1993).
‘Ludendorff s original scheme to deliver a single, powerful blow against British strength gave way to a 
series of small attacks with limited objectives against both the British and the French. In the process, 
Ludendorff weakened the momentum of the entire assault. ‘ Herwig, The First World War, 407.
Middlebrook The Kaiser’s Battle, 329.
Ibid. 323.
Ibid. 333.
Ibid. 277.
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Somme as far as Ham, and later as far as Péronne’.’^ ® The Cabinet in London had a 
discussion whether they should ‘put any political pressure’ on the French Government in 
order to urge them to do more, but decided to wait until Haig had had a meeting with 
Pétain.’^’
The meeting with Pétain took place at 4 p.m., on the 23^ '^ , and Haig was quite 
satisfied: ‘P[étain] seems most anxious to do all he can to support me and agrees that the 
only principle which should guide us in our movements is to keep the two Armies in 
t o u c h . Pétain on his side was anxious about the British willingness to keep the armies 
united: ‘[I]t is we who have to stretch out our hand to him, and we are stretching too 
wide.. .we are stretching too wide. It is dangerous. Douglas Haig is fleeing fi*om Pétain [to 
cover his bases], one might say, and the unity of action which had been hinted at does not 
e x i s t . Pétain had indirectly been ‘blackmailed’ to take a gi'eater responsibility at the 
junction between British and French troops, by the deliberately weakening o f  the British 
troops in the ai-ea. But now Haig’s oblique order of battle, i.e. his dilution o f  the forces 
adjacent to Pétain’s troops, suddenly boomeranged. The BEF could not hold long enough 
for the French Anny to ‘rescue’ them, as the Gennans came too fast,
Haig’s gambling, forced upon'him by Lloyd George’s inability to follow a coherent 
strategy, turned out disastrously. Holger H. Herwig’s words encapsulate the dimensions 
of the catastrophe and the reasons for it:
Colonel Kirke to tlie Wai* Cabinet. WC 371 (March 23). Colonel Kirke, of tlie General Staff, had been on 
a ‘fact finding mission’ at G.H.Q after order by Lloyd George, who was not satisfied with the  information- 
flow from G.H.Q,
‘It had to be remembered, however, that tlie French were themselves, expecting an attack: in Champagne, 
and we must not be too gi'eat in demand upon them until the situation tiiere was cleai*er. [ ...]  The question 
was tlien raised as to whether it was necessary to put any political pressure on the French Government to 
render us the necessary assistance, and it was suggested that tlie Prune Minister or some other Member of tlie 
Wai* Cabinet might proceed to Paris for the puipose. The Wai* Cabinet had no reason to suppose that the 
French would show any reluctance, and decided -  That the question of putting political pressure on the 
French Government need not arise until the result of Field-Mai'shal Sir Douglas Haig's conference with 
General Pétain was known,’ CAB 23, WC 371 ( March 23)
Blake, Haig, 296 (24 March 1918)
Herbillon (’expressing the views of the General’) quoted in Richard Griffiths, Marshal Pétain  (London, 
1970), 66.
‘The British anny in the First World War was battling for the ability to shape strategy o r , at a minimum, 
to give a coherent body of strategic advice which the government might then accept or reject in the light of its 
political priorities. The nature of the war -  the fact that waging it permeated every facet of national life and in 
the end subordinated, at least for its duration, the principles of liberalism and democracy to its demand -  
rendered uncertain the precise boundaries of what constituted proper military concerns.’ Strachan, The 
Politics o f The British Army, 143.
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111 2 days, Ludendorffs ‘mobile’ and ‘attack’ divisions had 
decimated Gough’s Fifth Army and driven the British almost 40 
miles behind the Somme and the Crozat Canal. Haig had lost 200 
000 killed and wounded, 90 000 prisoners of war, and 1300 guns. 
Most importantly, his defences had been mptured, a 50-mile gap 
driven through the lines. ‘Open field’ lay aheead of the Gennans, 
The British had attempted to adobt the ‘elastic defence in depth’ 
without really understaning it, were not used to being on the 
defensive, and had failed to defend the marshy Oise region of 
Gough’s thinly-deployed Fifth Anny.^^^
4.3 Doullens
According to Haig, the road to Doullens started on the night of Sunday the 24^ ,^ after a
meeting with Pétain.
Pétain struck me as very much upset, almost unbalanced and most 
anxious. I explained my plans as above [thin down Pluiner’s fi'ont, 
and concentrate at the Somme], and asked him, to concentrate as 
large a force as possible about Amiens astiide the Somme to co­
operate on my right. He said he expected every moment to be 
attacked in Champagne and he did not believe that the main German 
blow had yet been delivered. He said he would give Fayolle all his 
available troops. He also told me that he had seen the latter to-day at 
Montdidier where the French Reseives are now collecting and had 
directed him (Fayolle) in the event of the Gennan advance being 
pressed still further, to fall back south westwards towards Beauvais 
in order to cover Paris. It was at once clear to me that the effect o f  
this order must be to separate the French from the British right flank 
and so allow the enemy to penetrate between the two annies. I a t 
once asked Pétain if he meant to abandon my right flank. He nodded 
assent and added ‘it is the only thing possible, if the enemy 
compelled the Allies to fall back still further.’ From my talk with.
Pétain I gathered that he had recently attended a Cabinet Meeting in  
Paris and that his orders from his Government are to 'cover Paris a t  
all costs On the other hand, to keep in touch with British Army is  
no longer the basic principle of French strategy. In my opinion, our 
Aimy’s existence in France depends on keeping the British and 
French Annies united. So I hurried back to my Headquarters a t 
Beaurepaire Château to report the serious change in French strategy 
to the C.I.G.S. and Secretary of State for War, and ask them to come 
to France.
Monday, March 25. Lawrence at once left me to telegraph to Wilson 
(C.I.G.S London) requesting him and Lord Milner to come to France
135 Herwig, The First World War, 406.
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at once in order to airange that General Foch or some other 
detennined General who would fight, should be given supreme 
control of the operations in France. I Imew Foch’s strategical ideas 
were in eonfonnity with the orders given me by Lord Kitchener 
when I became C. in C. and that he was a man of great courage and 
decision as shown during the fighting at Ypres in October and 
November 1914.^^^
On Tuesday, 26 March, the allies gathered for a conference in Doullens, to discuss the 
serious situation. The conference was attended for the French by President Raymond 
Poincaré, who presided, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, Louis Loucheur, the French 
Minister of Amiaments, Foch, Pétain and Foch’s Chief of Staff, General Maxime 
Weygand. And on the British side: Lord Milner, member of the War Cabinet, Haig,
Wilson, General Sir Herbert Lawrence, and General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, 
representing General Hemy Rawlinson, the British Military Member at Versailles. The 
proceedings began by Haig explaining his actions on the British front, and he concluded by 
saying that he had placed the Fifth Army under ‘the orders of Pétain’, who at once broke in 
with ‘Alas, it no longer really exists, it is broken’. T h e n  Pétain continued, after a heated 
intermezzo with Wilson over the state of the British Anny, to account for his actions. He 
agreed that Amiens should be held, but refused to make any guarantees, allegedly causing 
Foch to add: ‘We must fight in front of Amiens, we must fight where we are now. As we 
have not been able to stop the Gennans on the Somme, we must not now retire a single 
inch.’^^® Then something remarkable happened as Haig replied; ‘If General Foch will 
consent to give me his advice, I will gladly follow it.’^^  ^This Milner and Clemenceau took 
as their cue, and they retired into a comer, consequently brealdng the meeting up into small 
groups. Clemenceau drafted and proposed a fonnal agreement, entrusting to Foch: ‘the co­
ordination of the action of the British and French Armies in fi'ont of A m i e n s A g a i n  
Haig amazed his auditors by refusing to accept the proposal. ‘This proposal seemed to me 
quite woithless as Foch would be in a subordinate position to Pétain and myself. In my 
opinion, it was essential to success that Foch should control Pétain; so I at once
Blake, Haig, 297 (24-25 Mairch 1918). 
Maurice, Lessons o f Allied Co-operation, 132. 
Quoted in Terraine, Haig, 423.
Ibid. 423.
' ‘^ Hbid. 423.
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recomiTiended that Foch should co-ordinate the action o f all the Allied Armies on the 
Western Both GovemiTLents consented, and with a stroke Haig had made Foch
virtually Generalissimo,
One of the most fateful hours of the war was over/"^  ^The crisis was solved by 
Haig’s unexpected feat of valour. Haig was no great admirer of either French generals or 
the principle of unity of command under any other general than himself, but Pétain’s 
defeatism had convinced him that he had to sacrifice some principles to get the Alliance a 
French general that would actually fight. In a letter to Foch after the war, he was quite 
franlc: ‘Lord Milner and General Wilson arrived on the 25*, and it was then agreed that in 
order to prevent the separation of the French and British Armies it was essential that you 
should be appointed at once to the Supreme Command. I personally pressed for this.[...] 
On these facts, I thinlc I can fairly claim that the initiative in the matter was mine! It was a 
privilege the credit for which I cannot abandon to anyone . Accord ing  to John Tenaine 
Haig’s claim was warranted; ‘Haig’s role in the appointment of Foch was crucial[.]’ "^^'^
The story above is the one we find if we read Haig’s diary, Edmonds ’ official 
accounts, or the books by such modem historians as John Terraine and William Philpott.^"^  ^
The problem, though, is that this stoiy is pure fiction, based on conceit, blatant lies and 
national pride. Haig’s account not only misrepresents, as most memoirs probably do, it is 
also flatly false. In Lloyd George’s words; ‘[I]t is only human that he [Haig] should search 
out apologies which cover up his own mistalces. But he has gone beyond, outside and often 
right across the facts.’ It is a harsh conclusion, but if we take a closer look at the files, 
there is no other to draw. In the following I will try to reveal what actually happened, I
Blake jfmg, 298 (26 Maivh 1918).
Historians, knowing what happened after Douilens, often designate The Second Battle o f  Marne, in niid- 
July, as the turning point of the war. From then on it was one-way traffic towards the Gennan border, even if 
the casualties on both sides remained high throughout.
Letter to Foch 2^  ^September 1919. NLS, ACC 3155 No.216h (coiTcspondence about British-French 
relations)
Terraine Haig, 424.
‘Now Haig exposed the better side of his nature. At the moment of greatest danger he was willing to 
sacrifice his own personal interests to ensure tlie cohesion of tlie alliance. To ensure co-ordination he 
willingly subordinated himself to General Foch’s overall strategic direction at the Douilens conference on 26 
March[...] Since Pétain had shown himself ‘upset, almost unbalanced and anxious’ in the face of the crisis, 
and Foch was ‘sound and sensible .. .[and] has brought great energy to bear on the situation’ , it was ‘essential 
to success that Foch should control Pétain’. If  it meant that he had to control Haig as well, ttiat was a sacrifice 
worth making in tire greater allied cause.’ Philpott ‘Haig and Britain’s European Allies’ in Bond and Cave 
Haig, A Reappraisal 70 Years On, 136.
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), vol II, 2026.
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show where Haig is bluffing, and indicate why he told untmths. But before I do so, we 
have to look a bit closer at the meeting’s historiogi'aphy.
4.3.1 ‘A fable agreed upon’
General Montgomeiy-Massingberd was probably the only one who actually took notes 
during the conference. But the notes he took, which eventually became O.A.D. 795, are of 
dubious value. As soon as the conference was over he distributed a typewritten summary of 
die meeting in the G.H.Q. for the other participants to comment on. The original 
typewritten note ended like this: ‘After much private discussion between Ministers and 
Generals concerned, a Resolution by M. Clemenceau was drawn up and [handed] out. This 
amounted to a decision that General Foch would be placed in a position to co-operate the 
action of the two Commanders-in-Chief.’ '^^  ^This account Haig could not accept and 
corrected it with pencil to: ‘After private discussion between Minister and Generals 
concerned, a Resolution by M. Clemenceau was drawn up proposing that General Foch be 
appointed to ‘co-ordinate the operations of the Allied Annies about AMIENS’ to cover that 
place. The Field-Marshal pointed out the difficulty of such a task, unless General Foch had 
full authority over all the operations on the Western firont. M. Clemenceau agreed, and this 
proposal was unanimously adopted by the representatives of the French and British 
Governments.’''^  ^Tliis eventually became the wording of the O.A.D.795. Montgomery- 
Mass ingberd also stated in a response to Edmonds in 1925, that the O.A.D.795 was 
unreliable since much of the conference was in French, and most of it took place in small 
groups. As a consequence, O.A.D.795 is a disingenuous historical source.
Lord Milner and Louis Loucheur published their memories of the conference, as 
such, after the war. The others around the table also wrote about the conference in their 
memoirs or diaries, but not as encapsulated narratives as Milner and Loucheur did. '^'^ The 
most important of them is Sir Douglas Haig’s.
The authenticity of Haig’s diary, or diaries, is dubious. In this work I have used 
both the hand-written version and the typed version in 38 volumes (which Robert Blake
Letter from Montgomery-Massingberd to Edmonds dated 23 May 1928. CAB 45/177 ‘Douilens’ 
Montgomery-Massingberd’s papers 7/19, Liddell Hart centi'e For Military Archives, K ing’s College . 
‘There are four accounts of the Douilens conference from those who were present. The fullest is that of M. 
Loucheur published in L ’Illustration of 24 March 1928, Lord Milner’s account was published in The Mew 
Statesman of 23 April 1921. Lord Haig’s is in Duff Cooper, Haig, vol. ii, p.258’. Maurice, Lessons o f Allied 
Co-operation, 133 (The fourth is probably Montgomery-Massingberd’s)
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abridged for The Private Papers o f Douglas Haig 1914-1919), both in the National Libraiy 
of Scotland. The problem is that they paint a completely different picture o f  the days 
leading up to the Conference, and the Conference itself. Robert Blalce asserts in his preface 
that: ‘[Haig] did not, when revising [and typing] his diary, make any important changes in 
what he had originally written. He does not appear to have deleted anything, but he did 
sometimes add a sentence or a paragraph. On the very few occasions when such additions 
occur in the extracts of this book I have indicated them by brackets and a explanatory 
f o o t n o t e . I n  general, this seems to be tme, and the gi*eater part of The Private Papers o f  
Douglas Haig can be accepted at face value. But in the section dealing with the Douilens 
conference, either Blake’s assurance is a blatant lie, both because Haig actually removed 
sections of his hand-written diaiy, and Blake does not indicate a single one o f Haig’s 
numerous and extensive additions in the section covering the Douilens meeting, or Blake 
had simply not read the hand-written version.
The problem of a spurious diaiy is reinforced by the fact that most o f  the secondary 
literature in Britain about Douilens is based on Haig’s typed diaiy or Blake’s abridgement. 
The only exception is Denis Winter’s ‘March 1918: The Gennan Offensive’ in his own 
Haig’s Command, A reassessm ent.^Winter’s book is not enjoyable reading, as things 
always seem a bit easier for the annchair strategist, armed with hindsight and moral 
contempt. But Winter’s chapter about the Douilens Conference, which is based on the 
hand-written version of the diaiy, is nearer the truth than Sir James Edmonds’s, Jolm 
Teiraine’s and William Philpotfs accounts in respectively o f the Great War,
Douglas Haig - The Educated Soldier, m à Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the 
Western Front, 1914-18. All are based on Haig’s typewritten diaiy. But it turns out that the 
hand-written version, as opposed to the typed version, fits fairly with all the other available 
material on the case, such as cipher books, minutes and the French sources.
Haig’s letters to his wife Dorothy and to his sister Henrietta, are according to Colm 
McLaughlin, some of the most revealing Great War p a p e r s . H a i g ’s letters to his wife, 
concerning Douilens, are not surprisingly in accordance with his hand-written diary, as they
Blake,/7a/g, 13.
According to Colm McLaughlin (Senior Assistant, Manuscripts Division National Library of Scotland) 
there has been no ‘in-depth research undertaken thus far as to Haig's doctoring of the tnitli in  his Great War 
papers, otlier than that undertaken by Denis Winter’. E-mail 21 June 2001 
'^Hbid.
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were written almost simultaneously and sent to the same person. Haig wrote quite freely, 
but in our case we have to be aware that his wife had borne a deaiiy wanted son on 15 
March, just days before the Gennan attack. Douglas tried probably to appear a bit more 
careless in his letters to his wife and in his diary than the situation actually wan'anted, 
knowing that she was especially fragile in those days.*"  ^In the gloomiest hours, on the 24* 
and 25*, his letters and diary entries are significantly more light-hearted than his official 
minutes and reports.
It is impossible within the scope of this thesis to do any research, as such, on the 
French side of the table. I have therefore only used readily available French sources, 
including Loucheur’s article in L ’Illustration in 1928 and the book by Paul Carp entier and 
Paul Rudet from 1933,'^'' even if their value in this context is rather limited, as both are 
memorabilia of the war, and not analytic in any way. The most comprehensive book I’ve 
used from the French side is from 1929 and written by the head of Clemenceau’s militaiy 
secretariat, General Mordacq.'^^ Mordacq was close to the happenings, but his book is still 
an eyewitness’ naiTative more than a critical analysis of the generic inconvenience of 
command and control in coalition warfare. Besides them, I have used biographies of the 
most central persons on the French side, and the French official histoiy of the war. 
Obviously some of the French participants at the meeting later found Haig’s revised history 
rather embarrassing, and some of their conespondence with Haig after the war, is also used 
in this thesis.
Now, as I have showed my hand, we are ready to reveal my account.
4.4 The meeting - reconsidered
The discrepancies start early, already in how the meeting actually came about, and continue 
all the way to its conclusion and affcennath. Let’s start with the beginning.
4.4.1 The caliing -  a supersonic General
Sir Henry Wilson actually turned up at G.H.Q as early as 11 a.m., 25 March, which was 
extraordinarily early, given that the request for his presence had been sent after 3 a.m. the
On Haig’s letter of 2 f  ‘ starting with ‘I am glad that the attack has begun at last’, Lady Haig has attached a 
note reading: ‘Douglas writes optimistacly (sic) because remember I am in bed. He really looked terribly 
anxious when he was at home. Note was he says about the reseiwes’ NLS, ACC 3155/164 ‘Extracts of letters 
to Lady Haig March f '  1918 -  May 1918.’
Paul Carpentier and Paul Rudet, Un Important Événement de la Grande Guerre La Conference de 
Douilens du 26 Mars 1918 et la Réalisation du Commandement Unique (Paris, 1933)
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same m o r n i n g . F o r  purely physical reasons, Wilson must have started the preparations
for his journey to France before Haig’s meeting with Pétain at 11 p.m., 24 March.
According to Wilson’s own diary, Foch had telephoned him about 5:30 p.m. on the 24*,
‘asking what I thought of situation’, and Wilson had said that he would ‘come over and see
him’.'^  ^In fact Haig did ask Wilson to come over, but long before the meeting with Pétain.
According to documents in the PRO, Haig had decided to ask Wilson to come over
somewhere between 5 p.m. and 6.30 p.m., and sent a teleginm:
Situation is serious. Enemy have captured Morval Ridge to-day and 
separated and 5* Armies. 5* Anny which is tired is being pressed 
back from the Somme south of Peronne. 3* Anny is withdrawing to 
line of the Ancre. The line of the Somme from the south is being 
taken over by the French with six divisions, and they are sending six 
divisions south east of Amiens, but these movements will not be 
completed until 29* March. We must expect the enemy to press his 
success with vigour and without delay westward down the Somme 
Valley. Between the Bapaume -  Cambrai Road and Peronne he has 
lai'ge reseiwes. I am opinion that the junction with French Army can 
only be re-established by vigorous offensive action of French while I 
do all I can from the north in combination with them. To-night I shall 
meet Petain. I hope General Wilson will come to France to confer 
with me regarding situation.
On this occasion Blake’s editing of Haig’s diary is more misleading than Haig’s own 
account. According to Haig’s diary, both the type- and hand-written versions, he dined with 
General Byng, commander of 3""^  Army, at Beaurepaire at 20:30. At this meeting he ‘told 
Byng to hold on with his left at all costs to the right o f the First Army near Arras and if 
forced to give gi'ound, to do so by tlmowing back his right on to our old trench system fi-om 
Aims via Ransart and along our old defence line’.'^  ^During the day Haig had appai*ently
Général H. Mordacq, La Vérité sur le Commandement Unique (Paris, 1934; 1st pub. 1929).
According to XeiTaine, Haig returned to G.H.Q 3 o’clock (after his meeting with Pétain) and ‘Lawrence 
immediately telegraphed to Wilson.’ Teiraine Haig, 421.
The ‘notebook’, attached to The Diaries o f Field Marshal Sir Heniy Wilson, IWM, DS/MISC/80. 
According to Liddell Hart, Foch had called Wilson after an abortive argument with Clemenceau over the 
unity of command, as ‘Battles are not directed over the luncheon table’. Foch to Clemenceau on the 24*, 
quoted in Liddell Hart Foch, The Man o f Orleans (London, 1931) vol. 2, 291.
WO 33/920 European War, Secret telegrams (2"‘' July, 1917 -  3^ *^ May, 1918) No. 7734 (No.Q.B.C.
7865) 24* March. ‘From Field -Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, France, to Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff.’ There is a copy of the cipher in WO 158/25 ‘Correspondence’, as well, with several Hand-written 
remai’ks: ‘Telephoned to WO 6p.m.’, ‘Copy No 5 to Lord Milner. ’ (When Copy No 5 was issued to Milner is 
unclear), and ‘Written at 5 p.m. in CinC’s room 24/3’ (Signed J.H.Dartdson (M.G., G.S.)
Haig’s diary, Sunday 24* March. NLS, Haig’s papers ACC. 3155/124 Diary no 26, M arch 1918, 
(underlined in the original)
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decided to leave Gough’s 5* Anny high and dry in the lion’s den, and prepare a 
counterattack from the nor th . Remember  that Haig had deliberately made his right wing 
weak, and now he had lost it completely. To keep Britain’s 3"^  Army connected with its 1®^ 
Anny was regarded as more important than keeping the connections with French and the 
British 5* Array. This was indeed a severe change of strategy, but it was Haig who made it 
on the 24*, not Pétain. Hence the telephone message from Haig, asking Wilson to come 
over, which arrived at about 7 p.m. during Wilson’s stay at Downing Street, was not caused 
by Pétain at all, as Haig and Blake later wanted us to believe.'^'
The fate of the Secretary of State for War is also odd. According to Haig he wanted 
to ask the Secretary of State for War, who at the time was Lord Derby, to come to France 
with the C.I.G.S. However, two lines below Haig states in his diaiy that Lawrence called 
Lord Milner, without offering any explanation as to why he appai'ently had changed his 
mind.'^^ In fact Milner was already in France when Haig had his meeting with Pétain: T he 
Prime Minister having asked me to run over to France in order to report to the Cabinet 
personally on the position of affairs there, I left Charing Cross at 12-50 on Sunday, March 
2 4 th> 1 6 3  the reason for Haig’s change of mind be that Haig knew that Milner already 
was in France? But why should he then ask for him in London? Or could it be that Haig 
just pretended that he had called Milner as he pretended that he had called Wilson to curb 
Pétain? Would it have been too embarrassing for him to face the fact that a high-ranking 
official was in France apparently to clean up the mess? Wouldn’t it look better if Milner 
were there on his invitation? And why did he refer in his diary to Milner as Secretary of 
State for Wai'?'^'' Could it be that Haig ‘polished’ his diary after Milner became Secretary
In his hand-written diaiy Haig wrote: ‘My intention being to concentrate all reserves I can by thinning my 
line in the North, With these Reserves to strike Soutliwaids when the enemy has penetrated to Amiens.’ (NLS, 
ACC. 3155/97) In his typed version, written with the knowledge of the outcome, he changes the when to ’if  
the enemy peneti'ates’. (NLS, ACC. 3155/124).
To make matters even more suspicious, it is even attached to the memo of the meeting w ith Pétain: ‘N.B. 
On this C.-in-C. wired to C.I.G.S., War Office, requesting him to come to France.’ The person who added the 
‘N.B’ had obviously ‘forgotten’ about Haig’s earlier telegram, or did not know about it.
Blake, Haig, 297 (24-25 March 1918).
Milner’s Minute, 27 March 1918, CAB 21/41.
In his diary Haig writes about a meeting with Poincare m April 1919. In the typed version he says that they 
started to discuss the appointment of Foch, and started to hark back. ‘I saw that there was nothing more to be 
got out of Pétain, so I motored as quickly as possibly from Dury to my H.Qrs. at Montreuil and telegraphed to 
London asking Lord Milner (S. of S. for War) and the C.I.G.S. to come at once to France to discuss this grave 
change in French Strategy’ NLS, ACC 3155-136 Volume 38, 3 April 1919.
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of State for War in mid-April, momentarily forgetting that Milner had changed hats since 
the actual meeting?
The conclusion is that Haig made up a sequence of events that did not took place, in 
order to appear to be in control of the situation, a prerequisite for the mightiest general in a 
mighty empire. The way the conference actually came about is quite simple. Milner started 
his journey with a meeting with Poincaré, Clemenceau, Foch and Pétain, in Pétain’s 
headquarters at Compiégne, which Haig and Wilson could not manage to attend. Milner 
was asked how the ‘co-operation between the allied aimies could best be established’, and 
answered that he had to consult Haig before he could express any o p i n i o n . T h e n  they 
arranged for a meeting on 26 March with Haig, at Douilens, since Haig had already 
an'anged to meet his commanders there. In fact Haig joined three conferences in Douilens 
during the 26*. The main topic of the first one, between him and his army commanders, 
was how many divisions Plumer, Home and Byng could spare for the battle around 
A m i e n s . T h e  second meeting was a short encounter mainly between Lord Milner and the 
British general s .Mi lner  was anxious to know whether Haig actually had ordered his 
troops to withdi'aw towards the Channel Ports, which a despatch to Weygand the day 
before indicated. He was also anxious to see Haig’s reaction to the idea o f authorising a 
general to co-ordinate the actions of the two Cs-in-C. He was smprised to see how eager 
Haig was on the solution. The famous conference, which is our concern in this essay, was 
in fact the third and last meeting of the day.
If Haig’s ‘creativity’ seems too inventive on this occasion, his claim for credit for 
‘promoting’ Foch is probably even more so.
4.4.2 The perfidious castling
As seen above, Haig allegedly lost his faith in Pétain during the meeting at Dury, on the 
night of 24*. There he had learned, he says, tliat Pétain had orders from the French 
Government to ‘cover Paris at all costs \ If we read the British minute from tlie meeting
Milner’s Minute, 27 Maivh 1918, CAB 21/41.
'^W O  158/25 O.A.D. 793.
WO 158/25 O.A.D. 794.
168 ,The progress made by tlie enemy on our right and along the valley of the SOMME makes it evident that it 
can only be a question of time when the French and English Armies are driven apart. It becomes necessaiy to 
take immediate steps to restore the situation, and this is only possible by concentrating immediately astride 
the SOMME west of AMIENS at least 20 French divisions to operate on tlie flank of the German movement
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we find no such ominous phrases as, ‘French Government’, ‘Palis’ or ‘all costs’. W h a t  
Pétain did, according to Haig’s own notes, was to point out ‘how difficult the situation 
would be for the British Aimy if it were cut fi'om the French. His Anny would have all 
France to retire back into, but the British would be very unfortunately situated’, Pétain 
continued to say that he still feared a Gennan attack in Champagne, and that his divisions 
in the Montidier area ‘had been given orders to fall back (in case of necessity) south- 
westwards!’'^' He would, however, give Fayolle all the troops he could to close the gap in 
the Somme valley. Hence, Pétain’s considerations were not especially suited to cause the 
anguish that Haig later describes. Thus, Haig concludes the 24* in his hand-written diaiy 
with: ‘I went from Beauquesne to Dury. Gen Pétain met me there at 11 p.m. I explained my 
plans as above and asked him to concentrate as large a force [as possible] near Abbeville 
astride the Somme to co-operate on my right. He said he expected to be attacked in 
Champagne, but would give Fayolle all his available troops. I got back to [Beauquesne] 
about 3 a.m. (Monday). Situation seems better, but we must expect the great attacks to 
c o n t i n u e . T h e r e  is nothing at all about any panicking on Pétain’s part or any late night 
calls to London.
But bad news continued to pour down, and, when Wilson anived at Haig’s 
headquarters on Monday 25 March, Haig was apparently knocked off balance: ‘D.H. is 
cowed. He said that unless the ‘whole French army came up we were beaten’ and ‘it would 
be better to make peace on any terms we could’. W i l s o n  realised that someone had to put 
things back on track again, and suggested the possibility of an Allied supreme commander, 
whereupon Haig in fact nominated Pétain for the post. This Wilson could not agree to, and 
he actually had to talk Haig into accepting Foch’s candidature.'^'' Would Haig have 
promoted Pétain for the post if he had been deeply concerned about Pétain’s will to fight?
against the English Aimy which must fight its way slowly back covering the Channel ports. ’ From a message 
handed to Gen. Weygand at Abbeville at 4 p.m. 25 March, WO 158/20 (General staff notes on operations.)
Not even French historians have managed to trace such a decision. ‘II est impossible de faire dire cela à 
l’Instruction du 24 mars où l’expression ‘couvrir Paris’ n’est employée nulle part.’ Guy Pedroncini, Pétain 
Le soldat et la gloire 1856-1918 (Paiis, 1989), 352.
WO 158/48 ‘Conference at DURY at 1 l.p.m., Sunday 24* March ‘.
Ibid.
NLS, ACC.3155, 97 (Italics added) According to Major General Clive, Pétain was also satisfi.ed by the 
meeting’s outcome, ‘saying that he would sleep better that night tlian for many nights.’ Quoted in Tim 
Travers, How the War Was Won, Command and Technolog)> in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917- 
7975 (London, 1992), 67.
The Diaries o f Field Marshal SirHemy Wilson IWM, DS/MISC/80 (25 Mai’ch.)
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Obviously Haig had not lost his faith in Pétain after all, as he later claimed. Not 
surprisingly, Pétain was a bit annoyed with Haig’s revised account when it leaked to the 
press after the war.
Just after the war, Stéphane Lauzanne wrote a book called Les Hommes que j ’ai 
vus, where he divulged a conversation between Poincaré and Haig, on the latter’s departure 
from France in April 1919. Poincaré had apparently told Lauzanne that Haig had revealed 
that he had realised on 24 March that Pétain had given a fatal order of withdrawal, and that 
anew commander was imperative to save the s i tua t ion.When reading Lauzanne’s 
account Pétain could not understand where Haig had got the impression that he had ordered 
a withdrawal, and asked him in a letter of 15 December 1920: ‘Les déclarations de Mr. 
Stéphane LAUZANNE doivent elles êti'e tenues pour confonnes â la vérité? Dans le cas de 
l’affirmative, je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître quels sont les ordres communiqués 
par mon Etat-Major qui ont pu vous faire croire, le 24, que mes intentions étaient de replier 
l’Armée Française sur PARIS, alors que le [24] Mars, à 11 heures du soir, dans notre 
rencontre à DURY, je venais vous dire ‘de ne pas lâcher la main que je vous tendais’. In 
his answer, of 25 December, Haig rather unconsciously exposed how weak his case was. 
‘From this discussion [with Pétain on the 24*] I reached the conclusion that while you 
were prepared loyally to help us to the gi'eatest extent possible, you retained the view that 
the main Gennan attack was yet to be delivered, that it would be delivered against the 
French fr'ont, probably in Champagne, that in such an eventuality you might be obliged to 
make dispositions to cover Paris as that would be your primary care, and that should the 
Gennans continue to advance successfully on Amiens, the French forces which were at that 
time collecting about Montidier, would be given a South Westerly direction for their
Travers. How the War Was Won, 68.
‘Lorsque à la fui de la campagne, le maréchal Haig vint officiellement prendre congé de M . Raymond 
Poincare, il lui déclara spontanément; ‘C’est le 24 mars que j ’ai été convaincu de la nécessité d’avoir un 
commandant en chef unique, qui nous fut superposé à Pétain et à moi lorsque je reçus communication des 
ordres de repliement du général Pétain. Je compris alors que nous ne nous entendions pas et que nous 
marchions à la perte de nos deux armées. La seule façon de tout sauver était d’avoir au-dessus de nous un 
homme auquel nous serions tous deux subordonnés C’est pourquoi j ’avais demandé a Londres d’envoyer un 
membre du gouvernement anglais s’entendre avec le gouvernement fi'anqais pour la nomination du général 
Foch, comme commandant en chef des armées allieées. ’ Extract from Mr. Lauzanne’s book enclosed with 
Maréchal Petain’s letter of 15 Décember. NLS, ACC 3155 No.216h, correspondence about British-French 
relations.
Ibid. Pétain probably mixed the dates as he originally wrote, '.. .alors que le 23 Mars à 11 heures du soir...
The late night meeting was on the 24*.
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r e t r e a t . T h e  conclusion of this line of reasoning is not convincing, even if  the premises 
were correct. Haig did not believe in any major Gennan attack in Champagne, hence 
that eventuality would probably not materialise. Furthermore, the troops at Montdidier 
would move south west only if the Germans advanced ‘successfully on Amiens’, but the 
entente’s sole aim was to impede that very movement, even if  Haig doubted they could 
manage it. As a consequence, the contingency plans that Pétain most likely had revealed at 
their meeting were reasonable the mentioned situations ai'ose, but, and that is the main 
point, they probably would not. That’s why Haig actually was comforted by the plans when 
he heard about them on the 24*, as his comment in his hand-written diary exposed. In his 
personal apologias after the war Haig simply transfonned French contingency plans to 
actual operational plans. To this Pétain made his objection, and Haig in fact pleaded guilty 
in his letter to Pétain, hoping probably that no one would notice.
If Haig was humble towards Pétain personally, he was venomous behind his back.
In November 1920 he sent a confidential note to The Times stating: ‘Between 21®' March 
and 15* April the French did practically nothing and took little part in the fighting. For 21 
days the British sustained tire whole weight of the Gennan attack made by 106 
Divisions.’'^'' If that was the case, why was Pétain on his way to Paris with his troops?
If Haig’s disavowal of Pétain is unwarranted, the panegyric bestowed on Foch is in 
fact even more so.
General Sir A. Montgomery-Massingberd wrote something noteworthy in a paper, 
probably to Edmonds, dated 19 November 1925: ‘One thing it is most important to
Letter from Haig to Pétain 25* December 1920. NLS, ACC 3155 No.216h, correspondence about British- 
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remember about this Conference and about Foch’s position at that time, which is now 
completely forgotten and I doubt ever realized. That is, that the Foch we knew later and the 
Foch the world now loiows is a very different man to the Foch of the Douilens Conference. 
His reputation was then very much under a cloud. He had been more or less Stellenbosched 
ever since the Soimne, and he had had a bad car accident which had caused severe injuries 
to his head. No one could say how he would turn out, or how he would do in charge of the 
Western Front. Many Frenchmen were doubtful.[...] Foch was not then the one great 
general of the war, as most people thinlc of him now, but a general who had been 
‘dégomméd’, and whom quite a lot of people thought to be a bit off his head.’'^' Lloyd 
George had the same doubts: ‘When a man of over 65 has been violently flung on to a 
windscreen you may well doubt his fitness to command in the field amiies numbering in 
millions at a critical stage in the history of the gi'eatest war ever w a g e d . W h a t  reason 
should Haig have for preferring a general of Foch’s dubious reputation, at the cost of the 
only French C.-in-C. that Haig in fact had had a rather good relationship with?'^"^
Haig’s relationship with Foch was not good at all. Lloyd George, certainly not a 
great admirer of Haig, commented on it in his memoirs: ‘But as to Foch, whom he also met 
in this company of exceptional gentlemen and fine soldiers, all he has to record in Ms Diary 
is:- ‘As to Foch, he is a ‘méridional’ and a great talker.’ It represents his general attitude 
towards Foch. He always referred to him in any conversation I had with him during the 
War with amused contempt.’ How could this gi'eat talker, a quality Haig disgusted, 
suddenly turn into a ‘man of gi'eat courage and decision’? The answer is probably quite 
simple -  he did not. Again Haig is inventing a sequence of events that suits his self-image. 
Tliere are no signs of any telegram going to London, suggesting Foch as supreme 
commander. There is not even a sign that Haig liked the idea of promoting Foch at all! If 
we read Wilson’s diary we find a completely different story. Haig had in fact to be ‘talked 
over’.'^  ^Foch was personally much closer to Wilson than he ever was witli Haig. There
CAB 45/177 ‘Douilens’
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were several reasons to pick Foch as the supreme commander, none of them as devious as 
Haig’s later construction.
As we’ve seen, almost immediately after the attack the British had understood that 
the outcome of the crisis depended on the French ability to release and move enough 
reserves to fill the gap in Gough’s Fifth Army.'^^ The Prime Minister saw the situation as a 
proof of the soundness of the much-wanted General Reserve .Hence,  Foch’s name, as 
the nominated head of the Executive Committee presiding the Allied General Reserve, 
would easily come to mind when searching for someone to command a ‘general reserve’, if  
created. In fact Foch himself regai'ded his candidature as supreme commander in this 
light."**
The British, i.e. Wilson and Milner, also discussed another solution on the evening of the 
25*. Wilson proposed to entrust Clemenceau with the ‘supreme control of the situation, 
with Foch acting as his technical adviser’. A s  Milner reports: ‘We [he and Wilson] 
discussed the personal difficulties of effecting such co-operation, and Wilson made the 
suggestion -  which seemed to me a good one -  that both countries might agree to leave it 
to Clemenceau, in whom the British generals a well as the French had confidence, to take 
any decision necessaiy to bring about the better co-operation of the Annies and the best use 
of all available reseiwes. He was on the spot. His country was at stake, and he would no 
doubt be guided by the military opinion of Foch, who appeared the most likely man to take 
bold and prompt decisions, and to see the struggle as a whole without talcing a specially 
French view.’'^'' Wilson’s idea could have been a response to Haig’s misgivings about 
Foch. It sounds reasonable that the ‘personal difficulties of effecting such co-operation’ 
refers to Haig’s personal difficulties with the French generals. That could also be why
‘The Chief of the Imperial General Staff pointed out that the British Army was now attacked by a large 
proportion of the Gennan Army, and was menaced with a possible attack by the whole. It was clear that tlie 
size of our army was not sufficient to enable us to cope with so heavy an attack whatever measures might be 
taken in regard to man-power, and that French assistance was indispensable.’ CAB 23, War Cabinet 371 (23 
March)
‘The Prime Minister pointed out that if the Versailles scheme for the constitution and control of thé Allied 
General Reserve had only been brought into full operation it would not have been necessary to have this 
bargaining process with tlie French, but that tlie Executive War Board would have decided immediately as to 
the disposition of the forces.’ Ibid.
‘ ,„puis me faisent attribuer le Commandement des reserves générales, me preparent en u n  brot aux yeux 
de tout le monde, â prendre, le commandement des Armies Alliées au moment que vous avez si settlement 
fixé vous même des le 24 Mars.’(sic) Foch to Haig in a letter 16.9.19. NLS, ACC 3155 No.216h, 
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Milner was highly surprised when he experienced Haig’s willingness to accept Foch at the 
Douilens conference.
According to Foch though, Wilson’s proposal was not a good idea. When Wilson 
saw him about the matter, he responded: That won’t work. Clemenceau knows nothing of 
leading armies or directing battles. Wfiio, tlien, will take charge of affairs? There will be 
decisions to take -  who will take them? Clemenceau will say; T agree with Haig and 
Pétain. But it is not a matter of agreeing with them. He must command. Who will assume 
the responsibility?.. .No, it won’t work’. Foch and Wilson agreed that Wilson should 
suggest to Milner, ‘that Foch should be commissioned by both Governments to co-ordinate 
the militaiy action of the two Commander-in-Chief.’'®^ Hence, when Foch pulled up by the 
Hôtel de Ville at Douilens, he knew that gi'eat things could happen to his career. In Liddell 
Hart’s words; ‘Like Napoleon at Noti'e Dame, he was about to crown h i m s e l f . I n  
Foch’s own opinion the crisis was not a result of a lack of man-power, but a lack of will­
power, and he undoubtedly saw liimself as the man to provide it.'^''
Foch had originally not been Clemenceau’s favourite, but already before the 
conference took place Pétain’s notorious pessimism started to irritate Clemenceau: ‘Pétain 
est agaçant â force de pessimisme’. P é t a i n  had admitted before the meeting that he 
expected that the British anny would be defeated totally, and that he had given orders for 
the retirement of the French left.'^^ Clemenceau found Pétain’s attitude disgraceful, and his 
outspoken defeatism, or realism, later gave Haig the straw to cling to, as it promised.
Milner’s Minute, CAB 21/41.
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almost inevitably, to expose the pessimistic Pétain as the scapegoat. But the ‘relegation’ of 
Pétain should not be seen in the light only of differing personalities. Pétain’s military 
philosophy, which put its emphasis on a strong defence, had apparently been bankrupted by 
the swift success of Ludendorff on the first days of the assault. The choice o f  Foch, ‘the 
French general whose commitment to the pursuit of victoiy and refusal to admit defeat 
bordered on the iirationaP, at the cost of Pétain, was as much a bid for a more offensive 
and aggressive conduct of the war as the want of a ‘new’ face.'^^
To sum up: both London and Paris appreciated the imminent danger of a German 
breakout through the junction between the British and French troops. They also realised 
that Pétain’s and Haig’s previous agreement to cooperate was insufficient. In Lloyd 
George’s words: ‘The fact that we were two amiies and not one meant that on a vital part 
of the line -  Somme to Moreil- it was not clear for days who was in command of it. That 
shows what lack of unity has meant to us, ’ What they needed was someone who could 
gi'ab the reins, and the person they found was Clemenceau. As Montgomery-Massingberd 
wrote: ‘[Clemenceau] undoubtedly dwarfed all the others -  Milner, D.H., Wilson and Foch, 
and continued to do so till he had Foch safe in the saddle and it was going veiy well. D.H., 
like all of us, was, I believe, very fond of and a gi'eat admirer of Clemenceau.’'^  ^For 
reasons of efficiency, and the haughtiness of the military profession, Foch was appointed 
the de jure co-ordinator, de facto on behalf of Clemenceau.
Who should have the credit, then, for appointing the ‘stellenboshed’ general? Lloyd 
George’s claim is dubious, though he gets some points for the overall drive towards unity 
of command, but not for the actual realisation of it. He was not as keen as h e  later wanted 
us to believe, and he could not have given Milner directions as to what to do beforehand. 
Haig’s scramble for credit borders on disgrace, as we have seen. To use M ilner’s words: ‘I 
never said anything about it myself, because I hate the scramble for credit which is going 
on, in which I must say some of the soldiers ai'e the worst offenders. M ilner’s own 
indirect and more modest claim is more credit-worthy, but he has to share some of the
The quotation is from Strachan, Politics o f  the British Anny, 136.
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honour with Wilson, on the British side. The Sunday Express’s theory of 1920 is still the 
most convincing: ‘Here was the crisis, the moment in which gi'eat opportunities are seized 
or missed. The chance was seized, and Lord Milner seized it. Taking M. Clemenceau aside, 
he proposed directly to him the appointment of General Foch as generalissimo of the 
French and British armies. Clemenceau, whose mind had worked towards the same 
conclusion, a g r e e d . A s  a shrewd politician, Clemenceau appreciated the value of having 
London proposing Foch. Nevertheless, Montgomery -  Massingberd’s advice to Edmonds is 
undoubtedly sobering, and may stand as the ultimate warning to all similar quests for 
personal or national glory: Tn my experience, it is veiy hard to say who was the real 
originator of a proposal such as this. If you could really trace it out, you would probably 
find it was someone quite different to what you thinlc ~ e.g. a junior staff officer, or two or 
three of the chief people came to the same conclusion at the same time, as the result of the 
obvious impossibility of any other course of action.
As a conclusion, the initiative in the Alliance had undoubtedly gone to Paris for a 
while. Haig had been defeated in the field by the Gennans, and had probably forfeited any 
vestige of confidence he had left in London. At the Conference he tried to save his 
reputation, career and situation by tying his own destiny to the ‘talker’ Foch, and probably 
hoped that Foch could save him from the mess he and Pétain had got into. Later on, with 
some distance fi-om it all, he conducted a shrewd and perfidious recasting, by betraying 
Pétain and grovelling before Foch.
4.4.3 Extended Authority -  the master of the obvious.
Haig’s offer, that Foch should co-ordinate the action of ‘all the Allied Armies on the. 
Western Front’ instead of just around Amiens, is also controversial. Denis Winter, for 
instance, claims that Haig’s last offer, the extension of Foch’s authority, is pure fiction."'^  ^
On this occasion Winter thinks too little of Haig, as Haig appeal's to be in the right, but for 
all the wrong reasons.
According to Milner, Clemenceau first handed him a note reading: ‘Le Général 
Foch est chargé par les gouvemments britanniques et fi-ançais de coordonner l’action des 
années britanniques et français sui' le front ouest. Il s’entendra à cet effet avec les généraux
NLS, ACC 3 155/228a, correspondence concerning the appointment of Foch. 
Montgomery-Massingberd to Edmonds 19. November 1925, CAB 45/177. 
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en chef, qui sont invités à lui fournir tous les renseignments nécessaires.’^ '''' He gave the 
note to Haig who ‘readily accepted it but suggested that it should be extended to cover the 
other Armies -  Belgian, American, and possibly Italian -  that might be employed on the 
present Franco-British firont’.'^ "^  Then the plirase ‘des années alliées’ substituted ‘des 
années britanniques et français’.
When Sir James Edmonds reached 1918 in his Histoiy o f the Great War he was 
bewildered by the discrepancies between Milner’s account and the General Staff Record of 
the meeting, that conveyed Haig’s version that he demanded a greater geographical 
extension of Foch’s authority, and not an organisational, as Milner assumed. In a letter to 
Sir Maurice Hanlcey, on 17 May 1928, Edmonds admitted Üiat he thought the ‘G.S. version 
is the correct one and should be accepted; not Milner’s’.^ "^  And the reason was; ‘I find that 
the British General Staff record O.A.D.795 of 26* March, initialled by Haig confrnns 
completely what he told me’.^ "^  Further on, Haig’s amendment, as recorded by Milner, did 
not amount to much: ‘[Haig] would, had he suggested it, have mentioned Portuguese (who 
were with and under him) and not bothered about the Americans and Italians (with the 
French), whom the conference could not c o m m i t . T h e  problem though, is  that 
Edmonds’ proof is circular, for, as seen above, Haig himself was tire ‘editor” of O.A.D.795.
Edmonds could not have been that sure, for, on the same day that he sent his letter 
to Maurice Hankey, he sent another one to General Herbert Lawrence, stating : ‘Of the 
British representatives of the Douilens Conference (26* March 1918) only you and Ar'chie 
Montgomery suiwive. Montgomery says that he stood in a comer and gathered very little 
about what was happening, so I must appeal to you. Milner’s version of what occurred and 
the G.S. record O.A.D.795 of 26* March, initialled by Haig, differ. Can you say at this 
length of time by whom the G.S. record was di'awn up.’^ "^
Lawrence’s answer of 21 May 1928, starts by confessing: ‘I cannot say who drew 
up the G.S, record to which you [refer]. Montgomery came with us because Davidson was
CAB 21/41, Milner’s Minute, 27 March 1918.
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occupied elsewhere.’^ "’ Then he says something about the background of the meeting, 
corresponding with Haig’s version, and continues: ‘After all the whole point was that the 
French would fight or help in any way. Haig was prepai*ed to make any sacrifice to force 
them to talce a hand in the battle. Even with Foch’s good will, he had difficulty in getting 
them to do anything and the utmost he succeeded in doing at the time was to put four 
divisions taking the Arras front where they did nothing but interfere with our lines of 
communications -  Later on they took over [Kemmel] and lost it when the Gennans 
attacked. I don’t loiow whether the time has come to say all this and you will [use] your 
own judgement. On reflection I am almost certain that Montgomeiy drew up the G.S. 
record on my instructions.’^ " Then Edmonds went back to Montgomery again, who 
confessed that his rough notes from the conference were the source for the O.A.D., and not 
much to be tmsted.^'^ But what about the French accounts of the meeting? Could they help 
Edmonds?
The official French liistory does not say much about the meeting as such, only: 
‘Après un rapide échange de vues, ces représentants décident de confier au général Foch la 
mission de diriger la bataillef.]’^ '^ Apparently, the consequences of the meeting, that unity 
of command was finally reached, seemed more important to them than the actual exchange 
of words around the table.
One of the French participants at the meeting, Louis Loucheur wrote an article in 
L’Illustration on 24 March 1928 to commemorate the famous meeting, and he actually 
gave Haig some support. Clemenceau drafted the first note with the phrase, devant Amiens, 
and Loucheur writes: ‘Cela est évidement insuffisant, et M. Clemenceau, sur l ’observation 
du maréchal Haig, appuyé par le général Pétain, corrige et remplace les mots devant ' 
Amiens par : su?- le front occidental Haig was at least given credit for stating the 
obvious. In 1933 Paul Caipentier and Paul Rudet published a book about the Conference, 
and they stated: ‘Le général Foch, le maréchal Haig et le général Petain sont unanimes pour 
demander que l ’expression “sur le fi'ont occidental” soit substituée à celle “en avant 
d’Amiens” et le mai’échal Haig propose que la désignation “des années alliées” remplace
CAB 45/177 ‘Douilens’, Letter from Lawrence to Edmonds dated 21 May 1928.
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“des années britanniques et français”. Un des assistants demande aussi que le mot 
“occidental” soit remplacé par “ouest”. This book, although a secondary source, which 
also cites Milner’s accounts, in fact supports both Haig and Milner. General Mordacq 
complicates it a bit further by claiming; ‘Le général Foch demanda que l ’on substituât 
l’expression “sur le front occidental” à celle “en avant d ’Amiens”; le général Haig, celle 
“d’années alliées” aux tenues “britannique et française”. I f  we really want to go into 
details, Loucheur attached a copy of Clemenceau’s first draft to his article, and there ‘avant 
d ’Amieits’ is overwritten with ‘sur le front occidental’, and with ‘ouest’ in the margin. In 
the Milner papers, in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, there is attached another version of 
Clemenceau’s draft, signed by G. Clemenceau and Milner. In these notes, which ai'e 
duplicated by hand, the phrase ‘alliées sur le front ouest’ is present, hence these notes are 
based on the one in Loucheur’s article. But this time the phrase ‘armées britanniques et 
françaises’ is overwritten by ‘des armées alliées ’. Hence, this change came late, after the 
assistants had staifed to copy Clemenceau’s proposal. That’s probably why Milner 
remembered the last change, because then the signed notes had to be comected, or he 
signed a corrected note. Milner was dead when Edmonds started his investigation, and 
could not connnent on the minor details that suddenly became important and that he had 
left out of his minute. The reason why Montgomery-Massingberd did not remember Haig’s 
change is probably that it happened in one of the small groups the conference disintegrated 
into, which he did not attend.
What about Haig’s own unsullied account, the one in his hand-written diary? Here 
he says: ‘ It was proposed [originally; ‘We also decided’] that Foch should be appointed to 
co-ordinate the operations at Amiens. I at once recommended that he should co-ordinate 
the action of all [the word ‘all’ is inserted] tire Allied Annies on the Western Front. Both 
Governments agreed to this.’^" This seems to be a fairly good description o f  what actually 
happened. Haig, probably together with the other generals, found Amiens too naiTOw, and
Louis Loucheur, ‘Le Commandement Unique’ L ’Illustration (24 March 1928), 277. 
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he proposed to expand Foch’s authority over other allies as well, perhaps because Haig’s 
need for reserves was urgent, and especially as the Americans had manpower to ‘ spare’
The conclusion is that Haig was probably right in his claim that he asked for the 
whole western front to be included, and tliat he asked for the agi*eeinent to include the other 
Allies after Clemenceau and Milner had signed the agreement, which he later denied.
When Haig after the war had figured out tlie grand narrative of how he alone saved the 
situation by ‘sacking’ Pétain, the ‘little story’ of how he extended Foch’s authority 
probably seemed less important.^'^ Given that this was the case, the most intriguing 
questions still remain. Why did Clemenceau originally focus on Amiens? He must 
obviously have laiown that the problem was not Amiens, but how to get enough reserves to 
that area, and they evidently had to be taken ft'om elsewhere, hence the co-ordinating 
commander also needed authority elsewhere. And the second question is: why was Haig so 
eager to take credit for the discovery of the obvious, and Edmonds so keen on giving it to 
him?
The answer to the first question is probably straightforward. Britain was on the run 
in the field, and was about to lose ‘the little war’ against France. They had to choose 
between whether to suinender to Ludendorff or to Clemenceau, so to speak.^^" Therefore, 
giving the British a feeling of reciprocity was a matter of couitesy. Clemenceau obviously 
loiew that his first proposal was militaiily meaningless but he judiciously used a trick of the 
political trade, praised by Abraham Lincoln, that important decisions should be made to 
look like the decisions of a committee. Haig especially, who had fought a fierce battle for 
more than two years over his independence, ought to have appreciated the French savoir 
faire. The fact that Haig soon, and long before he ‘found out’ that the whole conference
‘It is absurd to see in Haig’s advocacy of an extension of Foch’s authority a supreme sti'oke of 
magnanimity, as it has often been represented. Haig was a practical Scot, not given to such gestures. In 
accepting a superior authority, his mling idea was to obtain an ample flow of French reserves to cope with 
both the immediate danger and with tlie further Gennan attack that he anticipated in Flanders. Under the 
prevailing circumstances he had nothing to give and all to gain. The further that Foch’s authority was 
extended the larger, naturally, would be the sources from which the reserves could be drawn. ’ Liddell Hart, 
Foch, 297.
It is not an issue in this thesis to figure out exactly when Haig created his revised story about the Douilens 
meeting, but it seems that he had the stoiy more or less ready when he returned to Britain in 1919.
'The French saw [in the Douilens agreement] the realisation of a dream- their long-cherished project of a 
French Supreme Command. As they left the town hall Clemenceau delightedly declared to tine head of his 
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was his master plan, insisted on at least an active participation proved that French courtesy 
was well founded. General Herbert Lawrence’s repugnance for Ms French brothers in anns, 
which had only a faint root in reality, probably shows that he also felt that the dignity of 
British generalship was besmirched at Douilens. This is the reason why Edmonds was 
much more occupied by the question of who said what, at the meeting, than his French 
counterpaifs. Edmonds prefeined Haig’s version of events for parochial reasons, not for its 
veracity. It was important to give the impression that the act resulted in a unity of 
command, not British subordination in an hour of despair. Probably most British accounts 
of the meeting are more or less coloured by tlie understandable desire to disguise the 
defeat. Lloyd George’s rather dubious claim to the fatherhood of the agreement points in 
the same direction.
If it were not for the ‘sacrifices’ of Haig or the foresightedness of the Prime 
Minister, the history of Douilens, regarding Britain, would sound like this, in the voice of 
‘The Tiger’: ‘Well boys, this has gone too far, we take over from here’. Not too much for 
the British to be proud of.
4.4.4 God’s own commander
So far I have not looked into Haig’s ‘heart and kidneys’. Much has been said about his 
motives, traits and personality elsewhere, and the prospect of a psychological ‘screening’ of 
a man long gone is not promising.^^' Nevertlieless, I will briefly try to answer two 
questions that keep lingering when reading Haig’s papers. Why did he bother to antagonise 
his friends over minor details, after such a gi'eat victory? And why did he allow later 
generations to look through his web of lies by keeping his archives relatively intact? Why 
did he not bum ‘the ewdence’?
It is easy for our post-modern generation to forget how important religion was for 
Sir Douglas Haig. For him God was the major strategist of the war, the ultimate C.-in-C. so 
to speak. The fact that Haig was near the top of the Army when the Great War broke out 
seemed to him further proof of God’s great plan, which he also revealed to his wife after
I subscribe fully to Prior and Wilson’s warning: ‘Let it be said bluntly. We need no more books devoted 
exclusively to Sir Douglas Haig -  and least of all to trivialities such as his spitefulness or noble character, liis 
callousness or grim forbearance, his sexual deviance or martial uprightness.’ Review of W inter’s H aig’s 
Command m Journal o f the Australian War Memorial, 23 (October 1993).
‘Religion made things simple for Haig: it provided life with order, meaning and justice, and left no room 
for self doubt’ Gerard J. DeGroot ‘Intj'oduction’ to The Reverend George S. Duncan’s papers in Guy, 
Thomas and DeGroot (eds.) Militaiy Miscellany I  (The Army Records Society, 1997), 270.
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taking over as Commander-in-Chief in 1915: ‘all seem to expect success as the result of my 
aiTival, and somehow give me the idea that they thinlc I am “meant to win” by some 
superior Power.
Given that Haig saw himself as a commander with a mission from God, the fateful 
day of 24 March 1918, when he realised that the BEF was on the verge of a catastrophe, 
must have been a day of real anguish. The futility of Haig’s desperate prayer to Wilson on 
the 25* that the entire French Aimy had to come to his rescue, or else they would have to 
sue for peace, indicates that Haig saw himself as fallen from g r a c e . T h e  anguish of the 
crucified Jesus shouting in despair: ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ was 
figuratively speaking present when Wilson found the ‘cowed’ Haig on the 25*. Was God 
actually on tire Gennan side? Hence, the crisis of March 1918 was not only a national 
crisis for Britain it was also a personal and existential crisis for Haig.
Haig knew perfectly well when he anived Douilens that both London and Paris 
were bent on some sort of unity of coimnand, and he knew that Foch was certain to become 
the supreme commander. What he did not Icnow was whether he would survive the 
meeting. He knew that the last time he had resisted subordination, at Calais, he had nearly 
lost his job. Now, after Passchendaele, he Icnew that he would not be able to withstand an 
open ‘vote of confidence’. He probably also knew that sti'ong forces, especially Sir John 
French, wanted to remove him immediately after the Gennan ‘walkover’.^ ^^
In his letters to his wife, Haig was deeply concerned about the government’s witch­
hunt after the ‘unexplainable’ breakdown of the British forces at the 21®'. On. 6 April he 
wrote to his wife: ‘Gough goes home today and is to call and see you. I have done all I can 
to stick up for him, but the Cabinet want to divert criticism from themselves on to someone 
else! I expect that they would like to attack me only my case is so very strong. I have 
repeatedly told them that they were mnning ‘unjustifiable risks’ by continuing the war 
without making adequate arrangements for keeping Divisions up to strength. This 
apologia indicates both that he was afraid of being removed, and that he had not yet 
‘realised’ that Pétain was to blame, and not the British Government, It is worth noting that
Haig to Lady Haig, 27 December 1915. Ibid. 270.
DeGroot claims that Haig never lost his spirit; ‘Confident of God’s help, Haig never doubted that the 
British Army would eventually win’, Ibid. 275.1 think, on tlie contrary, that Haig was veiy m uch in doubt on 
the 24*.
The Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Hemy Wilson, IWM, DS/MISC/80 (24 March 1918).
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Lloyd George had another view on how well Haig ‘stuck up’ for his comrade: ‘[W]hen 
Gough had been beaten owing to conditions for which Haig alone was responsible, Haig, 
instead of accepting that responsibility as an ‘officer and a gentleman’ removed Gough 
from the command and left the Government to infer that the dégommé General was alone 
to blame.
On 11 April Haig issued the famous Order of the Day containing ‘With our backs to 
the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the 
end.’^ ^^  On the same day he wrote to his wife: ‘If one has full confidence that everything is 
being directed from above on the best lines, then there is no reason for fussing’. T h e  
problem is that fussing was what Haig had done. His decision to fight his way back to the 
Channel ports, and his suggestion to Wilson that ‘it would be better to make peace on any 
terms we could’ unless the whole French anny came up, were nothing other than ‘fussing’. 
When Haig’s ordeals were over, he again saw evidence that he was God’s own 
commander. ‘[I] scarcely feel that I deserve this gi'atitude, for as the Old Testament says 
‘the battle is not yours but God’s’, and I feel that 1 have only been the instrument to carry 
out the Almighty’s intentions.
The answer as to why Haig took the time to fight futile battles over minor details 
after the war is probably that there was nothing minor about God’s instruments. To criticise 
Haig’s ability as a leader, or to suggest that he had lost his nerve, was in fact to criticise 
God himself. Haig had passed the test, he had been worthy of the grace of God and played 
his part in God’s plan accordingly. To say something else was no minor detail! As He did 
to Abraham, God had given Haig a tremendous test, and he had passed.
The reason why he did not bum his papers is probably that he actually believed his 
own story. Some of Haig’s ‘creations’, as for instance the time of his call to Wilson, were 
so far-fetched that it is hard to believe that he consciously fabricated such a hoax. The 
cognitive dissonance between his altmistic self-image and the forgery was probably too 
much to handle. If he had physically destroyed his papers, what would that have said about 
him? Haig’s evasive answer to Pétain’s accusations after the war showed that he had not
NLS, ACC 3155/164.
Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol II, 2019. Liddell Hart, on the other side, claimed that Wilson ‘had raised 
the question of removing Gough’. Liddell Hart, Foch, 299.
Quoted in Sheffield, Forgotten Victor)’, 192.
Haig to Lady Haig 11 April 1918, quoted in DeGroot, ‘Introduction’, 402.
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lost his grip on the reality as such, but his self image had not room for both a military 
failure and a world saviour, and he chose more or less unconsciously to be the last.
4.5 Douilens and beyond
We have seen what the British authority over distance looked like in the days preceding the 
crisis of March 1918, and we have seen how the disaster around Amiens broke down the 
long-standing obstacles against unity of command. In what follows, we will look at the 
impact the outcome of the conference at Douilens had on British command and control.
4.5.1 Authority
Long before the Great War Bismarck had put his finger on the main difficulty of any 
militaiy alliance: ‘Within an alliance there is always a horse and a r i d e r . T h e  persistent 
and intriguing question was: who should be the horse, and who should be the rider? It is 
especially tricky to find the answer if the coalition paifners are of the same size and 
military importance. The question had frustrated the entente for almost four years of war, 
After Douilens, Foch was eventually aclcnowledged as the rider, but who was the horse?
4.5.1.1 Whose intentions?
The agreement at Douilens had only been a defensive means against a ‘battle imposed upon 
us by the enemy’. But soon, as the Gennan troops reached their culmination point, Foch 
wanted power to create action, or ‘powers for the infusion of an idea of action’. H e  
wanted to have his own intentions, and not just the right to respond to German moves:
‘Now to plan this offensive action, to inspire and direct it, to ensure its being carried out by 
the Commander in Chief, and also to arrive at an equitable distribution of forces, the 
powers conferred upon me by the Douilens Agreement were plainly inadequate[.. .]The 
simple role of co-ordinating was not sufficient[.. .]It gave far too little play to  the initiative 
of the officer who filled it [.. .]Tlie role should be changed into one of d i r e c t i o n . ■
The British Government also felt that the Douilens agi'eement was insufficient. The 
War Cabinet was especially concerned by the fact that the French C.-in.-C., Pétain, did not 
seem to follow the spirit of Douilens. ‘It was pointed out that co-ordinating between
Haig to Lady Haig 17 November 1918, quoted in DeGroot, ‘Introduction’, 407. 
Neilson and Prete, Coalition Warfare, vii.
Hankey, The Supreme Command, vol 2, 791.
Ibid.
Foch, Memoirs, 313.
70
General Foch and the French Higher Command was no less important than between him 
and the British Higher Command, and that the former might be more difficult to 
secure[.]’^ ^^
Consequently, on 3 April the allies had another meeting about the command and
control relationship, this time at Beauvais. The circumstances were completely different
from Douilens, as both Lloyd George and the Americans were present, and all parties had
had the opportunity to prepare for the conference. They reached the following agreement:
General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American 
Governments with the co-ordination of the action of the Allied 
amiies on the Western front. To this end all powers necessary to 
secure effective realisation are confeiTed upon him. The British,
French, and American Governments for this purpose entmst to 
General Foch the sti'ategic direction of military operations. The 
Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and American aimies 
have full control of the tactical employment of their forces. Each 
Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government 
if, in his opinion, the safety of his army is compromised by any order 
received from General Foch,^^^
Paris had initially opted for ‘Commander-in-Chief, but that would have expelled the King 
from the British chain of command, and Mordacq instead coined the tenn ‘strategic 
direction’, acceptable to all. But mostly for semantic reasons on 14 April Lloyd George 
did in fact accept that Foch’s title should be ‘ Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in 
France’, as it was assumed to be important to signal to President Wilson that Foch actually 
orchestrated the war on the Western front.
The agi'eement was deliberately vague and ambiguous, a classic within coalition 
warfare. The treaty should mean different things to different people. When, for instance, 
Wilson interposed with the objection that one ‘never knows where strategy exactly begins 
and ends’. Foch replied: ‘in France one knows it perfectly. ’
CAB 23, WC 380, (2 April, 1918)
Co-ordination of Allied Operations on the Westera Front. Agreement reached at Beauvais, 3 April 1918. 
Signed by Mr. Lloyd George, Field-Marshal Sir D. Haig, General Sir H. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, General 
Foch, General Pétain, General Pershing, General Bliss. CAB 23 WC 382, (4 April, 1918)
Liddell Hart, Foc/i, 306.
‘Je tiens essentiellement, me dit-il, à ménager les susceptibilités de Américans, et surtout de M, Wilson, 
qui, dans cette question de l’unité de commandement, s’est toujors rangé de nitre côté’: Clemenceau quoted in 
Mordacq, La Vérité sur le Commandement Unique, 187. Foch was created Maréchal de France on 6 August 
1918.
Liddell Hart, Foch, 307.
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Originally Foch had asked for more authority, as he was ‘compelled to use 
persuasion instead of giving directions. A power of supreme direction seems to me 
indispensable for the achievement of success.’^ '"' Foch was not quite satisfied with the 
Beauvais agreement, but it had at least given him the possibility to ‘conduct the battle on 
tire French front’
The conclusion is that Foch apparently got the power to overrule Pétain’s and 
Haig’s intentions with his own at Beauvais. But the Allied Govermnents did not entrust 
him with the power that normally follows supreme command. His junior officers had the 
right of veto, at least to delay his actions. Within a national command stmcture, no 
commander would accept any such right to subvert legal operational decisions. Foch had 
no choice, he was not appointed a de jure supreme commander.^''^ More important, he did 
not become the de facto supreme commander either.
4.5,1.2 Political dirigibility
An intriguing question arose when the Allies bestowed the strategic direction on Foch. 
Would Foch still be a French general with Clemenceau as his political head, or would he be 
some sort of international Generalissimo with no obligation to any national bodies, except 
the Allies as such?
Apparently Foch started to behave as a general aloof from national policy, much to 
the initation of Clemenceau. In the translated words of the ‘Tiger’ himself: ‘Do you know’, 
the Marshal said to me one day, ‘that I am not your subordinate?’ ‘No, I don’t’ I replied 
with a laugh. ‘I don’t even want to know who put that notion into your head. You know 
that I am your friend. I strongly advise you not to try to act on this idea, for i t  would never 
do.’^ ''^  Clemenceau’s de facto power over Foch was effectively unquestioned, irrespective
Foch to Clemenceau on 2 April, quoted in Liddell Hart, Foch, 306.
24hThe Beauvais agreement did not entirely meet my proposition, since it did not extend m y authority over 
tlie whole of the Western Front from the North Sea to the Adriatic, or over all the Allied troops fighting there. 
Nevertheless, it did contain the essence of what was necessary for conducting the battle on the French front 
(which was the main theatre of operations) with the American, British and French Armies, the principal forces 
of the Entente’ Foch, Memoirs, 315.
The absence of the prerogatives of a commanding general in a pure national context, as for instance the 
right to promote and discipline subordinates, does not in itself exclude ‘unity of command’. The purpose of 
‘unity of command’ is simply to bestow on one person the power to compel subordinates, within the frame of 
the laws of war, irrespective of nationality.
Quoted in Newhall, Clemenceau, 397.
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of Foch’s opinion, even if they continued to squabble thi'oughout the But were
Clemenceau's instructions also superior to Lloyd George’s on the Western Front, as a 
consequence of his power over the Generalissimo? According to Lord Derby, then the 
British ambassador in Paris, Clemenceau apparently thought he could ‘nan’ the war, as the 
Generalissimo’s s u p e r i o r . I n  practice though, such a gi'andiose project was beyond reach.
Napoleon once said: ‘It would be better to have one poor general than two good 
ones.’^ "^  ^Now Lloyd George had two generals of dubious reputation, instead of one, where 
one of them took his instructions from Paris. A game o f ‘divide and mle’ was perhaps 
tempting but could not be played too far. The game could be played both ways. According 
to Haig, the British government’s understanding of the Beauvais treaty was ambivalent: ‘I 
note that the Government now tells me ‘to use my judgement’ in obeying orders given me 
by ‘the Generalissimo of the Allied Aimies’[ .. .] This is a case of ‘heads you win and tails I 
lose.’ If things go well, the Government take credit to themselves and the Generalissimo; if 
badly, the Field-Marshal will be blamed! To ask Haig to use ‘his judgement’ could be 
dangerous. He had probably used it both at the Somme in 1916 and at Ypres in 1917. After 
Beauvais, Lloyd George’s room for manoeuvre was truly thorny.
4.5.2 Intention
Foch’s contemporaines lacked a proper word for his new assigmnent, as modern alliances
still were in the i n f a n c y . A s  head co-ordinator of generals with conflicting loyalties and
under different masters, his title of ‘strategic director’ was misleading. In our times, with a
centuiy of coalition warfare behind us, a new word has been coined for an old concept. In
NATO nomenclature it is called ‘co-ordinating authority’, and is defined as:
The authority gi'anted to a commander or individual assigned 
responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities 
involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or 
more services or two or more forces of the same seiwice. He has the 
authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or
‘It seems that Clemenceau and Foch are not on good terms. Foch is suffering from a swollen head, and 
thinks himself anotlier Napoleon! So Clemenceau has gi'eat difficulties with him now.’ Blake, Haig, 337 (27 
October 1918)
‘What amuses me is Clemenceau’s open contempt of our P[rime] M[inister]. He evidently thinks he can do 
what he wants with liim.’ Lord Derby to Foreign Secretary Balfour in April 1918. Ibid. 395.
Napoleon to Carnot 1796, quoted in Jay Luvaas, Napoleon on the Art o f  War (New York, 1999), 65.
Blake, Haig, 318. (15 July 1918)
The Austro-German alliance of 1879 is sometimes held up as the first modem alliance. S ee for instance 
Paul Keimedy in ‘Military coalitions and coalition warfare over the past centuiy’, 4.
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their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel 
agi'eement. In case of disagi'eement between the agencies involved, 
he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the 
event he is unable to obtain essential agi'eement he shall refer the 
matter to the appropriate authority.
The definition above covers Foch’s de facto authority quite well. His ability to order men 
into fire was limited. But his authority as the ‘film’s chief barrister’ was more substantial, 
and more important. What Pétain and Haig needed was not a new general, but an ‘honest 
broker', that could bring them out of their mutual and interlocking suspicions. Here Foch, 
the talker, could play his historical part.
4.5.2.1 Conflicting Perspectives
Foch explained his role during the crisis in March to Loucheur: ‘The situation can be 
likened to a double door; each of these generals [Haig and Petain] is behind his half of the 
door without knowing who should push first to close the door. I quite understand their 
hesitation; the one who pushes first risks having his right or left wing turned.. .Wliat should 
I do in their place? You know my method; I stick a wafer here, another there, a third at the 
side.. .The Germans can scarcely make any further progress. A fourth wafer, and they will 
stop a l together .Hence:  Foch’s mission was to unlock Haig and Petain from the 
prisoner’s dilemma.^^^
Foch’s British liaison officer, General Sir John Du Cane, observed perspicaciously 
after the allied counter-offensive had begun: ‘our greatest danger now lies in the trouble 
between ourselves. If we can stick together and avoid friction and rows we now have a 
sitter but whereas adversity forced us to be friends success is likely to make for trouble 
between the allied nations.’ Du Cane’s worries were not unwarranted. When the crisis 
had passed no one really liked to have Foch around.
NATO, Allied Administrative Publications (AAP- 6) (V) modified version, August 2000.
Foch to Loucheur on the 24“*, quoted in Liddell Hart, Foch, 291.
Prisoner’s dilemma : ‘the options and outcomes are so constmcted that it is rational for each person, when 
deciding in isolation, to pursue a course which each finds to be against his interest and therefore irrational’ 
TedHonderich (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy {Oxfoxà, 1995), 719.
Rawlinson diary (21 Aug. 1918). Quoted in Fhilpott, Anglo-French Relations, 160.
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4.S.2.2 Plan Fetishism
Haig’s main problem with the concept of ‘unity of command’ was not that the supreme 
commander could make dangerous mistakes, but that he, as second in command, would 
have to take all the blame. Haig’s concern is spelled out in George Dewai*’s Sir Douglas 
Haig's Command'. ‘If the supreme head orders the commander-in-chief of the Ally to 
undertake an operation which turns out disastrous and leads to a gi'eat loss of life, on whom 
will the responsibility fall- who will be called to account and punished for the blunder? 
Inevitably, if any one is called to account, it will be the commander-in-chief who obeys the 
order. There is no way out of this dilemma. It is the second in command who is 
responsible. It is he who is punishable in regard to the lives and safety of the anny under 
him; not the first in command -  except in regard to troops of his own n a t i o n . H e n c e  in 
June Haig asked for a ‘letter of indulgence’: ‘The effect of the Beauvais Agreement is now 
becoming clear in practice. This effect I had realised from the beginning, namely, that the 
responsibility for the safety of the British Army in France could no longer rest with me 
because the ‘Generalissimo’ can do what he thinks right with my ti'oops. On the other hand, 
the British Govermnent is only now beginning to understand what Foch’s powers as 
Generalissimo amount to. This delegation of power to Foch is inevitable, but I intend to 
ask that the British Government should in a document modify my responsibilities for the 
safety of the British Anny under these altered conditions.
What about the chaps in the trenches, at the other end of the wire? Could they ask to 
be revealed of their responsibilities? Would it be entirely all right for a British lieutenant to 
order his men into the tonnent of Gennan Maschinengewehr knowing that the head of his 
nation’s army had asked to be exempt of responsibility? If Haig was off the hook, who 
could eventually be hanged?
Consequently, the decapitation of the British chain of command was totally 
unacceptable for many of Haig’s subordinates. General Gough, who had not been at 
Doullens, was stunned when Foch arrived at his headquarters directly after the meeting and
Dewai', Sir Douglas Haig's Command, vol 1, 149.
Blake, Haig, 314. (7 June 1918), Haig got his letter ‘Instructions of the Secretary of State for War- to the 
Field-Marshall Commander-in-Chief British Armies in France’ from Mihier 21 June 1918, which gave him 
the ‘liberty to appeal to tlie British Government’ before executing wide-ranging orders from the supreme 
commander. See Edmonds, Militaryf operations in France and Belgium 1918 (London, 1935), Vol III, 
Appendix IX, 351,
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started to boss him around: ‘It can be imagined how surprised I was at this outburst on 
Foch’s part. Surprise rather than indignation was my first impression. I now ask myself, 
how was it that a British General was placed in such a position? How could it arise that he 
was exposed to such rudeness from an Allied officer? How could Foch be so amazingly 
ignorant of the situation as not to realise the splendid fight the Fifth Army had put up?’^ ^^  
Gough was soon relieved of his command, and we can only speculate about how well 
Gough would have seiwed under a French general, who had ‘suffered a continuous series of 
reverses
As a conclusion, it was not irrelevant to the subordinates where the orders came 
from. The forgotten part of plan fetishism severely restricts the creativity of the command 
and control layout. Therefore it was important to keep Haig in the chain of command.
4.5.3 Dissemination
Haig’s first reaction to the Beauvais meeting was that the agreement did not mean 
anything: ‘I was in full agreement and explained that this new arrangement did not in any 
way alter my attitude towards Foch, or C. in C. French Army. I had always in accordance 
with Lord Kitchener’s orders to me regarded the latter as being responsible for indicating 
the general strategical policy, and, as far as possible, I tried to fall in with his strategical 
plan of o p e r a t i o n . B u t  when Foch did more than just indicating the strategic policy Haig 
became furious.
In June Haig had enough, and ‘rang the bell’, or in Milner’s words (then the 
Secretary of State for War): ‘In consequence of an objection taken by Field Marshal Haig 
to orders received -from Foch about the disposition of the British reserves, with regard to 
which the Field Marshal appealed to the British Govermnent under the terms of the 
Beauvais Agreement, the C.I.G.S. and I left London at mid-day on Thursday June 6^ ,^ in 
order to attend a meeting arranged at the Ministiy of War, Paris, on the following day, at
General Sir Hubert Gough, The Fifth Army, (London, 1941), 306.
Ibid. 308 .
In Washington President Wilson congratulated of Foch on his new appointment at Doullens. The War 
Cabinet decided that ‘President Wilson’s message should be kept back from publication and that the Foreign 
Office should inform the French Government that we aie going to make an announcement immediately in our 
press.’ CAB 23 WC 378, (30 March 1918).
Blake, Haig, 300. (3 April 1918)
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which Clemenceau, Foch and the Field Marshal were to be p r e s e n t . M i l n e r ’s mission 
was difficult. For the British Government it was important to stand by the agreement of 
Beauvais, but at the same time the British manpower situation did not allow any 
recklessness from Foch.^^^ When Milner met Haig in Paris he was struck by the latter’s 
pessimism and bad temper. The situation seemed delicate indeed.^^^ But when the meeting 
actually started Milner heaved a sigh of relief, as the generals’ opinions were not 
irreconcilable after all: ‘[Foch and Haig] always seem to get on quite well together when 
brought face to face.
This way of doing business eventually became Foch’s modus operandi. Haig was 
not willing to follow orders as such, and Foch had to talk him into his decisions. ‘It was 
tacitly admitted, I think, by all of us that, given such due notice and a chance of having his 
views fully considered, he [Haig] would have to obey Foch as Commander-in-Chief if the 
latter insisted on overruling his object ions.Consequently Foch had not the power 
supeiveniently to influence Haig, as Haig expected to have the opportunity to influence 
Foch reciprocally. As Foch himself lucidly stated: ‘What later on was known by the term 
‘unified command’ gives a false idea of the powers exercised by the individual in question 
-  that is, if it is meant that he commanded in the military sense of the word, as he would 
do, for example, in the French Army. His orders to Allied troops could not have the same 
characteristic of absolutism, for these troops were not his.. .But by persuasion he could 
stimulate or restrain their Commanders-in-Chief[.]’^ '^^
‘Record of a Visit to Paris, June 6 - 8 ,  1918.’ Milner’s papers 374, Memoranda and letters, mainly relating 
to the conference at Doullens, March 1917 -  Jan. 1919. Bodleian Library, Oxford.
‘I have received no definite instructions, but I drink I rightly interpret the mind of the Government when I 
say that they are most anxious to give all possible assistance to the French in their present straits, and not to 
impair Foch’s authority as C-in-C. at the same time, if, in your opinion, Foch insists on something which 
recklessly exposes tire British Army to destruction, they will support you in resenting it.’ Memorandum to 
D.Haig 7/6/18. Milner’s papers 374, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
‘After dinner the C.I.G.S. and I had a long conversation with tire Field Marshal and General Lawrence 
about the military position, and the conversation we were to have with Clemenceau and Foch the following 
day. We found them both very pessimistic as to the outlook. The French troops were, in their opinion, not 
fighting well.’ Record of a visit to Paris, 6 - 8  June, 1918. Milner’s papers 374, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Ibid. We have to remember though, that Haig’s lack of fluency made him prone to gloss over dissension, 
and Milner’s observation may be a bit too wishful. ‘[Hjaving no dialectical proficiency, [Haig] felt no 
inclination to seek debate. One detects in him a certain gaucheness in relations with those who were his 
superiors or equals in rank[.]’ Terraine, Haig, 55 .
Milner’s papers 374, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Quoted in Teiuaine, Haig, 426.
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In August General Rawlinson questioned the chain of command: ‘Are you 
commanding the British Anny or is Marshal Foch?’^ ^^  Haig gave his answer to Foch the 
same day, still with Rawlinson present: T spoke to Foch quite straightly and let him 
understand that /  responsible to my Government and fellow citizens fo r  the handling o f 
the British forces. If Haig had admitted to Rawlinson that he was only Foch’s 
subordinate, he had reached a dead end in his generalship. Foch chose not to stand up and 
fight, and continued the only feasible style of leadership, the art of persuasion.
General Pershing had a similar attitude towards Foch. In August 1918 Pershing 
made the supreme commander ‘pale and exhausted’: ‘I was provoked to say: ‘Marshal 
Foch, you have no authority as Allied Commander-in-Chief to call upon me to yield up my 
command of the American Anny and have it scattered among the Allied forces where it 
will not be an American anny at all.’ He was apparently surprised at my remark, and said,
‘I must insist upon the amangement,’ to which I replied, as we both rose from the table 
where we sat, ‘Marshal Foch, you may insist all you please, but I decline absolutely to 
agree to your plan. While our anny will fight wherever you may decide, it will not fight 
except as a independent American anny’... Not even Pershing’s superior, President 
Wilson, esteemed Foch’s pontificals. Foch was in fact, as the supreme military commander 
of the alliance, infonned of the Gennan armistice note to President Wilson through the 
newspapers, and nobody asked his opinion.
Petain also had difficulties with Foch’s role as superior: ‘Foch and Pétain did not 
give exactly the same orders; the difficulties of a commander-in-chief of the French anny 
having over him a supreme generalissimo were already [27 March] showing 
theniselves[.]’^ ^^Pétain was weakened further by the appalling French loss o f  Chemin des 
Dames in June 1918, where the French leadership was in disarray, and Haig started to gain 
stature again after the disasters in March.
Rawlinson asking Haig at a meeting 14 August 1918. Terraine, To Win a War, 118.
Bidks Haig, 323. Haig’s italics. (14 August 14 1918).
Pershing, quoted in Terraine, To Win a War, 134. ‘[l]t says much for his temper and his manners that 
relations with liis powerful subordinates were generally quickly repaired after such scenes.’ Ibid.
Ten-aine, Haig, 474.
Griffiths, Marshal Petain, 72.
'Pétain was in semi-disgrace; General Guillaumat was recalled from Salonika to replace him, and though 
this extreme step was not in fact taken Petain and the French Army were now placed directly under Foch.’ 
Terraine, To Win a War, 72.
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Haig had scorned Foch for his loquacity, but Foch’s ability to talk became his 
greatest, and only, asset. Clemenceau had trouble accepting this fact: ‘Foch could not 
simply ‘command’ Pershing (or Haig, or Diaz of Italy, whose government had adhered only 
to the Doullens formula of ’coordination’), and Clemenceau’s pressing of a moot point 
fatefully damaged their re l a t ionship .As  a persuader, the tongue-tied Haig would have 
been absolutely useless.
4.5.3.1 Isomorphic actions
According to John Terraine one of the wonders of the war was how well the Allies coped 
with the ‘platoon commander’s war’ that subsisted in the last 100 days of the war.^^^ After 
their tactical sense had ossified in timetabled and trench warfare, the flexibility of the last 
100 days was amazing, but not within the scope of this thesis. In my opinion, the Doullens 
conference had little impact on the troop’s ability to adapt to a new or, more strictly, old 
kind of warfare. The changes at the very summit of the military hierarchy did not have 
much influence on the ability to cany out isomoiphic actions, and are therefore left aside.
4.5.3.2 A gamut in harmony?
As we have seen ‘the gamut’ was not completely in harmony in the period leading up to 
March 1918. For instance, the failure to defend the marshy Oise region, had its origin in the 
mismatch between the demand for command and control, and what could be delivered. On 
21 March the gamut was blown completely off balance. As ‘chaos and confusion gripped 
British headquarters’, the troops, used to detailed orders, were paralysed, as old plans 
suddenly became useless.^^^ Foch’s energy and access to allied troops gave the BEF an 
indispensable respite. And during the following months the BEF once more regained poise 
over the gamut.^ "^^
Micro-management of a moving battle was impossible given the information 
technology available in 1918. The command and control layout had simply not got the 
capacity to carry battlefield intelligence all the way up to Haig before it became obsolete,
Newhall, Clemenceau, 397.
Terraine, To Win a War, 202. The resuming fighting spirit provided by the more ‘adolescent’ Dominion 
troops probably goes a long way to explain the BEF’s rather astonishing ability to cope with moving battles. 
However, the British troops’ ability to cope with a new reality was still tremendous.
The citation is from Herwig The First World War, 407.
^^ '^ ‘The British army, having initially been confused by tlie new conditions of warfare, had b y  July 1918 tamed 
the new technology and worked out effective ways of harnessing it. The BEF proved highly adaptive and 
innovative in mastering a Revolution in Military Affairs.’ Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 198.
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and bring his decisions down again before they became o u t d a t e d . H a i g  was gradually 
squeezed out of the OODA-loop, and the ‘decision threshold’ was inevitably pushed 
downwards.^^^ A statement of General Monash indicates how the practice had changed; ‘It 
has come to be an article of faith that the whole of the successive stages of the great closing 
offensive of the war had been the subject of most careful timing, and of minute 
organisation on the part of the Allied High Command, and of oui' own G.H.Q. Much 
eulogistic writing has been devoted to an attempted analysis of the comprehensive and far- 
reaching plans which resulted in the delivery of blow upon blow, in a prescribed order of 
time and for the achievement of definite strategical and tactical ends. All who played any 
part in these great events will know that it was nothing of the kind[,]’^ ^^  Still the BEF’s 
battalions had not been freewheeling improvisers waging war ad-lib on a large scale. The 
same Monash’s ideas of a battle plan were still rather rigid: ‘The battle plan having 
been...crystallised, no subsequent alterations were peiinissible, under any circumstances, 
no matter how t e m p t i n g . T h e  point is that the initiative was pushed down. Britain’s two 
mutually contradictory command systems, ‘umpiring’ and ‘restrictive control’, coped rather 
well with this, even if reluctantly. When Haig in October wrote in his diary: ‘They [Byng 
and Rawlinson] agreed that no further orders from me were necessary, and both would be 
able to carry on without difficulty’, it was a late aclcnowledgement of an already 
established practice.^^^ Even his Anny commanders’ ability to micro-manage was 
questionable.^^^ As a consequence, Haig like his senior subordinates, ‘proved far more 
effective as a commander once the sphere of his activities began to diminish to an extent 
that brought them within the limits of his capabilities.
Tn fact it sometimes appeared in 1918 that Haig’s command of the BEF had achieved a certain symbolic 
quality, while power in the BEF continued to shift to the anny commanders, in particular to the experienced 
Rawlinson.’ Travers, How The War Was Won, 177.
OODA is an acronym for Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. The OODA Loop is essentially a process by 
which one focuses on observing an event and acting on it faster than tlie enemy. The concept is developed by 
a former fighter pilot in tlie US Air Force, Jolin Boyd.
Quoted in Terraine, Haig, 425.
Quoted in Terraine, Haig, 347.
Blake, Haig, 329. (1 October 1918).
‘As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have perceptively obseived, the role of Haig and the Army 
commanders diminished and became less relevant as the forces under their direction ’grew in  expertise and 
complexity’. Simkins, ‘Haig and his Aimy Commanders’ ,96.
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson Command on the Western Front. Quoted in Simkins ‘Haig and his Army 
Commanders’, 97.
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BEF’s gamut, i.e. the harmony between needs and possibilities in command and 
control, became quite good in the last stage of the war, in fact sufficient to win a world 
war. But it was Foch who had given them time to tune in again, after the cacophony of 
March 1918.
4.6 Conclusion - -que le mieux, est l’ennemi du bien.
The idea of ‘unity of command’ is one of the fixed ideas of the military profession, and one 
of Napoleon’s maxims underscores the apparent obviousness of that idea: ‘Unity of 
command is of the first necessity in war. You must keep the army united, concentrate as 
many of your ti'oops as possible on the battlefield, and take advantage of eveiy opportunity, 
for fortune is a woman: if you miss her today, do not expect to find her t o m o r r o w . B u t  
after seeing the entente cordiale in action some started to doubt the usefulness of 
Napoleon’s maxims: ‘Since I have seen Alliances at work, I have lost something of my 
admiration for Napoleon.
In the twentieth century, when coalition warfare became the western way of war, 
General Wesley K. Clark, the most recent supreme commander in combat, was apparently 
surprised that NATO could do militaiy business at all in a coalition environment: ‘In 
practice almost every nation had special teams monitoring its forces, ready to cry foul at the 
least deviation fi.'om expectations. It was a miracle we had made it as far as this, I thought, 
without a major blowup.
Clark points at problems arising from national coalitions. I think he is wrong. The 
evaluation of coalition warfare has been misdirected. It is easy to explain why generals and 
academics have concentrated on national boundaries, as fighting wai's have for long been 
the prerogatives of the nation-state. My point is that the frustration of command and 
control, as described above, is only spuriously connected to multinationality. The problem 
is not multinationality as such, but the dissonance of what I have called ‘the gamut’. 
Frustrations like Clark’s can also arise within a single-nation operation.
A modem battlefield is characterised by the high numbers of participants on each 
side of the conflict, where all of them could be from the same nation. If for instance the 
U.S.A. had started a war against a South-American state to stop the flow of narcotics, the
Napoleon ‘Notes sur l’art de la gueixe’, quoted in Luvaas, Napoleon on the Art o f War, 64.
General Maurice Sarrail to Clemenceau in 1918. Quoted in Neilson and Prete, Coalition Warfare, vii.
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U.S. State Department, U.S. Defence Department, Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Dmg Enforcement Agency could all participate without any ‘unity of command’ as such. 
Add to this the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and numerous private volunteer 
organisations, many without any other cohesion than a similar T-shirt, unity of command 
would be a deceitful dream, even if everyone present in the field was an American. In 
Robert R. Leonhard’s words: ‘To attempt to apply the aged principle of unity of command 
within this vast cast of characters is not only unrealistic, it is i l l e g a l . I n  fact one of 
Wesley Clark’s major challenges during the Kosovo operation was to sort out ‘friends and 
foes’ within the U.S. Administration. On one occasion Secretary of Defence William S, 
Cohen told Clark, with a ‘voice like ice’: ‘I’ve told you before, you don’t give military 
advice to Holbrooke .Napoleon required unity of thought -  ‘military, diplomatic, and 
f i n a n c i a l T h a t  was a delusion, even for him.
Even within the anned forces itself, ‘unity of command’ is a dream, and not even a 
‘beautiful one’. Artillery and air support, the logistical apparatus and the engineer support 
are seldom under the command of a single commander. A classic statement by General 
Paul X, Kelley, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, sums up the difficulties of inter­
service cooperation, and hence of ‘unity of command’: ‘Asking a man to be as loyal to the 
other services as he is to his own is like asking him to be as loyal to his girlfiriends as he is 
to his wife.
To orchestrate the multi-participant battlefield of our own days, and not only the 
military part of it, talking and persuasion ai'e the only way, as both legal and procedural 
connections can be absent. The frustration of Clark and Foch occurs when the dissonance 
between their expectations or image of proper generalship collides with the given reality. 
Foch expected to be a C.-in. C, but none of his subordinates let him find comfort in that
Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future o f  Combat (New York, 2001), 
399.
Leonhard, The Principles o f  War for the Information Age, 202.
Clarke, JVaging Modern War, 113. Clark’s rather reasonable apology goes like this; ‘[A]s a regional 
commander in chief I couldn’t very well do my job without sometimes exchanging ideas with other members 
of the U.S. government travelling in my region.’ Ibid.
Luvaas, Napoleon on the Art o f War, 65.
Quoted in Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (Washington, 1996), 7.
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illusion for long. Clai'k’s comparison with Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, was also 
misplaced.^^^
The question as to why officers still cling to the myth of the all-powerful 
commander falls outside the scope of this thesis. But Haig’s mind-boggling falsification of 
liis accounts, in spite of the oveiwhelming probability of being exposed, and General 
Clark’s attempt to ‘pull his rank’ against a foreign officer, indicate how deep-rooted the 
image of the Great General is.^^  ^The counter-forces against ‘unity of command’ are 
profound and thought-provoking. The only thing that tend to diminish those counter-forces 
is the ‘sound of guns’ -  the enemy’s guns, that is, or alliances bordering on imperialism, a 
master-vassal relationship. As the presence of the Red Army provided the cohesion of 
NATO during the Cold War, Ludendorff s troops on the Somme provided the cohesion of 
the entente cordiale.^^^ When the ‘glue’, or the presence of a strong Germany, disappeared 
in November 1918, any shadow o f ‘unity’ vanished fast, as the peace conference at 
Versailles would prove.
The struggle for the romanticised ‘unity of command’ will crumble the much more 
important ‘unity of effort.’ The affection for fetching military principles exposed on the 
drawing-board blunts our ability to appreciate boring but feasible heuristics. Lacking a 
‘fifth service’, or non-national military entrepreneurs, without any preferences at all to a 
mother seiwice or nation, the challenge is to reap the fruit of militaiy collaboration without 
subordination. The first step towards that direction is to kill the real ‘ghost o f  Napoleon’ -  
the dream of ‘unity of command.’
T looked over at the picture on the wall of the first Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. I looked down at my desk, the same desk he had used to sign the activation orders of our 
command almost fifty yeai's ago. I was the first of his successors to have to lead NATO to war, and I wasn’t 
going to lose.’ Claiic, Waging Modern War, xxii.
‘Mike, I ’m a four-star general, and I can tell you these tilings.’ From General Clark’s dispute with 
Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson, British Army, over Pristina airfield in 1999. Ibid. 394.
The ‘prototype of all alliances’, the Grand Alliance of 1813-1815, was deeply dependent on pressure from 
without to keep their cohesion within: ‘The pressure exerted by tlie mere knowledge that Bonaparte was still 
at large, reinforced as it was by his sudden and dreadful appeai'ances, was enough to hold the alliance together 
in moments of crisis and eventually to persuade it to consolidate its resources in such a way that victoiy 
became impossible.’ Gordon A. Craig Problems o f Coalition Warfare: the Militaiy Alliance Against 
Napoleon, 1813-1814 (Colorado, 1965), 21.
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Case 2: The strategic colonel
IVb are never tfeceivBd, we deceive oursalves.
■ Goethe
The German military band, belonging to the infantry regiment 307, that had rehearsed and 
polished their instruments for the parade in Oslo, waited rather impatiently on the crowded 
ship that would bring them to the party in Norway. Suddenly, with a crack, they found 
themselves in a place more horrible than Dante’s inferno. They who still lived could 
choose between burning or freezing to death. Some did botli. The brand-new German 
cruiser Blûcher had been on her way to Oslo to capture the Norwegian Royal Family and 
take control of the Norwegian government. No one had expected the Noiwegians to try to 
stop her; hence the flagship herself was in the van of the formation that sailed up the 
narrow Oslo l^ord that cold April night.^^^
At Oscarsborg, a mid-nineteenth centuiy fortress, and the last obstacle for the 
Germans, just 30 km south of Oslo, a gi'ey-haired colonel, close to retirement, decided to 
turn the Gennan musicians’ lives into a real hell. Without any declaration o f war, bending 
his rules of engagement, and totally at odds with Norwegian military traditions, the old 
colonel gave his orders. About one thousand Gennan sailors and infantry were killed, and 
Norway found itself de facto at war for the first time in 125 years.
How could it happen that the old and almost outdated Colonel Birger Eriksen 
(1875-1958) made the arguably most fateful decision in the modern history o f Norway?
5.1 The preface
At the outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, Norway declared herself neutral. 
That declaration was repeated on 3 September, when Great Britain and France declared war- 
on Germany. Since both the Germans and the British knew that a war of economic
Admiral Kummetz inferred from the feeble resistance from the coastal batteries at Rauoy, that the 
Norwegians had orders not to stop them, just to demonstrate a protest against tlie German violation of 
Norwegian neutrality. Frank Binder, and Hans Schlimz, Krysseren Blücher [Schwerer Kreuzer Blûcher] 
(Oslo, 1991), 81. General Major Engelbrecht (163. Infantry division) who also was on Blücher, protested 
fervently against the decision to have the flagship in front, but was brushed aside by Kummets; ‘Oscarsborg 
will never open fire! ’ Quoted in Sven T. Ameberg and Kristian Hosar Vi dro mot Nord. Felttoget i Norge
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blockade was bound to follow, the question of Noi*wegian neutrality was important. For 
Germany Norwegian territorial waters would be an important breathing tube, and an 
effective Norwegian neutrality would give Gennan shipping much better protection than 
the Kriegsmarine could against the Royal Navy, For the Royal Navy, the neutral conidor 
along the Norwegian coast constituted a major gap in the blockade of Gennany. There was 
also a growing belief in London that Swedish iron ore, which during winter was shipped 
through the Norwegian port of Narvik, was the ‘Achilles’ heel of the Gennan war 
economy’.C onsequen tly , Gennany accepted the Norwegian decision immediately, and 
endorsed Norwegian neutrality on 2 September. The Allies did not respond, and only after 
a direct question from the Norwegian Foreign Minister did Great Britain, on 22 September, 
guarantee Norwegian neutrality.
France knew how devastating it was to fight a war on its own soil, and it was not 
unreasonable to think that this time France would like to fight elsewhere. Fuithermore it 
would be a major advantage for Great Britain if the main theatre of war was situated 
overseas. If the Wehrmacht had to bring their amroured forces by ship, the Royal Navy 
would decide the outcome, or at least that was what conventional militaiy wisdom would 
dictate.^^^ The problem was, of course, that the maturity of the air ann had outdated certain 
parts of conventional military wisdom. Churchill, among others, learned this the hard way, 
in the Norwegian waters.
On 8 April, by coincidence the day before Weserübung, four destroyers of the Royal 
Navy laid 234 mines close inshore in the southern approaches to Narvik.^^^ During the
april 1940, skildret av tyske soldater og offiserer [The Norwegian. Campaign, told by German servicemen] 
(Oslo, 1989), 42.
Patrick, Salmon, ‘British strategy and Noivvay 1939-40’ in Patrick Salmon (ed.), Britain andNorway in 
the Second World War (London, 1995), 3.
Steen, 'E.KNorges sjokrig. Volume 1 Sjeforsvarets noytralitetsvern 1939-1940 Tysklands og Vestmaktens 
planer ogforberedelser for en Norgesaksjon. [Noiway’s naval war, Vol 1] (Oslo, 1954), 13.
When Laurence Collier (Cliief of the Northern Department in Foreign Office) heard rumours about a 
German action in Norway in March 1940 he responded: ‘I wish I could believe this story. German 
inteivention in Scandinavia is just what we want!’ Quoted in the forthcoming Norges forsvarshistorie Volume 
3 [Norway’s military history] by Tom Kristiansen and Rolf Hobson.
^^ ‘^But it soon became cleai- that the Admiralty -  from fear of German air attack -  was not willing to send 
anything except submarines into the Skageirak. Such caution revealed a realisation of the effect of air power 
on sea power that the Admiralty had never shown before the war. But it reflected badly on Churchill’s 
judgement in seeking to spread the war to Scandinavia’. Liddell Hart, Histoiy o f the Second Woild War (New 
York, 1971), 61.
Some people have found it a bit too coincidental that the Royal Navy laid mines almost a t  the same 
moment as the Germans approached Norwegian waters. F.H. Hinsley who had free access to official
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previous winter there had been numbers of violations of Noi*wegian neutrality, allegedly 
from all four parties, the Norwegians, the Germans, the Allies, and the Soviets.^^^ 
Nevertheless, the Royal Navy committed the first flagrantly hostile act against Norway. 
The key problem, though, with the mine-laying operation was not the mines, but that the 
operation disturbed both the Norwegian and the British appreciation of the huge German 
threat that materialised at the same moment. The Norwegians looked in the wrong 
d i rec t ion , and  the Royal Navy was caught off its guard, fancying it was the only stalker 
that night.
5.1.1 Weserübung
In December 1939 the leader of the small and inconsequential Norwegian nationalistic 
National Union Party, Vidkun Quisling, was twice granted an audience with Hitler, 
arranged by Admiral Raeder, who wanted to improve the strategic situation of the naval 
forces by seizing Norwegian ports. Hitler told Quisling that it was vital for Germany that 
Norway showed strict impartiality towards the belligerents. If Norway consented to British 
needs Germany had to take actions accordingly.Quisling, on his side, had already 
indicated that the Norwegian government was ‘pro-British’ and that the government had 
decided not to respond by force, if  invaded by any of the belligerents.^^^ On 14 December, 
the same day he had had the last meeting with Quisling, Hitler ordered an investigation for 
an invasion of Nomay, called Studie Nord.
Studie Nord was a contingency plan, and not a plan for an actual operation. But on 
16 February, the planning gained a new degree of seriousness and urgency. On this day the
documents is neveitheless unequivocal in his conclusion; ‘The Germans achieved total surprise by their 
invasion ofNoi-way.’ F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (London, 1979), Vol 1, 127, 
Until further investigation proves otherwise, we have to accept that the actual date for die mine-laying 
operations has to be seen in an intra-France and an inter-France-UK context, and not as much in the German- 
UK-Norway framework. See for instance Michael Tamelanderd and Niklas Zetterling, Den nionde april. 
Nazity>sklands invasion av Norge 1940 [9*'‘ April, The German invasion](Lund, 2000), 36.
I will not cover the Norwegian-Soviet relationship in any length in tliis essay, as the existence of the Red 
Army did not influence Norwegian policy in any significant degree during the spring of 1940, Nils 0rvik,
Vern eller vakt? Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939 Vol II [Guard, or watch? Norwegian security policy 
1920-1939 Vol II] (Oslo, 1961), 327.
‘It is deal' that the vigilance in the Foreign Office was more westwai'd tlian southward. It is from tlie west 
that the pressure seemed more dangerous to the Norwegian neutrality.’ The civilian investigation committee 
of 1945. (Tilrading fi'âprotokollkomiteen om ‘Innstilling fra Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945 [Innst.O.IX 
A] Oslo: 1947), 17.
Hans Fredrik Dahl, Vidkun Quisling. En forer for fall (Oslo, 1992), 42.
Tamelander and Zetterling, Den nionde april, 23.
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Royal Navy had demonstrated to the whole world that it did not respect Norwegian 
neutrality, by hoarding a German vessel, ûiq Altmark, inside Norwegian waters. And the 
Norwegians had demonstrated, by neither inspecting thoroughly, nor fending off
HMS Cossack, that they where unable to safeguard their n eu t r a l i t y .A  couple of days 
later (21 February) General von Falkenhorst was appointed commanding general of the 
operation Wesejmbung. On 3 March, Hitler decided to secure the northern flank before he 
started the offensive in the west: Weserübung should be launched before Fall Gelb.
Operation Weserübung was hazardous, at best. Assault groups should capture the 
most strategic locations simultaneously at 04.15 in the morning of 9 April, at Oslo, Horten, 
Arendal, Kristiansand, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik.^^^ A total of 
about 60 naval vessels and about 10 000 soldiers, would present the Norwegians with a fait 
a c c o m p l i .The war in the noith should end before it had started, by capturing the Royal 
Family and taking control of the Govermnent and Parliament.
Just after 4 o’clock Admiral Kummetz on the bridge of Blücher breathed a sigh of 
relief. He had almost passed the last obstacle to the most important and most difficult part 
of the whole operation. Blücher was well inside the range of Oscarborg’s artillery and 
nothing had happen, not even a searchlight had been seen fi'om the citadel. The assumption 
that the Norwegians would meet the invasion by warning bursts only seemed justified.^®^
Raeder claimed ‘[T]his incident proved beyond a doubt that Norway was completely helpless to defend its 
neutrality... now at last the necessity of moving into Norway had to be strongly considered. ’ From Michael 
Salewski Die deutsche Seehiegsleitung 1935-1945 [1970]. Quoted in Major Timothy F, Lindemann’s ‘Joint 
Operations Case Study Wesembung Nord: Geimany’s Invasion of Norway, 1940% a research paper presented 
to the research department, Air Command and Staff College USAF, 1997.
^®A stoiy by Deiry reveals how hazardous this operation was. As late as 4 p.m. 9 April Chamberlain 
informed the House of Commons that: ‘it was ‘very possible’ to believe that the landing in question was at 
Larvik, not Narvik, though the distance between the two ports is nearly a thousand miles.’ T.K, Derry, The 
Campaign in Naiway (London, 1952), 66. Narvik seemed at bit too far.
One of the reasons why the British intelligence did not anticipate Wesembung was that the forces that were 
concentrated in German harbours were deemed too small to be of any danger. Hinsley, British Intelligence in 
the Second World War, Vol 1, 117.
In a meeting with Hitler in late December 1939 Admiral Erich Raeder assured Hitler that they should not 
expect serious resistance from the Norwegians. (Kristiansen and Hobson, Norges forsvarshistorie, chapter 
19). That assumption underpinned the whole operation, and was an opinion widely held in Europe. Hence, the 
Swedes refused to assist Norway against the Geiman attack because: ‘Norway had no aimy and was already 
practically in German hands.’ From Minister Mallet to Foreign Office 02:20 10.4.1940. Quoted in Kristiansen 
and Hobson, forsvarshistorie, chapter 18.
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5.1.2 Norwegian neutrality
In the period between 1895 and 1905, the Norwegian Armed Forces went through a 
tremendous rearmament process. The tension between Sweden and Norway increased until 
it reached its peak in 1905, when both countries mobilised troops and thousands of them 
faced each other across the b o r d e r . B u t  the Norwegians did not back down despite the 
overwhelming militaiy power of Sweden, and consequently Norway won the brinkmanship 
crises that eventually resulted in the Norwegian act of independence. The Armed Forces 
got their pait of the glory, even if the Swedes had been persuaded more by the gi'eat powers 
of Europe than by Norwegian mitrailleuses.
The fate of Belgium during the Great War made a tremendous impact on 
Norwegian politicians. It was considered utterly foolhardy of the Belgian government to 
resist the German avalanche that poured into their countiy in August 1914. According to 
Norwegian calculations, the only responsible thing to do would have been a symbolic 
resistance to demonstrate that the Geiman annies were violating Belgian neutrality. 
Thereafter Belgium should have waited for the peace conference. The Belgians did not 
achieve anything more by the gun, than they did at the peace talks; they only caused 
needless destmction.^®^ By anning with insufficient weapons of only small-bores 
Norwegian politicians intended to reduce the risk that some trigger-happy individual or 
units would misunderstand the strategy, and start a fatal battle: ‘Not a single shot should be 
f i r ed!Pat r io t i sm,  militaiy enthusiasm, and a feeling of ‘we can do it’ regarding the 
defence against major powers, were all dangerous sentiments that the politicians had to 
repress, or else the politicians could be forced by a popular movement into a war they did 
not want.^^^ As the socialist Kristian Gleditsch wrote in 1935; ‘If the Belgian forces had 
been in disorder, if  they had allowed the German troops to march thi'ough, the Belgian
The Nowegian mobilisation in 1905 was partial and silent, or ‘as little sensational as possible by personal 
order to each man, without the use of church-bells, placards or advertisement.’ Teije H. Holm Forsvaret og 
1905 [The Defence and 1905] (Akershus festnmg: 1980), 27. In 1905 tliis line of action made perfect sense, 
in 1940 it did not, as we will see later.
According to William Fhilpott, it seems that King Albert came to the same conclusion during the Great 
War. ‘Any offensive, King Albert thought, should take place in France, wliile Belgium itself should be 
liberated by diplomacy rather than force.’ Fhilpott, ‘Britain and France go to War’ War in Histoiy 2(1) 
(1995), 45.
Mowinckel (liberal) quoted in Nils 0rvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939 (Sammendrag av 
‘Sikkerhetspolitikken 1920-1939’) (Oslo, 1962), 79. Both the Norwegian Labour party and the Liberals 
warned against playing ‘Belgium’s role’ if a new war broke out.
Qrvik Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939, 82,
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population would probably have got off the war more easily. During a modem war between 
major powers, a functioning defence is a danger to a small nation, not a security. It is 
paramount not to play the role of Belgium in 1914.’ *^^  This strategy had to be secret both to 
the fellow Norwegians and to foreigners as it rested on the illusion that Noi*way would 
defend its dependency. If anyone doubted the Norwegian will to resist, one of the criteria of 
a free nation would vanish, and that could cost dearly at a peace conference. Hence,
Norway had to strike a delicate balance between the ability to guard its neutrality, and its 
ability to fight a real war, which could become a dangerous temptation.^^ ^
This tacit sti'ategy caused a tremendous amount of friction. Given the fonnal tasks 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces: to deter aggression, and to resist if deteiTence failed, 
Norwegian defence ought to be as strong as the purse allowed and the external threat 
demanded. The politicians did the contrary; they made the defence as weak as possible. 
Without the secret premise of trying to avoid Belgium’s fate, their actions seemed almost 
irrational. After the war, it was common to excuse the low pre-war budget allocation by 
referring to a general ‘public poverty’ Norway was certainly not a wealthy nation, but 
there was no financial crisis in Norway in the years leading up to 1940, and the growth in 
the GNP was substantial.^^^ Had the politicians chosen to give priority to military 
measures, more money could have been available.
With hindsight, the idea of not defending the countiy seems almost unbelievable, 
given what we Imow about the German occupation during the Second World War, But the 
bmtality of the Nazi regime was unimaginable for Noiwegian politicians, at least until the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia. If someone attacked Noi*way, and in the 1920’s and early 
1930’s the only power that could do so was Great Britain, the operations would probably 
be temporary and limited. Status quo ante bellum was, according to the attitude, bound to 
follow for any ‘innocent’ nation that demonstrably had protested against the violat ion.^In
Kristian Gledisch, Foran en ny verdenskrig [Facing a new world war] (Oslo, 1935) 91-104. Paraphrased in 
0rvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939, 79.
Terje H. Holm 1940 -  igjen?[\94Q - again?] (Oslo, 1987), 11.
See for instance the recommendations from the civilian investigation committee of 1945. (Tilrading fra 
protokollkomiteen om ‘Innstilling fi'a Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945’ [Imist.O.IX A] Oslo: 1947. p,6) 
The Norwegian GNP rose with 25% in the period between 1934-39. 0ivik, Vern eller vakt?, 78.
0ivik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939, 87.
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other words, the constitutive rules of foreign affairs were taken for granted.Accordingly,  
it would be pure recklessness to endanger eveiything Norway had achieved since 1905 by a 
‘Belgian war’, caused by thoughtless military pride.
Finally, Norway relied on an implicit ‘guarantee’ from the Royal Navy. As long as 
Britain ruled the waves, no one would dare to attack Noiway, except Britain, but why 
should she? The Norwegian Commanding Admiral, Henry Edvard Diesen, had an almost 
bullet-proof syllogism that took the shape of a dogma for the Norwegian Navy: ‘The one 
who wants to conduct a landing here -  whether in the south or elsewhere -  has to be the 
master of the seas. And the one, who is the master, has no need for a landing. -  In my 
opinion this scare is highly exagge r a t ed .The  threat that the ‘hawks’ envisaged, against 
which Diesen directed his polemics, was not an assault on the whole of Norway, but a 
geographically limited occupation of ports for supplying naval forces, and o f bases for air 
operations. A large-scale occupation of the whole, or of greater parts of Norway, was not 
imaginable, not even for the military alarmists.^
In the First World War Norway had from the first day of the war mobilised the navy 
and the coastal artillery, in addition to a number of anny units.^^  ^When the war broke out 
in 1939 Norway was unable to take the same precautionary measures because it did not 
have the personnel required. Colonel Eriksen at Oscarsborg had for instance to use people 
from the kitchen to man his pre-1900 cannons, and even then he had only crew for two of 
the three 28 cm Kiupp-cannons in the main battery.^ Due to the lack of experienced 
personnel the two guns could not be reloaded once fired, and to optimise the hit-probability 
they had to wait until the vessel was at minimum firing range, before opening fire. In 
addition to this, his searchlights were out of order, which together with the fog made it
See chapter 3. The Draconian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which demonstrated to the whole world that might 
was right, could not have made much impression on the Norwegians.
Admiral Diesen, in the newspaper 14 Jan. 1939. Quoted in Odd-Bjom Pure, Mellomkrigstid
1920-1940. Volume 3 i Norsk utenrikspolitisk historié [The history of Norway’s Foreign Policy] (Oslo, 
1996), 305, Diesen ought to have said: ‘The one has to be the master of the air'. But given that not even the 
British Government had grasped the significance of air power yet, he may probably be excused.
See for Captain 0ivinn 0 i ’s speech in March 1939, quoted in Teije Baalsrud Politikken mot forsvaret -  
frem mot 1940. [Politics against defence, up to 1940] (Oslo, 1985), 117.
Steen, Norges sjokrig, 13.
Tamelander and Zetterling, Den nionde april, 84.
90
difficult to measure the distance to the target. Several of Eriksen’s less bellicose
colleagues would undoubtedly have found the gloomy conditions at Oscarsborg an 
excellent excuse for doing nothing.^^^
At 4.21 the old colonel fired his guns in anger, for the first time in his whole career. 
Both shells hit the cruiser and had a devastating effect.^^  ^Blücher lost her steering, and 
drifted towards the torpedo batteries at Kaholmen, where the retired captain Andreas 
Anderssen had just arrived. Eriksen had called him up when he had received messages of 
unloiown intruders in the Ijord, as the regular chief for the battery was off sick.^^^ Eriksen 
ordered two torpedoes launched, and Blücher was doomed. The German flagship, already 
late for the Weserzeit, would not come at all. She came to rest on the ocean floor at 06.22.
A shot had after all been fired!
5.2 Oscarsborg and beyond
In Oslo, the German envoy Curt Brauer demanded to meet the Noiwegian Foreign 
Minister, Halvdan Koht, at 4.20. At this meeting Brauer handed over a memorandum of 19 
pages, containing the German claims. The original plan was that Brauer should bring a big 
stick to the meeting, in the drapery of German mai'ching bands in the streets, and the huge 
shining Blücher, Emden and Lützow at the harbour. But now he had only empty threats, and 
it was not difficult for the Noiwegian government, which was gathered at Koht’s office, to 
call the bluff.^ '^^
One might have imagined that the Norwegians would suirender immediately, given 
what is been said above about the neglected putrefaction of Norwegian military power. But 
the Norwegian government did not know the scale of the German assault, though they
Erilcsen stated in a newspaper aiticle in Aftenposten 6 June 1945, that the seai'chlights were just 
operational again after maintenance but not used. (Microfilm at the National Library, Oslo)
^^Hn a remark as to why the coastal artillery at Makeroy, further south in the Oslofjord, had remained silent 
during the German invasion, the investigation committee that was established after the war added; ‘Here as in 
many other places one got the impression that they concentrated on finding a reasonable excuse to give in.’ 
NOU 1979:47 Rapport fra Den Militœre Undersalcelseskommisjonen av J946., 36.
The overwhelming effect of the shelling was partly due to the fact that the Germans had not prepared the 
ship for operations in a war zone. Eriksen’s article in Aftenposten 6 June 1945.
Eriksen had received a message that the ships where German, but he distrusted the identification, due to 
the restricted visibility. Ibid.
Had Germany demonstrated her power with troops, ships or bomber aircraft, the Norwegian govermnent 
would probably have done as their colleagues in Copenhagen. But the remaining German ships had turned 
south, and due to the weatlier no aircraft showed up in time. Ole Kristian Grimnes, Veien inn i krigen. 
Regjeringen Nygaardsvolds krigsvedtak i 1940. [The road to war, tlie government’s decision for war] (Oslo, 
1987), 17.
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knew that there had been sporadic fighting in several other parts of Norway. It is not 
unthinkable that Brauer’s message came almost as a relief. By explicitly offering Norway a 
‘deal’, Brauer unwittingly gave Koht the opportunity overtly to refuse it, and by that to give 
the crucial signal of Norwegian will to stay independent.^^^ Norway’s ability to fight was 
much less important. Furthermore, by accepting Brauer’s ultimatum, Noi*way would have 
joined the war on the ‘wrong side’. In addition, a war on Norwegian soil could follow 
irrespective of the Norwegian answer to Brauer.^^^
When later on the seriousness of the situation dawned upon Koht, he was no longer 
so sure what to do, He and several of his colleagues in the government were interested in 
an ‘understanding’ with the Germans when they saw more of the whole pictui'e, and got the 
impression that Hitler really had presented them with a fait accompli, despite the minor 
hiccups. The reason why Norway finally got the courage to pick a war with the strongest 
military land-power in Europe, was that Germany added a new demand, that the Norwegian 
King should appoint Quisling Prime Minister in N o r w a y . T h e  King refused, and 
maintained that he would abdicate if he was forced to do such a thing. The royal rebuttal 
was not decisive though. What frightened and embittered the Noiwegians was that the new 
claim of Germany made clear that the whole operation was something more than just a 
military precautionary measure. Now it was obvious that Hitler wanted a political and 
ideological reorientation of Norway. That was too much to ask for.^^  ^This was clearly not 
a ‘Belgian’ war, it was a war of conquest.
The sinking of Bliichei' and the campaign that followed were maybe insignificant in 
military terms, but Eriksen’s resoluteness in this sub-Arctic night had in fact a major 
impact on the following world war. By giving the government a breathing space, the Allies 
gained a very substantial benefit fi'om the Norwegian mercantile fleet, ‘which was
When Koht rejected the German ultimatum he said: T remember what your Führer said recently; a people 
that without resistance give in to an assaulter is not worthy of life.’ Bjom Bjomsen, Det utrolige dognet [The 
unbelievable day] (Oslo, 1977), 86. It was apparently important to demonstrate a will to live, not to win the 
war.
The Norwegian Minister of Justice, Terje Wold, writes in his unpublished memoirs that since Norway 
probably would be a theatre of war anyhow, it was paramount that Norway joined the right side. Cited in 
Grimnes, Veien inn i bigen, 28.
The guarantee from Britain that they had ‘decided forthwith to extend their full aid to Norway and will 
fight the war in full association with them’, was important for the decision to take the war, but not sufficient. 
The message quoted is from a telegram from Foreign Office to Cecil Doinier, dated 12:55 9.4.1940. Cited in 
Ki'istiansen and Hobson, Norges forsvarshistorie, chapter 18
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subsequently profitably employed in the Atlantic convoys and elsewhere’ But the most 
important consequence of Eriksen’s action was that he saved the skin of Churchill. As First 
Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill bore the responsibility for the fumbling o f the Royal 
Navy.^^° But Chamberlain, as Prime Minister, had later to take the political blame for the 
disastrous intervention in Norway, and the poor perfonnance of the British Army that 
followed. Churchill had been wrong in Norway, but Chamberlain apparently even more. In 
other words, the shot from Oscarsborg deserves to be heard around the world:
Of course, Churchill might have risen to the top without the stimulus of 
the Norwegian campaign, but it was by no means an inevitable 
outcome. It was perhaps the single most significant event for Britain in 
the course of the war; for who would claim, whatever his faults, that any 
other leader could have sustained the nation so successfully in the dark 
days ahead?^^'
In the pages above I have drawn the broad scene behind Eriksen’s decision to commit an 
act of war. hi the following I will look closer into the authority over distance that 
sun'ounded him.
5.3 The Norwegian Authority over distance in April 1940
5.3.1 Authority
Despite the fact that Noiivay is governed by the parliamentary system, and that the 
government did not have a majority in the parliament, foreign affairs in Norway were 
virtually handled by one man only, Halvdan Koht. The spealcer of the parliament, Carl J. 
Hambro, and the liberal, Johan L. Mowinckel, also had great knowledge and interest in 
foreign affairs, but, even if Hambro’s contribution bolstered the government in the first 
days of the war, their ability to influence the secretive Koht was modest. A sign of Koht’s 
high-handed attitude in foreign affairs is revealed in Hambro’s biography. On 6 April the 
Prime Minister, Nygaardsvold, called Hambro, a conservative, to ask him whether he had
Grimnes in Jo Benkow and Ole Kristian Grimnes Vendepunkt -  9. april i vàr bevissthet. [Turning point -  
9 April in our conscious] (Oslo, 1990), 38.
Maurice Harvey ‘The balance sheet of tlie Norwegian campaign’ in Salmon (ed.) Britain and Norway in 
the Second World War, 21.
In a letter to General Ismay after the war, Churchill admitted: ‘I certainly bore an exceptional measure of 
responsibility for the brief and disastrous Norwegian campaign - if campaign it can be called’. Quoted in John 
Lukacs, The Duel (New York, 1991), 32.
Maurice Haivey ‘The balance sheet of the Norwegian campaign’, 23.
93
heard any news from Koht. Hambro gave a negative reply, and was instead asked to call 
Koht to find out whether he had any more infonnation about reported German naval 
movements. Nygaardsvold’s reason to beg a politician from an opposition party to plead 
for infonnation from a member of his own party and cabinet was, according to Hambro, 
that; ‘Koht does not speak to us, but he tells you something, once and a w h i l e . H e n c e ,  
Koht was almost the incarnation of the civilian authority in Norway’s foreign affairs. 
Consequently we will meet him again in the pages that follow.
The decision to mobilise on the morning of 9 April, and the ‘declaration’ of war 
that implicitly followed the refusal of Brauer’s ultimatum, were political decisions with 
military consequences, but there was practically no one around who possessed the 
appropriate military grip.
The general staff evacuated to a hotel on the outskirts of Oslo, when the 
headquarters lost its power supply during an air-raid warning at about 04.30.^^^ Much to 
their surprise, they found the hotel crowded with guests, and of no use for military staff 
work. Hence, the general staff was literally on the mn, and about to fall apart. The 
department responsible for the physical writing of the mobilisation orders actually ended 
up around Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher Nielsen’s private dining table, where the crucial 
orders where put to p r i n t . W h e n  the commanding general, Kristian Laake, who had gone 
home for his toiletries, eventually arrived at the hotel he could not find anyone, and no 
message telling him where to find his staff. What made matters even worse was that he 
couldn’t get a car from the hotel. Hence the general wasted the most crucial hours, when 
Wesembung, due to bad weather and the resistance from Oscarsborg and the coastal 
artilleiy at Kris t iansand,was about to collapse, walking in the streets of Oslo searching 
for the general staff.
Johan Hambro, CJHambro, Liv ogDrom. (Oslo, 1984), 208.
Lars Borgersrud, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon. Nytt fys pâ forsvarshistorien fra 1814 til 1940 
[Conspiracy and capitulation, a new light in Norway’s military history] (Oslo, 2000), 219.
Ibid. 220.
The coastal artilleiy at Odderoya, outside the city of Kristiansand, in the southern part o f  Norway, initially 
withstood the Geiman task force no IV. It took several hours, with bombardment from sea and air, before the 
Norwegian forces, under suspicious circumstances, gave in. It is important to notice that even if the resistance 
from the remaining coastal batteries was feeble in comparison with Oscarsborg, their contributions were 
above average, compared with their fellow services.
Bjornsen, Det utrolige dognet, 159.
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The conclusion is that the legal authority in Norway, the civilian, which was also 
evacuated hurly-burly out of Oslo in morning, and the military, were both in disarray in the 
crucial hours of the 9 April. The question is; who took then the lead, if any?
5.3.1.1 Whose intentions?
A fact that complicated the mobilisation for war even further was that the relationship 
between the Norwegian Labour Party, which took office in 1935, and the officers was 
disastrous. The party had declared itself as a revolutionary class party in 1918, and had 
during the early thirties tried to disband the armed forces, the sword of the bourgeoisie. 
Apparently there was almost a civil war between them.^^  ^As a curiosity, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Oscar Torp, who became Minister of Defence in the Norwegian exile 
government in London during the war, had in fact been imprisoned for five months for 
anti-military agitation in 1924, and had lost the right to seiwe in the Norwegian Armed 
forces.^^  ^Labour was not pacifist per se, but anti-militarist. They wanted a new anny with 
the ‘best sons of the working class’ as o f f i ce r s . The  Labour politicians were not deaf to 
the gale warnings that poured in fi'om Europe in the years preceding the Second World 
War. But the party rhetoric and personal antipathies were hard to overcome and 
precluded foreign policy consensus, even in the face of a grave external t h r e a t . B y  
insisting on party politics, by refusing numerous proposals for a coalition government, and 
by estranging the officers, Labour impeded its own crisis management enviromnent. One of 
the most serious crimes of omission was that Minister of Defence Fredrik Monsen refused
Nils 0rvik, Solidaritet eller noytralitet. Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk 1920-1939, Vol 1 [Solidarity or 
neutrality, Norwegian security policy 1920-1939 Vol I] (Oslo, 1960), 127.
Einar Gerhaifisen, who after the war became the longest serving Piime Minister in Norwegian history, was 
sentence to 75 days in prison in the same trial. Egil Helle, Oscar Torp -arbeidergutt og statsmann. (Oslo, 
1982), 82-92 .
Martin Tranmæl at Labour parly’s national congress in 1936. Quoted in 0rvik, Vern eller vakt?, 103.
One of the main Labourite protagonists, chief editor Martin Tranmæl, stated in a speech in  April 1939; 
‘We are up against a stormy night, which can cause a catastrophe. Today we have the responsibility for a 
whole population. Our party and our government have realised this[.] ’ Quoted in Baalsnid, Politikken mot 
forsvaret, 112.
‘French politics in the thirties is a case in point. Class antagonism so dominated politics that the cry of the 
Right became ’Better Hitler than Blum’ and French national interests in Europe were sacrificed to the 
domestic interests of political coalition.’ Lebow Between War and Peace, 71. The Norwegian case is not 
identical, but we recognise the same mechanism.
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to call ib.Q Defence counsel after 1937.^ "^  ^Consequently, Labour’s arrogant pre-crisis 
decisions made the crisis even more difficult to handle.
The distrust between Labour politicians and the officers worked both ways. In the 
cold early morning of 9 April, Birger Eriksen did not know anything about Curt Brauer or 
about the Nonvegian refusal. But he feared that the politicians would not dare to stand up if 
pushed. When Eriksen gathered his officers after he had learned that there had been gunfire 
further south, some of them suggested that he should ask for pre-orders from higher 
author i t ies .But  Eriksen refused: he had the orders he needed, and he was afraid that 
someone above him in the hierarchy would get cold feet and not allow him to open fire, 
with the possibility of sinking a foreign ship and actually killing peop le . Er ik sen  had 
talked to his superior officer, Admiral Smith-Johansen, in Horten at 23:55 on 8 April. As 
indicated by the log, it seems that he only got a situation r e p o r t . B u t  according to the 
foimer commandant at Oscarsborg, Magnar Torvaldsen, this is not the whole tiuth. 
Torvaldsen says that Eriksen actually asked the Admiral for orders, but the Admiral did not 
dare to give him any. Eriksen was frustrated but chose to keep the Admiral’s vacillation off 
the record. '^^  ^Colonel Eriksen did not leave any diary or memoirs that reveal his real 
intentions. But a more famous Norwegian officer, Otto Ruge, did. Ruge’s action in the 
chaotic morning may shed some light on Eriksen’s decision.
In. 1934 the Defence counsel (Forsvai'srâdet), was established to enhance the cooperation between civil and 
military authorities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and Commanding General, 
Commanding Admiral were its most distinguished members. The counsel did not manage to bridge the gap, 
something the general staff found problematic during the thirties. The counsel did not meet after 1937.
Tt follows that leaders must also be evaluated in terms of their precrises decisions, that is, the extent to 
which they were effective in creating a policymaking environment conducive to successful crisis management 
within the limitations imposed by the political culture in which they operated.’Lebow, Between War and 
Peace, 335.
A small patrol boat, ‘Pol IIP, was tlie fu'st Noiivegian unit in contact witli the intruders in  the Oslofjord. It 
fii'ed warning bursts about 23.00 8 April, and was subsequently destroyed by tlie Gennans. Hence, its captain, 
Leif Welding Olsen, became the fu'st Norwegian officer killed in action dming the Second World War.
Sten Wahlsti'om og Jorgen Weibull, Historia pâ plats. (Malmo, 1990), 102. It has not been possible to 
verify this allegation in any written materiel. Sten Wahlstrom states that the assertion is based on ‘coalesced 
interpretation of different sources’, and is unable to give any specific reference. (Wahlstrom in a letter to the 
author, dated 27 March 2001.)
‘Admiral Smith-Johansen reported personally tliat OsloQord fought intruding naval units. ’ Rapport fra  
sjefen for S.F.D.I KontreadmiralJ.Smith-Johansen p,4 National Archives Krigen i Norge Box 180 [The war 
in Norway]
A telephone conversation with Captain Magnar Torvaldsen (retired), former commandant at Oscarsborg, 
15.02.01.
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At the outbreak of war Ruge was the inspector of the infantry, and therefore had no 
position in the operational chain of command.Nevertheless,  when the evacuating 
Norwegian government by coincidence passed through the town where he was posted 
during mobilisation, he decided to show up on his own initiative. He had talked to the 
commanding general and the chief of staff and got the impression that they wanted to 
surrender. Turning a blind eye to the chain of command, and its traditional procedures in 
civil and military relationships, he seized the opportunity to get in touch with an ‘old 
friend’, the Minister of Defence, Birger Ljungberg himself, to ensure that the government 
was determined to fight. Ruge did not find Ljungberg in the school building that served as 
the temporaiy parliament of Noiway. While waiting for Ljungberg he was fortuitously 
asked by the Minister of Justice, Terje Wold, what he as an officer thought about the 
situation. Ruge told him that he was there to tell his old friend Ljungberg that the 
government could not give in now. Wold was exhilarated and said that apait from himself, 
Ljungberg and the Minister of Supply, Trygve Lie, the whole govermnent was wavering. 
After that encounter Ruge was occasionally in touch with several of tlie cabinet members. 
The day after, Ruge was formally appointed commanding general as an answer to General 
Kristian Laake’s obvious inadequacy as a wartime leader. In essence it was only a rubber- 
stamping of the decision he himself had taken the day before.
Ruge’s act of ‘disobedience’ gave hhn one of the most prominent places in the 
scantily populated pantheon of Norwegian war heroes. Under different circumstances, 
raising his voice in political circles, where he had no business at all, would have cost him 
not only his job, but also his reputation. Birger Eriksen had the right to speak, so to speak, 
with his guns. But he decided to say something else than was expected of him. He was 
expected to give the intruders a lesson, not to kill them.
5.3.1.2 Political dirigibility
A consequence of Labour’s distaste for officers, was a severe alienation fr'om the whole 
business of war-fighting. They lacked elementaiy military knowledge, and did not ask for 
any assistance from officers, even after Brauer’s visit. The fumbling that followed was 
disastrous and inevitable.
‘^*®This section is based on Otto Ruge, Felttoget. Erindringer fra kampene april - jtm i 1940. [The Campaign, 
memoirs] (Oslo, 1989), 13-28.
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When Koht infonned Parliament, in the late afternoon of 9 April, of the government’s 
decisions so fai', he said that it had mobilised the four southernmost ‘brigades’. Later he 
was criticised for this, because his phrasing gave the impression that it was only the 
brigades, and not the entire military force in the Southern Norway that had been mobilised. 
In his memoirs Koht blamed his lack of military knowledge for his inaccuracy.^"^  ^And he 
continued his apologia by saying that, in ft'ont of among others the Minister of Defence, he 
had infonned a journalist that Norway had ‘fully mobilised’. In other words, there should 
not have been any reason for doubt. In fact, the encounter with the journalist provoked even 
more confusion, in ways that were far beyond Koht’s expertise to foresee.
At the crack of dawn on 9 April, the editor from the Nomegian Press Agency, S.A. 
Friid, showed up on his own initiative, at the train station where the govermnent, 
parliament and the royal family were about to leave Oslo. Friid managed to get a word with 
the Foreign Minister, Koht said that the government had refused to accept the German 
ultimatum, and that it had given the militaiy order of a general mobilisation, but not that 
Noiway was at war with Geimany. Moreover it was simply not true that the cabinet had 
ordered general mobilisation, a fact that we will return to later, and it was utterly unwise to 
say so. The government had decided upon a silent mobilisation, and consequently the 
troops were called up by mail.
There was already a latent confusion about when the reservists should meet on 
mobilisation. In accordance with the regulations of 1935 the troops were meant to meet the 
day after the order had gone out. But as late as 2 April 1940 the commanding general 
announced that the troops should meet on the fourth day after the order had been issued.^^^ 
In itself, such a change was bound to cause confusion, as it preceded the real mobilisation 
by only seven days. In addition, when the chief of the General Staff, Colonel Rasmus
‘I was not that educated in the technical military expressions, and I spoke witliout preparations.’ Halvdan 
Koht, Frâ skanse til skanse, Minne frà laigsmânadene i Norge [The war in Norway, memoirs] (Oslo, 1947), 
19
The rather strange reason for this was that he feared tliat the politicians would wait too long to ‘pall the 
tiigger’ and the army therefore needed the thi'ee extra days to get on their feet. Magne Skodvin, Norsk historié 
1939-1945 (Oslo, 1991), 18. In fact it was no reason to think that the enemy would give them three days 
respite.
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Hatledal, finally got permission to mobilise he cut down the time lapse by two days, and set 
11 April as the first day of mobilisation.^^ ^
Back to Koht: what should reservists who heard the message from the Foreign 
Minister on the radio believe? Should they start to count days fi*om Koht’s message, or 
start counting fi'om the day the letter from the mobilisation office arrived? Whatever 
decision they took, many of those who had the guts to join for a war met a closed door or a 
message that they should go home and come back later, on Thursday, 11 April as the 
quartermasters and commandants would not, or could not, just hand out weapons and 
ammunitions to people that wanted to shoot at the Geimans. This did not improve fighting 
spirit.
That Koht lacked education in ‘technical military expressions’ is explicable, his 
inability to ask for help less so. Trygve Lie blames the commanding general for not 
demanding a conference with the government, on the morning of 9 April. This is utterly 
unfair to General Laake. Constitutional custom prohibits officers from giving a politician 
any order, qua politician - it was the other way around.^^^ Koht’s modus operandi, though, 
was even more deplorable: ‘We need, I guess, the courage to wait to talce decisions until 
the occasion arises. For situations usually do not materialise the way you have anticipated 
them, they usually show up quite differently than expected, and it is then that you have to 
make the decision that that situation asks for.’^ ^^  This seems like political prudence, but it 
shows no concerns for the complexity of military operations. When the threat has 
materialised it is too late. It is when the plans were drawn and the decisions made that 
steadfastness is important. The pivotal moment was when Captain Vian on the destroyer 
H.M.S. Cossack smashed into the Geiman freighter in February, not when Brauer
knocked on Koht’s door in April.
The chief of the General Staff had no executive power, he was only the administrative manager of the staff. 
On mobilisation the commanding general would turn into commander in chief, and the general staff into 
Army Headquarter. Borgersrud, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 218.
Tamelander & Zetterling, Den nionde april, 94. Hatledal himself said afterwards to the investigation 
committee that Koht’s slip of the lip was fortunate. At least some got an early start by meeting immediately. 
(Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945 bilag nr 7 ‘ Aprildagene’ box no. 3, p,83)
353 Trygve Lie, Leve eller do. Norge i b ig  [Norway at War](Oslo, 1955), 21 The Prime Minister meant that 
the Minister of Defence would ensure the liaison with the armed forces, and that a meeting with the 
commanding admiral and general would be superfluous. Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945 bilag nr 7 
‘Aprildagene 1940’ box no. 3, page 78
Koht, Halvdan. Quoted in Grimnes, Veien inn i bigen. 111.
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The Norwegian commanding admiral had ^VQnAltmark exemption from the 
neutrality regulations, by letting it through restricted area, as he was afraid that a ‘ticklish’ 
situation could occur if the Royal Navy benefited from a Norwegian ejection of the ship.^^  ^
Admiral Diesen made his decision in consultation with the under-secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office, Jens Bull. Koht was in Trondheim and cannot be blamed for the actual 
decision to let Altmark continue the journey in Noi*wegian waters. The Norwegian 
gunboats Kjell and S/ca/w were on the spot when Cossack opened fire upon the Altmark to 
liberate assumed British captives. The Norwegian vessels obseiwed the blatant violation of 
Norwegian neutrality, just as Norwegian regulations ordered them to do, given the 
violator’s superior armament. Then Koht made a capital mistake. Both in letters of apology 
to Germany and in a speech in the parliament, Koht underlined that Norway could not do 
anything when it met superior force. It was in fact an invitation to all the bullies in the 
world. Let us instead imagine that the Norwegians had put up a fierce fight, and had been 
blown to bits by the intruder, or if Koht had foamed with anger on the Parliament’s rostrum 
and promised a beating to the next rowdy. If the Norwegians had signalled a credible 
willingness to defend their independence, none of the belligerents could have gamble’d on 
an occupation as a mere side-show to the ‘real’ conflict. Norway was not that important for 
any of them.^^^ Instead Norway did the opposite.
Koht and Fredrik Monsen, the Minister of Defence from 1935 to 1939, seemed to 
relate only to the types of crisis that later got the name brinbnanship. Like a conflict one 
could deliberately refuse to participate in.^^  ^In 1933 Fredrik Monsen explained that 
Norway had managed to stay out of the Great War because Norway had a ‘leadership that 
refrained from the use of force even against fairly serious violations of the neutrality 
regulations[.. .]our military apparatus was not used as an instrument of wai-’.^ ^^  The 
problem of course was that by doing this the likelihood of being drawn into a  spin-off crisis 
increased drastically, but neither Koht nor Monsen had any notion of such a crisis. Colonel
This section is based on National Ai'chives Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945 bilag nr 4 ‘Altinarksaken’ 
in box no. 3
A tempting ‘what if :  What if a captain with Colonel Eriksen’s dispositions had commanded Kjelll 
Major J.N. Kirkman (M.L2.b), an officer from Great Britain, made in July 1939 a tour o f  Norway, Sweden 
and Denmai'k. In his report to Laurence Collier at the Foreign Office, dated 15 August 1939, (70371/23662), 
he reported of Norwegian belief in isolationism. ‘There seemed to be a general atmosphere that there would 
probably not be a war, but that if there was, Norway would retire into her shell and keep clear of it.’. (Kindly 
handed to me by lecturer Nils Naastad at the Royal Norwegian Airforce Academy.)
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Otto Ruge, then chief of staff, knew the reality of spin-off crises: ‘By its [the neutrality 
guard’s] very existence, it will make cleai' that the violation of Norwegian neutrality will 
cause more pain than gain -  that it will not be profitable to try it.’^^  ^This had been 
common military sense for thousands of yeai's: "Qui desideratpacem, praeparet bellum. 
Koht had the nerve to defy it: ‘If you want peace, you have to prepare for p e a c e . T h i s  
statement must be read in the light of the Norwegian fear of being turned into a new 
‘Belgium’, as noted above. If not attacked, Norway would retain peace; if attacked Norway 
would still retain peace, by refusing to fight. The problem was, as we have seen, that the 
second option undermined the first. The irony is that Koht was right: the Gennans came 
allegedly with peace, as aggi*essors always do,^^  ^but Hitler’s concept of peace was at odds 
with Koht’s.
The conclusion is that the Noi*wegian politicians’ long-standing ignorance of 
military affairs had given them a poor direction of military matters. They did not know 
which words to use in their command and control function. Likewise, their lack of 
understanding fooled them into believing that the ‘moment of tiuth’ would be clearly 
visible. Apparently Koht and Monsen believed that all belligerents in a war join 
voluntaiily. It seemingly did not occur to them that ‘war could be interested in Norway, 
even if  Norway was not interested in war’, as the harder they tried to hide, the more 
tempting it became to find them.
5.3.2 Intention
In this chapter we will see that command and control is not only a question o f  eloquence 
and of political coup d ’oeil We saw in chapter 2 that there can be a tension between 
perspectives, and a ‘tension between actions that appear to be most militarily prudent to
Fredrik Monsen in parliament March 1933, quoted in QrAkyern eller Vakt p,I06.
Otto Ruge, ‘Norges stilling under en europeisk krig’ VârHœr 7. (1936) Quoted in Orvik, Vern eller Valet, 
324.
Flavius Vegetius Renatus (If you want peace, prepare for war.)
Koht in a parliament meeting March 1936. Quoted in 0rvik, Vem eller Vakt, 125. Monsen worked the 
same logic as Koht: ‘We cannot rely on cannons, if we go for that option we can be sure that one day will 
come when we no longer can be called free and independent.’ Monsen in the Parliament 10. June 1937. 
Quoted in 0rvik, Vern eller Vakt, 155.
‘The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over 
our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In 
other words it is the weak, those likely to need defence, who should always be armed in order not to be 
overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.’ Clause witz, On War, 370
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officers in the field and those that ai*e considered diplomatically appropriate by senior 
political officials’. In the Norwegian case this tension was acute.
5.3.2.1 Conflicting perspectives
Even if  Norway was neutral in accordance with the Hague convention of 1907, it was not 
indifferent to the war itself. The leading Norwegian politicians were in no doubt that it was 
the Allies who held the moral high ground. To join tlie war on the German side would not 
only be a moral catastrophe for Norway, but also an economic and strategic disaster. With 
Norway’s long coast, and its dependence on fishing and imported victuals, the Royal Navy 
could literally strangle her, as it had done the last time Noiway was at war, during the reign 
of Napoleon. But you cannot both be neutral and have a strong preference towai'ds one 
of the sides. Then you’re not neutral. At least, you cannot say it to anyone. Koht showed no 
regret about this tacit double game: ‘We had never said it in plain words; we would not nail 
it down as an official policy; it would feel like we disentangled us fi'om the neutrality. But 
we understand each other all right, eveiyone agreed tacitly when I used my manner of 
speaking about the ‘wrong side’.’^ "^^  Wlrat he didn’t say anything about was how the 
command and control apparatus could carry such a feeble notion to the military 
commanders who were scattered around the entire country, unsure of what to do if 
someone got too close.
Obviously, the regulations that the neutrality guard followed did not say anything 
about a ‘wrong side’. But the watch crews along the coast had a pattern of earlier actions to 
cling to. Norway had very rarely used weapons against violators of its neutrality,^^^ In other 
words, the use of force was an almost unseen exception to the practice of spectating. It 
made no difference whether the violator was Geiman or British, i f  the practical 
enforcement of the neutrality regulations revealed any ‘wrong side’, the wrong side was 
British. Koht was afraid that Royal Navy’s harassment of German vessels in Norwegian
As a professor in history, Koht was not unaware of this historical parallel. In a parliament meeting on 31 
August 1939, he reminded the audience of the Norwegian road to war in 1807 and concluded; ‘I think that 
experience could be a warning to us all.’ Grimnes, Veien inn i krigen, 25.
Koht, Fj'â skanse til skanse, 24.
Borgersrud clams that it happened against Soviet planes, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 234, while Magne 
Skodvin notes an incident where wanting bursts was approved against two British aircraft over Bergen, Norsk 
historié 1939-1945, 32
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waters could force Hitler to take precautionary meas ur es He nc e ,  it was important to 
show Berlin that there were no velvet gloves involved in the dealings with London and 
Paris. Hence, all actions that had preceded 9 April emphasised neutrality watch, not guard, 
with a bias against the perfidious Albion. In other words, what was self-evident in the 
political corridors was counter-intuitive to anyone outside the small circle o f  trust.
Koht did not make the guesswork any easier by his constant intervention in 
operational decisions. On 8 April Koht was asked by the commanding admiral what he 
should to do if the mine-laying vessels from the Royal Navy seized the opportunity to enter 
Narvik harbour and attack Gennan cargo ships there. The admiral suggested that he should 
tell the Norwegian naval vessels in the ai'ea to stop them, Koht rather hesitantly gave his 
approval, which in fact was well outside his prerogatives as Foreign Minister/^^ Later the 
same day, amidst exhausting and seemingly endless meetings in the Parliainent,^^^ Koht 
received a message that Gennan naval vessels were observed out in the North Sea, and that 
they were probably heading for Narvik. Koht found some comfort in the fact that this 
message came from London, so the Royal Navy obviously Icnew about the movement, and 
he hoped that they would ‘catch the Gennans’ before they could do any harm.^^^ Again 
Admiral Diesen called the Foreign Minister, and suggested that he should give new orders 
to his vessels at Narvik, that they should engage the Gennans but let the British pass, since 
they came to Norway’s assistance. ‘Of course I gave him my a p p r o v a l . S u c h  an 
involvement by the Foreign Minister in military matters could be a source o f  confusion.
The grapevine can run hot in dangerous times, and the tmth is certainly the first victim of 
war. In his memoirs Koht attacks a mmour that said that he had sent a telegram that said 
that no one should resist the Gennans. The authenticity of the telegram, and even the 
existence of the telegram itself, has never been proved, and Koht blamed the 
inmourmongers that flourished. Anyway he said something strange, given his 
conversations with Diesen: ‘The Foreign Minister had obviously no right to give militaiy 
orders, and no sane officer would think of following an ‘order’ from me.’^ *^ In fact, most
3 66
3 67
Koht, Frà skanse til skanse, 8 
Ibid. 10.
Koht’s fhistration over his colleague’s verbosity in tlie parliament is a striking evidence o f  the totally lack 
of any idea of crisis management and of the importance of vigilance and swiftness in tense situations. Ibid. 15. 
Ibid. 13.
Ibid.
Ibid. 18.
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officers would probably follow the orders from a Foreign Minister, but luckily some 
refused. On the evening of the Koht forbade the Noiwegian ti'oops at Midtskogen from 
stopping the German paratroops that chased the King and his government. This skirmish 
became in fact the ‘second Oscarsborg’ of the Norwegian campaign; witlrout it the King 
had probably been captured. Otto Ruge says in his memoirs that he had talked to Koht on 
the telephone and refused to follow his orders, without a formal order from the government 
itself. Koht had asked him: ‘Do you actually mean we should fight?’ ‘Yes’ the colonel 
answered, and Koht had thanked him, on the verge of his tears,^^^
The discrepancy between Koht’s bird's-eye view and the perspectives of the military 
worms was frirther increased by the fact that the Noiw^egian Armed forces were rich in 
Nazi-sympathisers and members of Quisling’s political party. The commander of Infantiy 
regiment 15 in Narvik, Colonel Konrad Sundlo, was a party veteran in Quisling’s Nasjonal 
Samling. He was an unreliable person to have in charge of the land forces around Narvik, 
which had been the ’hot spot’ during the winter. In fact, the speaker of the parliament in 
Oslo, Carl J Hambro, had himself unsuccessfully tried to remove him.^^  ^ The result on the 
9*^  was as expected. Not a shot was fired by the ground forces at Narvik, despite the fact 
that the Germans had sunk two of Norway’s main naval vessels on their way in, and 
consequently killed hundreds of Noiwegian sailors. Sundlo was sentenced to imprisonment 
for life after the war for collaboration with the occupant during the war, but strangely not 
for t reachery.Sundlo was not alone. Even the general staff itself was craixuned with 
officers sympathising with Hitler and Germany. The chief of the mobilisation section,
Major A.F. Munthe, was in fact one of the founders of Quisling’s party, and a close 
personal friend. It was a rather delicate situation, and the chief of the general staff, Colonel 
Hatledal, got a rather nasty feeling when he learned that it was German ships that
Ruge, Felttoget, 20. In 1949 the Norwegian government issued a directive which is still valid {Kgl res 10 
Juni 1949), that gave a striking example of a lesson learned that was too hard to state explicitly, but too 
important to overlook. The directive pronounced that in the event of an armed attack, officers were to 
mobilise regardless of whether the government issued the order. Orders of discontinuance issued in the name 
of the government were to be assumed to be false. Likewise, resistance was to continue irrespective of enemy 
threats of retaliatory bombing. This directive was designed as a measure against potential ‘Quislings’. Hence, 
the directive was a safeguard against psychological operations and black propaganda. But it is not 
uni'easonable to think that the directive also was an attempt by the politicians to ward against defeatists among 
themselves and the officers. Just as Odysseus had himself tied to the mast, the Norwegian politicians had 
automatically suspending their own authority in case of war.
Bjomsen, Det utrolige dognet, 54.
Borgersrud, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 331.
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penetrated his perimeters, knowing the preferences of some of his key personnel,^^^ 
Ironically, Quisling himself should have done his military service at the general staff when 
mobilised, but he had got higher ambitions.
To sum up, even if  it was paramount not to end up on the ‘wrong side’ of the war, 
the way to put that strategy into practice was unknown to any of those assigned to 
transform that attitude into physical actions. Fuithermore, orders and counter-orders 
flourished, without much coordination and impact assessment. On top of that, important 
figures in the military supported Hitler in the ongoing European war, which, given 
Norway’s neutrality, was not any bigger crime tiian cheering on the British. Officially, 
there was no such thing as a ‘wrong side’! Consequently, in the maelstrom o f  orders, 
‘opinions’ and messages that poured out - some authorized, some unauthorised, some 
untrue and some blatantly treacherous, - the lieutenants and captains had to malce their 
decisions about life and death. The perspective in the governmental corridors, where 
everybody ‘understood’ who the good chap was, was radically different from the 
perspectives created in the field by the neutrality baloney.
5.S.2.2 Plan Fetishism
Plans are, as said earlier, an important device in command and control, but they have a 
nasty proclivity to autonomy. As an example of this phenomenon we will look into a much 
debated incident, that we have touched already; the decision to implement a silent 
mobilisation when the enemy was already in shore. How could the government decide on a 
secret emnlment when the war was well on its way? And how could the foreign minister as 
a matter of course broadcast to the entire world that Norway had mobilised, i f  it was 
secret? This seems like military madness and has been a subject of much controversy ever 
since.
The reason for this seemingly irrational decision was that both the General Staff and 
the government were ‘hijacked’ by old plans. The cmrent procedure was utterly inadequate, 
but no one managed to disentangle himself from the procedures.
To understand the difficulties we can draw a simple matrix:
Ibid. 216.
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Figure 5-1 The mobilisation matrix
Full Partial
mobilisation mobilisation
S ilen t
mobilisation
Open
mobilisation
Hie politicians could originally ‘mix’ the matrix in ways that con-esponded to%niîitaiy 
needs and the international situation. A full mobilisation could be silent, or open, partial 
mobilisation likewise. But in 1940 two of the options were gone:
Full Partial
mobilisation mobilisation
Silent
mobilisation
Open
mobilisation
In 1940 a partial mobilisation had to be silent, and a full mobilisation had to be open, by 
regulation. A partial mobilisation was all the politicians needed. Forces in the north of 
Norway were already mobilised, as a precautionary measure during the Winter War, and 
there was no point in doing anything there/^^ In addition to that, the Noiwegiafr Army was 
so full of paper tigers that the Minister of Defence, Colonel Ljungberg, hesitated to 
scramble thousands of troops to units which either did not exist, or had no fighting value. 
That would only add to an already chaotic situation.^^^ Hence, it made sense to go for the
Koht, Frà skanse til skanse, 19.
In a document &om the Parliament (St. meld. Nr.4) submitted on 7 September 1939 about neutrality 
watch, it is stated; ‘Given the prevalent situation concerning the combat readiness, an instant full mobilisation 
of the Navy will be troublesome. Especially the question of personnel will induce problems for the Navy, For 
the coastal aitillery, extensive arrangements have to be done in order to be able to receive the  crews.’ (Cited 
in Odd Fjell, (ed.), Klar til strid. Kystartilleriet gjennom ârhundrene (Oslo, 1999), 169.) Tliis was a 
peacetime assessment of the situation in the Navy, and no wonder that Ljungberg hesitated to  go for the all- 
embracing option in the chaos that chai’acterised 9 April. In a conversation he had with the Commanding 
General about the mobilisation, he referred to the forces that it was possible or ‘practical’ to raise. See 
Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945 bilag nr 7 ‘Aprildagene’ box no. 3, p,89
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partial solution, but still not for the silent one. When the Norwegian Chief o f  Staff, Colonel 
Hatledal, got the order from Ljungberg to execute a partial mobilisation he burst out: ‘Are 
you out of your mind, L j u n g b e r g ? H e  asked whether the minister, himself an officer, 
realised that such an order had to go by mail? Ljungberg confirmed his order and left the 
General Staff.^^^
After the wai' many tried to explain the apparently odd decision to use the postal 
administration to gather the troops when the war was in progi'ess and every hour 
counted.^^^ Colonel Birger Ljungberg, the Minister of Defence, was held responsible for 
this gaffe after the war, because he was the specialist in the government and he should have 
known better.^^^ His colleagues in the cabinet were excused for their ignorance of technical 
militaiy hair-splitting. Tiygve Lie claimed, for instance, that the Govermnent had decided 
upon a full mobilisation ‘as fast as possible’, and left it to the Minister of Defence to find 
the right wording as: ‘We did not have any copy of the mobilisation regulation at hand.’
Lars Borgersmd maintains that Ljungberg became a scapegoat after the war, 
because the real reason for the weird connection between the dimension and the calling of 
the mobilisation was too embarrassing for the establishment to admit. Borgersrud’s main 
line of reasoning is that there had existed a secret military network, containing politically 
reliable troops for riot control and potential counter-revolution warfare. In the new political 
situation following the Labour party’s rise to power in 1935 it was excessive to have two 
complicated mobilisation systems, one against an external enemy, and one against an 
internal enemy, given that the old ‘enemy’ now had gained legal power through the ballot
Quoted in Borgersrud, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 217.
In tlie investigation that followed the war, Ljungberg claims that he later gave the order for a general 
mobilisation, but he did not remember to whom he gave the order, and no one at tlie general staff remembered 
having received any. See the civilian investigation committee of 1945. (Tilrâding jErâprotokollkomiteen om 
‘Innstilliiig fra Undersokelseskommisjonen av 1945’[Innst.O.IX A] Oslo: 1947, 19.)
Many wiseacres after the war criticised Ljungberg for picking the wrong option of the two available. He 
should have gone for the full/open option. That suggestion misses the point, as both alternatives were 
‘wrong’.
Birger Ljungberg had been appointed Minister of Defence only three months before tlie outbreak of the 
war. He was not a politician or a member of the Labour party. When Minister o f Defence Fredrik Monsen had 
to leave the cabinet in the winter due to illness, the government appointed an officer to signal military 
awareness. Ljungberg was at the time commander of Infantiy Regiment No. 1, and no expert on politico- 
military affairs. His main qualifications were allegedly liis modesty and diplomatic virtues. Lars Borgersmd 
‘Militsere veivalg 1940-45’ in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, (ed.) Ikrigens kjolvann (Oslo, 1999), 165. Colonel Otto 
Ruge was a hot candidate but both Monsen and Nygaai'dsvold found him too stubborn, with a one-track 
military mind. Hambro, Liv og Drom, 165.
Lie, Leve eller do, 17.
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box. Hence, in 1938 the anti-revolution enrolment of conscripts was integrated with the 
system of neutrality guard. The enrolment of loyal conscripts in a tense internal situation 
had for obvious reasons both to be silent (not to give the rioters the possibility to sabotage 
the enrolment) and partial (they had to avoid the syndicalists.) Hence, the connection 
between the means and the scale of mobilisation made sense in counter-revolution 
operations, but not in a war with an external power. The important point is though that:
‘the new system was formally organised so that neither of its two original functions were to 
be excluded. In effect, the secret “silent” mobilisation was to become the only alternative at 
the level of partial mobilisation of the anny.’^ ®^ No one foresaw that this could have 
serious consequences in a given, and at this moment unimaginable, situation.
According to Borgersmd, this fatal fusion of two regulations was kept secret after 
the wai*. The reason is that the secret networks were re-established after the war as an 
answer to the communist scare.^ ®"^  Too much attention devoted to the old hidden agenda 
could endanger the creation of a new secret ‘Stay Behind’- force after 1945, against Soviet 
and Norwegian fifth columnists.
The tragedy of plan fetishism was spelled out during an accidental encounter 
between the Minister of Justice, Terje Wold, and the General Staff on 10 April. Wold 
asked General Laake, still the Commanding General: ‘What have you done until now, 
General? Where are your orders to the troops? And what is this I heai": our country has been 
at war since yesterday, and the first day of mobilisation is to be tomorrow? Was there really 
no other way of handling this m a t t e r ? Lieutenant-Colonel Wrede-Holm intervened: 
‘Well, actually.. .Yes, there was. We could have ordered an open mobilisation.’ ‘And why 
was this not done?’ Wold asked, and got the answer fi'om the general: ‘The government 
ordered otherwise’. Wold called attention to the ‘fact’ that the government had decided 
upon a general mobilisation and that it was up to the general to ‘settle technical details 
The minister obviously did not understand the flavour of military words, and the 
consequences of using them wrongly. It is strange though, that none of the cabinet 
members commented on the complete lack of preparations for war in the streets of Oslo
Lars Borgersmd, ‘Er du blitt gær’n Ljungberg?’ Historisk Tidsskrift Volume 75, no 3 (1996).
'The largest scandal in 1940 was the secret mobilisation, and the largest scandal for the Norwegian 
military historians is that they have no interest of it.’ Borgersmd, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 208. 
Francois Kersaudy, Noi'way 1940 (London, 1990), 101.
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and Hamar through which they travelled, which ought to have followed an open and 
general mobilisation.
Some words on a couple of sheets of paper had become a straightjacket that 
seriously inhibited the war effort. The only officer that could legally break the chain was 
the commanding general, Kristian Laake. But he was handpicked for his job in 1931 just 
because of his willingness to seiwe as a humble bureaucrat. The next in line, Hatledal, 
protested rather undiplomatically as we have seen, but he did not, quite understandably, 
have the nerve to disobey a direct order from the minister without the backing of his boss.
The way out of the problem would have been for the Prime Minister, or even the King 
in person, to broadcast that Norway was in a state of war over the public radio, to leapfrog 
all military gibberish and drown the swaim of gossip that lives by uncertainty. The fact that 
the authorities never used the word war in their parsimonious addresses to the public in the 
early stages caused tremendous fiiction.^^^ A lot of prepared and probably essential 
countermoves, such as the demolition of tlireatened equipment, were not executed because 
they were meant for a state of emergency that did not fomially exist at the crucial 
m o m e n t . ^ I t  is too much to expect that officers, who lived by ‘red tape’, should blow up 
their own equipment on their own initiative. Much of this equipment, as for instance the 
coastal batteries in Trondheimsfjord, became later essential in the Germans’ fight against 
the British expeditionary force.
The reason why nobody, except Quisling in his attempted coup d’état, jumped to the 
microphone, is rather complicated. Tiygs^e Lie claimed in his memoirs that the government 
actually had discussed the option of using radio to infomi the population, bu t had discarded
Ibid.
‘As it was, the appointment of Laake was a blatant attempt to hinder the expert autliorities to establish 
viewpoints that would disturb die governments proposal [of military cutbacks]’ Odd Lindback-Larsen, Veien 
til katastrofen. 1941: Tilbakeblikkfraenfengselscelle. 1973: Veimerker i dag. [The road to disaster, 
retrospection from a prison cell.] (Oslo, 1973), 62.
The fate of the cliief of the general staff, Rasmus Hatledal, was ratlier unfortunate. He himself had the 
moral fibre requested to shout load when necessary, and the investigation committee actually gave him credit 
for his ‘insubordination’ by calling up more troops than authorised from Minister of Defence. (Kreyberg 
p,123) But tlie battle against Laake and Ljungberg had totally worn liim out, and Ruge had much to his regret 
to replace him (‘undoubtedly one of the best officers in the Army’) Ruge, Felttoget, 4L
Eriksen tells a striking story in his article ‘The dramatic battle at Oscarsborg 9 April 1940’ mAftenposten 
6 June 1945: ‘A German officer asked me awhile after 9 April: ‘Tell me Colonel, when did you get the 
declaration of war?’ He was flabbergasted and refused for a long period to believe that no such declaration 
was submitted before the arrival of the naval unit.’ (Microfilm at the National Library, Oslo)
I am indebted to Tom Kiistiansen at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies for tirese observations.
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it because they did not want to trigger panic. With hindsight, he said, they should have used 
the radio, but it would not have had made any di f ference.One of Lie’s colleagues in the 
cabinet, Nils Hjelmtveit, in fact afterwards criticised the military for not going on public 
radio with the mobilisation order.^^^ This demonstrates both that Hjelmtveit did not know 
much about the mobilisation regulations and an inconsistency between Lie and Hjelmtveit. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg tried in fact on 9 April to get in touch with the broadcasting 
company, but was hampered by some Clausewitzian friction. He or the representative from 
the broadcaster misunderstood where to meet, and consequently he never saw anybody 
■ from the broadcasting company.^^^ The reasons why the radio remained silent were 
probably the combination of crisis-imposed stress and strain on the leaders, ignorance 
concerning the complexity of command and control, and the ‘Belgian ghost’. In contrast to 
what Lie said, it could have made a big difference if the government had broadcast a 
declaration of war. The German troops that were washed ashore seasick in Norway on 9 
April, were vulnerable indeed. If too many Norwegian troops had start to shoot at them 
they might have been upset and turned Norway into another Belgium by indiscriminate 
bombing.^ '^^ An overt declaration of wai* could destroy the basis for negotiation with the 
Germans.
5.3.3 Dissemination
The practical consequence of Norway’s preference for Great Britain was a secret that could 
not even be spoken about in secret parliamentary m e e t i n gs . Ho w  could such an attitude 
be disseminated to the officers? It could not be done by reciprocal influence. Koht could 
not possible travel around and hint at his unspeakable truth to any officer who needed to 
know. He could not even do it hy supervenient influence. His intentions could absolutely 
not be put down in words, nor broadcast by circular letters. Many of those who would
Lie, Leve eller do, 24.
Unders0kelseskommisjonen av 1945 bilag nr 7 ‘Aprildagene’ box no. 3, 81
Ibid. 83.
The armed forces were required to watch the borders, not guard them. (Koht in a meeting in the Defence 
counsel on the 12* of December 1936. 0rvrk, Veim eller Vakt, 155.), Hence no mass of force where available 
anywhere in Norway, except in the northern part of the country. But the German troops w ere fragile, without 
heavy weapons, when they arrived.
Not until 8 April 1940, after the mine-laying operations, did parliament speak in plain words. Johan L. 
Mowinckel, broke the spell; ‘Already in September, we were aware, that whatever happened -  and now I 
speak behind absolutely closed doors - we could not end up at war with Great-Britain.’ Grimnes, Veien inn i 
Icrigen, 26.
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have been on such a mailing list had preferences for Berlin, and, if Germany had Icnown 
how biased Norwegian neutrality was, it would have had reason to act,^^  ^The only hope 
that Noiivay had was that the soldiers should guess what to do; their actions had to be 
isomorphic; the troops had to make up their own minds.
5.3 .3 .1  I so m o r p h ic  a c t io n s
A militaiy investigation committee was established in 1946 to examine the course of the 
campaign in Noi*way, and to serve as a ‘fact finding’ committee. Public opinion after the 
war found that the officers especially had shown a degree of incompetence and a lack of 
fighting spirit that bordered on cowardice and even treacheiy. Some of the committee’s 
findings led to prosecution, but the report in itself was not declassified until 1979.
In the report we find an indication of the conditions in the aimed forces at the outbreak of 
the war:
The defeatism that oveiwhelmed this country in the last ten years before 
the war, in connection with the disannanient that stalled in the twenties, 
had made the military rather unpopular. It was generally looked upon as 
a necessaiy evil. The dismissive attitude the administi*ation and the 
politicians showed in opposition to even modest proposals to strengthen 
defence, had to give the military leaders the impression that there was 
no serious political support to resistance. Hence, the attitude towards 
the military worked strongly against the military leaders’ cmcial self- 
confidence and reliance. The officer-corps was gradually demilitarised, 
so to speak. In addition, they knew that the material they had was utterly 
inadequate due to lack of budget allocation, and that the conscripts’ 
training were poorer than in any other countiy. The politico-military 
position the politicians had taken was also confusing. It was constantly 
repeated that Norway should stay neutral under all circumstances. We 
should not enter the war. This could easily lead to the outlook that the 
defence should restrict itself to a mere formal rejection of any isolated 
violation of the neutrality regulations. No unambiguous statement that 
one should resist an assault by all available means was issued firom any 
head offices, and the lack of precaution after the outbreak of the w ar in 
1939 indicated the opposite.^^^
Some claim tliat Koht’s practise did give Germany a legal right to take military actions against Norway. 
See for instance A.E. Eidem, Der norske iwytralitetsbmdd (Larvik, 1953)
NOU 1979:47 Rapportfi-a Den Militcere Undersokelseskommisjonen av 7P45,[report form  the military 
investigation committee], 30.
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The above interpretation, points to the ‘demilitarisation’ of Norwegian officers as 
an explanation of their poor performance, and explains why most of them in retrospect 
‘guessed wrong’. But Norwegian officers have never been ‘militarised’. The Norwegian 
armed forces have always stressed domesticity and amateurism, with an emphasis on 
physical fitness, sobriety and the spirit of self-sacrifice.^^^ Physical exercise, marksmanship 
and nation building via general education have been the raison d ’être of Norwegian 
military education. Military questions have never been high on the agenda. Military 
dilettantism was nothing new in the 1930’s. The word that best describes the situation the 
1930’s is deprofessionalisation.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, military officers had constituted a 
strong profession, almost without being militaristic in any sense of the word.^®  ^But during 
the 1920’s and -3 0 ’s the attitude described in the statement from the investigation 
committee cited above, combined with the military’s own shoidcomings, had ruined it. It 
was the professionalism of the German soldiers that proved superior in the first crucial 
days of their attack, not the scarce weaponry at their disposal. Over the first nine days of 
the operations, the Germans felt physically inferior to the Norwegians, thanks to very high 
losses of supplies due to Allied sinking of cargo ships and to pure military friction.'^*^  ^But 
they felt battlewise, battle-worthy and battlesome; they did not expect the Norwegians to be 
any of these. The Norwegian forces that met the Germans in 1940 had no professionalism 
left; they had ‘no unity, no focus, no theory, and no system’.
Unity was effectively destroyed by a vicious pincer, formed by the severely reduced 
field exercises and the reformation of the officer corps. Virtually no exercises were 
performed for a large number of conscripts for almost 20 years.^°^ Hence, one of the most 
vital parts in any effective military organisation, small group cohesion, had no possibility 
of developing. The Norwegians had no time for indispensable teambuilding. Not even a
See for instance Karsten Friis, Forsvar og identitet. De norske frislaisverdier. [The military and identity] 
NUPTnotatnr.591, 1998.
Hans P. Hosar, Kunnskap, Dannelse og Krigens Krav -  Krigsskolen J 750-2000 (Oslo, 2000), 202 .
As many as five, out of seven, supply vessels designated for Narvik, Trondheim and Stavanger were sunk. 
See Holm, 1940 - igjen?, 48.
Samuel P. Huntington claims that preprofessional tliinldng has ‘no unity, no focus, no theory, and no 
system.’ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theoiy and Politics o f Civil-Militaiy 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 28.
Kristiansen and Hobson, Norges forsvarshistorie, Chapter 18. Exercises on regimental level and above 
were not held after 1922. Torkel Ho viand, General Carl Gustav Fleischer. Storhet o f fa ll (Oslo, 2000), 41
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sense of duty to the unit’s colours, usually a prerequisite of martial ethos, had time to 
develop. The Norwegian units that had seived together during the neutrality watch along 
the northern borders during the Winter War, or those who at least had some days between 
em'olment and active duty, did a considerably better job than the units in the south, that had 
be eni'olled, be apportioned and be assigned, and fight on the same day."^ °^  Hence, most of 
the Norwegian military units were ‘rotten’, so to speak; they did not contain any unity.
Even if the men were individually brave and well educated, they did not comprise a 
fighting force. Later in the war, Noiwegian airmen, sailors, the members of the resistance 
movement, and special operation units showed that even Norwegians loiew ‘how to die’, 
but then they had something to die for.
On top of that, on 1 January 1930, non-commissioned officers were by an 
administrative measure made officers.'^ '^  ^Before that date the average age o f  lieutenants 
was twenty-something, now it became almost 50."^ *^  ^As a consequence, the competition for 
positions became fierce, as the number of competitors had exploded. Esprit de corps was 
dangerously battered. General Odd Lindback-Larsen wrote about this a generation later: 
‘The famous gulf between officers and non-commissioned officers did not disappear. It 
was drawn in to the officers’ mess itself and became smaller but considerably more 
d a n g e r o u s . T h e  resulting esprit du coips was at best feeble.
Furthennore, Kohf s double-dealing and cover-ups blurred the^cns'. No ‘beacon’ 
was established in the case of fog and friction in war. The forces had no places to look and 
nothing to stick to, other than the delusive hogwash from the administration. Some feared 
the Russians, some the Germans, and some the Noiwegian working class.
Theoiy has never been an asset for Norwegian forces, but the arms race had made 
Norwegians’ lack of enthusiasm for military theory even more dangerous. In, 1905 
Norway’s inferiority compared to Sweden was a question of quantity, of numbers. Norway 
had the equipment and troops to do the same operations as any European power, on a 
smaller scale. In 1940 this was absolutely no longer the case. The Norwegians were both
Holm, 1940 - igjen?, 65.
‘The new arrangement was unpopular in both camps, and a typical example of the many half-measures that 
followed the cutbacks.’ 0rvik, Solidaritet elle}- noytralitet, 67.
Lindback-Larsen, Veien til katasti-ofen, 52.
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quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to almost any European country. They had no tanlc 
units, virtually no anti-tank defence, and an insufficient number of anti-aircraft guns. Still 
the Noiwegian officers continued to read foreign doctrine, and tried to adapt it to 
Norwegian conditions. But as the gap widened between the Norwegians and the major 
powers, this method caused serious self-delusions. Officers, like the later generals Ruge 
and Fleischer, obviously spent much time contemplating militaiy theory. The point is, 
though, that Noiway lacked any system and tradition to systemise, approve and authorise 
military ideas. While it is possible to deduce a doctrine fi’om the plans for mobilisation and 
operations, no explicit doctrine was available in 1940."^ °^  Major Gudmund Schnitler’s book 
on sti'ategy fi'om 1914 remained the source of militaiy wisdom in Norway well into the 
Second World War. Consequently, the Norwegians operated in April 1940 ‘ as if tanks and 
war planes had not been invented
The Norwegian system was severely undermined by years of political and military 
neglect. The Noiwegian order of battle looked formidable on paper, but paper was all it 
was. 6 6  infantry battalions could be a match for anyone, especially in deep snow, in 
Norwegian mountains and deep valleys. But the paper tigers was usable for nothing else 
than as a sleeping pillow for weary politicians."^®  ^In peacetime, only the neutrality guard 
could be mobilised (‘ stage mobilisation’), which contained 6  small brigades in addition 
to a small number of specialised units. If the international situation became blurred and 
unpredictable, Norway should according to the plan start rearmament and build a real 
army."^ ®^ Provided that materiel were available, and lines of communications open, the 
Commanding General stated that the army could manage the transfomiation in 6  months, 
tlu'ough a state of emergency, though he doubted whether the Noiwegians would accept
Lindback-Larsen, Veien til katastrofen, 54. Major Kirkman’s report to Collier: ‘[I]t means that officers 
generally retire to their rooms after meals rather than stay in the mess.’
The introduction to the Army’s tactical directive of 1938 ( [Felttjeneste II], signed by Kristian Laake and 
Otto Ruge), bear a resemblance to a doctrine, and was in fact quite modem. It emphasised the  importance of 
low level initiative: ‘The non-commissioned officers have to use their own initiative and seek responsibility, 
and not waste time waiting on, or ask for new orders each time the situation change.’ (Pt.4) The modem 
histoiy of Norway would probably have looked different if that attitude actually had characterised the 
Norwegian soldier.
Tom Kristiansen at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, in a private conversation 19 March 2001. 
Eventually, the peak of the Norwegian resistance did only involve about 20% of the planned man-power. 
In addition, many of the units did not manage to get their equipment before it was lost to the Germans. (See 
Holm, 1940 -  igjen?), 63
Stprp. nr. 6 1933,0m ny forsvarsordning, 21.
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such a burden in peacetime/' ' In other words this plan provided foresight. Major Odd 
Lindback-Larsen writes: ‘10:30 p.m. [ 8  April] we received a message from an obviously 
resentful General Staff; “There will not be any more messages to night. The Government 
will tomon'ow consider whether to call up more troops” Well! 10:30 p.m. the 8 ®^ of April 
1940. It was well over an hour till the wai* broke out, our foresighted leadership of foreign 
affairs had heaps of time.
To sum up: the problem in Noiway was the scarcity of professional soldiers, in the 
‘Huntingtonian’ sense of the word.""® Tlie Norwegian amied forces were more like a 
heterogeneous heap of wage earners and bureaucrats, who had ended up in the ranlcs for 
almost every other reason than a martial one. Wlien the black silhouettes approached the 
Norwegian coastal batteries in the dead of the night, the isomorphic actions of the 
Norwegian officers were reasonable congruent. They varied between doing nothing, 
shooting warning shots, and shooting at long range. Given what is been said above, these 
were the reasonable, responsible and expected things to do. Actually to sinlc an unknown 
vessel with the risk of killing people and to put the whole nation’s destiny at stake, by 
‘asking’ for reprisals, were far beyond the modus operandi of the Norwegian Armed forces.
5.3.3.2 A gamut in harmony?
All belligerents, Gemiany, Great Britain and Norway, grasped quickly the importance of 
King Haakon. Both the Gennans, via leaflets, and Quisling, via radio broadcasting, 
competed with die government’s privilege to command and control the armed forces. Both 
managed quite well. A lot of Norwegians for instance joined the Germans to prepare 
airfields for air operations against Norwegian troops."""' But the king was the ace in the 
battle for the ‘heaits and minds’ of the majority of the Norwegians. If Haalcon had gone on 
the radio and proclaimed a cease-fire, a great majority of the Norwegian troops would have 
followed suit. There were simply not enough focus, unity and cohesion to establish a
'" ‘ Ibid. 21.
'"^Lindback-Larsen, Veien til katastrofen, 105.
‘The distinguisliing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness.’ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 8
Norwegian workers repaired the runway at Foraebu neai* Oslo, after attacks fi'om the RAP in mid April. As 
many as 2000 Norwegians worked at the airfields of Væmes and Lade in the Trondheim area during the 
campaign, when the front was in the neighbouring county. Without operational airfields in this area there 
would have been no air support to Dietle’s troops in the Narvik area. It is very hard to imagine that the
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Norwegian variant to the Republican Government of National Defence that popped up in 
Palis after the Napoleon’s defeat in 1870.
In the situation that occurred on 9 April the Norwegian troops were in desperate 
need of intense command and control. Hence it had to be done by reciprocal influence, i.e. 
someone had to actually persuade them, or force them. Traditions, regulations, directives, 
and training — none of them had the power to overcome the deep-rooted defeatism. The 
vague intention of the government could not just be ‘stove-piped’ down to the troops.
There were too much confusion, contradictions and even bitterness around. Someone had 
actually to convince them. And there were not many around who had the integrity and the 
authority to ‘kick-start’ command and control on their own behalf. Birger Eriksen was one 
of them, Otto Ruge another.
When it dawned upon Eriksen that something really serious was about to happen, 
he called his senior officers to a ‘ council of war’, where they probably scrutinised the 
regulation of neutrality, and considered what to do if anyone tried to penetrate their 
perimeters.""® The regulation for the neutrality guai'd of 29 August 1939 prohibited any use 
of force without a direct order from the Commanding Admiral, except in self-defence. If 
the opposition was oveiwhelming one should withdraw.""^ This was plain nonsense: to 
withdraw a fortress was obviously impossible. However the instruction also said: ‘Vessels 
which despite protest tiy to intrude harbours of war, or the areas of the coastal artillery, 
shall be obstructed by all available means. Hence, Eriksen should presumably have been 
safe, or maybe not.
The manager at the museum at Oscarsborg, Commander Fjortoft, argues that 
something significant happened in 1934, when the coastal aitilleiy was transferred from the 
Army and organised together with tire Navy.""® The Naval attitude towards rules of 
engagement was substantially different from the Army’s. Naval vessels could sail outside
German troops could have withstood the allies without that support. See for instance Major O.H. Langeland, 
Dommer ikke, [No condemnation] (Oslo, 1948), 59.
Commander Jan Egil Fjortoft, chief of the Museum at Oscarsborg, on telephone 13* of February 2001. 
John Hogevold states that Eriksen deliberated upon the regulation of neutrality with Captain Th. Unneberg 
before the engagement. John Hogevold, Vàrmilitære innsats hjemme og ute 1940-45. (Oslo, 1984).
Instruks fo r Sjoforsvarets sjefer gin av Admiralstaben 29. august 1939 National Archives, Militære 
undersokelseskommisjonen av 1946 box 2519 (shelf 1B09265)
Ibid. pt.lO.
Conversation with Commander Jan Egil Fjortoft, on telephone 13* of Februaiy 2001.
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Norwegian territorial waters, they could hide or seek out opponents. Coastal artillery could 
not do much, just shoot. Fjortoft’s argument is that most of the officers at Oscarsborg were 
coloured by the Navy attitude to the rules of engagement. That is, they saw ‘hiding’ or 
waiting for orders as an option, something they probably urged Eriksen to do also. One of 
the excuses used to explain why the coastal artillery at Makeroy, some miles south of 
Oscarsborg, did not shoot at all was that they avoided ‘needlessly shooting, not to betray 
the positions of the battery’. The militaiy investigation committee could not believe such 
an explanation. It is simply not possible to ‘hide away’ two 301/2-cm howitzers moulded in 
concrete,""^ But the secrecy of his position would be a primary concern for a naval officer, 
aboard a ship, and such an imperative probably unconsciously slipped over to tlie coastal 
artillery. Captain Sodem, who fought at Oscarsborg, had a conversation with a Gennan 
officer, just after Eriksen had surrendered Oscarsborg, that highlights the difference further. 
The officers had asked him: ‘Why did you shoot at us?’ Sodem answered: ‘I ’m just a 
soldier, the government commands.’ The German continued: ‘You did not shoot at 
Cossack’. ‘No, I said, that was the navy, I was not there.’"'®® Consequently, the rules of 
engagement were confused, even on paper. And, as said earlier, Eriksen’s superior,
Admiral Smith-Johans en had refused to talce a stand.
Eriksen himself could not quite believe that his nation was on the brink of war. He 
released half the crew as late as 03:00, because he thought that the ships that had been 
observed further south were stragglers after a naval battle. Consequently, some of his 
officers criticised him afterwards for the tranquillising effect his calmness had on fellow 
officers,"'®' Furthennore, a comment Eriksen later claimed to have made after the 
engagement, reveals that he did not expect a war: ‘Well, we have not destroyed too many, 
but we absolutely maintained our neutrality.’"'®® Moreover, according to a former 
commandant at Oscarsborg, Magnar Toiwaldsen, Eriksen picked out a second lieutenant to 
walk in his footsteps after he had alaiined the forti*ess. The reason was probably that 
Eriksen wanted a witness in case of a court-martial. Even if Eriksen had to struggle with
1979:47 Rapport fra Deit Militære Undersokelseskommisjoiien av 1946., 36.
See S0dems report of 20.12.41 in Den Militære Undersokelseskoirmiiteen av 1946 Krigsoperasjoner i 
1940 Kystartilleriet, National Archives, Box 2509 (shelf IB 092 55)
Unpublished memoirs, still not to be disclosed, at the Museum at Oscarsborg.
Letter of 14* of July 1950 to the Armed Force’s histoiy department in. National Archives Krigen i Norge 
Box 193.
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his own uncertainty and qualms he still had the detennination to resist the baffling from 
above and fight against his own subordinates before he took on the Germans.
At about 4 o’clock Eriksen definitely ‘bear'd the drums of war’, when the lookout at 
Filtvedt, 11 kilometres south of Oscarsborg, reported several naval intruders. He went to 
the main signal office."'®® There he gave an order to the main battery to load their cannons, 
via the telephone operator. Captain Sodem, at the main battery, requested a direct order 
fi'om the colonel himself before loading any gun. Eriksen left the main signal room 
enraged, without even buttoning his coat, something unseen before.^®"' He had personally to 
talce charge and to give the order to load."'®® In other words, Eriksen was not only indirectly 
undermining spineless and pusillanimous politicians, he was also fighting faint-hearted and 
stubborn officers. Captain (of the Navy) Anderssen, who commanded the torpedoes, 
demanded written orders of engagement when he manned his position. He had never 
imagined that he actually was going to use them in battle."'®^  Wlren the burning Blücher 
actually appeared in his line of sight, he asked Eriksen again whether he really was going to 
launch his torpedoes."'®® Rumour has it that Eriksen now lost his temper and answered 
Anderssen’s question with the f-word.
In the midst of this internal friction Eriksen’s situational awareness was r'ather poor 
as well, as he later stated in a newspaper article: ‘There was no declaration o f  war, only a 
feeble neutrality watch. Nevertheless [I] had to take the responsibility, without hesitation, 
conferences or questions, to engage a fleet that approached in a completely peaceful 
formation.’"'®^ He knew that the formation had passed the naval base in Horten without any 
interference, he knew that the mines were not activated, and that the Admiral was 
unwilling to give him any orders. In other words, not much pointed towards a war, or 
towards a politically endorsed decision to resist the intruders. On top of this he had, as we 
have seen, to leave the signal room and personally direct the operations of the  main battery, 
probably because he feared that captain Sodem did not have the moral fibre actually to
The operation-centre was on another island and totally unfit for Eriksen’s need at this moment.
Captain Torvaldsen in a telephone conversation 15.02.01.
Eriksen stated in a newspaper article from 1945: Tt was the commandant who had to order the loading, 
since the cannons were not loaded when I arrived about 4 o’clock.’ Arbeiderbladet 4 August 1945. A rather 
polite description of the situation.
Othar Lislegaard, og Torbjom Borte, Skuddene som reddet Norge? Senkningen av 'B lücher’ 9. april 1940 
[The salvo that savedNoi-way] (Oslo, 1975), 35.
Eriksen mAftenposten 6 June 1945.
Eriksen m Arbeiderbladet A Kugast 1945.
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shoot/®® This assumption is supported by the fact that Lieutenant Bons ale, who was second 
in command to Sodem, reports that Eriksen gave orders direct to him, a description Sodem 
refutes in his comments to Bonsalc’s report: ‘I do not laiow anything about the order 
Bonsak mentions. Presumably it was delivered when he and the commandant were chatting 
by the battery.’ Sodem even asked Eriksen when he turned up by the cannons if they 
actually were going to shoot, something that probably soured Eriksen’s temper even 
more."'®® Eriksen had also in fact personally to advise the main battery’s rangefinders.
Again Eriksen description after the war is rather favourable to his subordinates: ‘The small 
and barely trained crews made it mandatory for the commander to be in the main battery, 
which is nonnally not his place.’"'®' Sodem, among others, needed very intense command 
and control, and Eriksen had to be there in person to convince him, something that 
deprived Eriksen of the ability to control the rest of his batteries. The extension of 
Eriksen’s authority over distance was severely reduced in order to produce sufficient 
intensity. Fj o r t o f t  at the museum at Oscarsborg concludes rather eloquently; ‘If one of 
the younger officers at Oscarsborg had been in charge, he probably still would have been 
searching for a telephone number to call to be told what to do by a senior officer. ’"'®®
Eriksen never became a hero in the armed forces after the war. He was in fact on the 
brink of being court-martialled for surrendering Oscarsborg on 10 April, after hours of 
bombardment, and after more battering than any of his colleagues."'®"' The author of the 
history of the Noiwegian coastal artillery, Captain Odd T. Fjeld, explain this odd close call 
by the fact that the ‘underbrush looks more impressive if you cut down the big trees’."'®®
Eriksen and Ruge were not by any means unique, but their postings and personality 
gave them an advantage over the military ‘entrepreneurs’ that popped up elsewhere in 
Norway.
An assumption by Fjortoft at the museum at Oscai'sborg revealed to me in a telephone conversation 15 
February 2001.
See Den Militære Undersekelseskommiteen av 1946 Krigsoperasjoner i 1940 Kystartillejàet National 
Archives Box 2509
Arbeiderbladet 4 August 1945
Eriksen took a position in the main battery with no telephone, and was dependent on an orderly with about 
'/2 minute’s running time. See Captain Unneberg’s report of 17.07.41 in Den Militære 
Undersokelseskormniteen av 1946 Krigsoperasjoner i 1940 Kystartilleriet National Archives Box 2509
Conversation witli Commander Jan Egil Fjortoft, on telephone 13 February 2001
The fortress was so battered after 10 hours of bombardment from sea and air that it had no  fighting value 
left, and was completely isolated.
In a telephone conversation with Captain Fjeld 13 February 2001.
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In a television interview after the war, General Ruge explained:
Among those who could not bear the responsibility, there are surely 
men who would have done well if they’ve had a clear order to stick to. 
And vice versa, I know men with a high national esteem who also had 
their weak moments, but were saved because they got an early message 
of what was expected. And thereafter commanded their units firmly, 
because the overwhelming pressure of self-determined decisions was 
lifted. That’s the way most of us are, we need something firm to cling to 
if  we are ‘squeezed’, an unambiguous instruction to follow. For most 
subordinates this means everything: they get bigger, or smaller, 
according to the leadership."'®®
Ruge himself was one of those exceptional men, who had the ability to make exceptional 
decisions, against others’ better judgement."'®® After Ruge had shown at Midtskogen that it 
was possible to fight back, the confidence and hastily-imposed military stracture allowed 
more supeiwenient- and isomorphic influence to talce place. "'®^ The troops could thereafter 
do well without intensive command and control for a greater amount of time. This is 
illustrated in the figure below. In the early hours the Noiwegian military machinery was 
nothing more than a frustrated bundle of individuals. During the 62 days campaign they 
grew into a more determined body of fighting soldiers. Without the vigorous courage of 
people like Otto Ruge, Carl Gustav Fleischer and Birger Eriksen, the troops would never 
have got the opportunity to improve.
Norge i h ig ,  program 3, overfall og motstand. [Nomay at war.]
Ruge quotes William of Orange in his memoirs: ‘Je n’ai pas besoin d’espérer pour entreprendre, ni réussir 
pour persévérer.’ Ruge, Felttoget, 206.
The almost mythical skirmish at Midtskogen was not Ruga’s achievement alone. Colonel Hatledal and 
Major Olaf Helset played more important roles than Ruge, but the ‘masterstroke’ was soon to  be associated 
with Ruge’s name. See Borgersrud, Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon, 247.
Figur 5-2 The Norwegian gamut.
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One could of course speculate about what would have happened if either the Commanding 
General or the Minister of Defence had been more like Ruge. That’s a futile effort. Both 
General Laake and Minister Ljungberg were, as mentioned earlier, handpicked for their 
positions, due to their willingness to serve humbly the current power structure, not to rise 
above it. When the First War broke out the Norwegian government did the opposite of 
what Nygaardsvold did. The Prime Minister, Gunnar Knud sen, appointed Major General 
Christian Holtfodt, a strong and wilful officer, as Minister of Defence. This ensured an 
effective coordination between the political and military aspects of Norwegian security 
policy, a coordination that was totally absent during the regime of the Labour party."'®^  The 
Norwegian hamstring is unique only in degi*ee; a career in a hierarchical organisation is 
always dependent on some kind of adaptability, ‘as officers who express too openly their 
desire to innovate or to criticise are not likely to survive’.''"'®
It is impossible to give a definite answer as to why ‘the few’, like Eriksen and Ruge, 
actually rise to the occasion. What Eriksen, Ruge, Hatledal and Fleischer all had in 
common, though, was that they had experienced 1905. Eriksen had in fact been in the very 
same place looking for the Swedes, as he was 35 years later. In 1905 Birger Eriksen was
Hovland, General Carl Gustav Fleischer, 24.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1971) Quoted in Lav.Tence 
Freedman (ed.), (Oxford, 1994), 126.
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gunnery officer at the main battery at Sondre Kaholmen, Oscarsborg. In 1940 he was 
commandant for all Oscarsborg, with four batteries, in addition to a torpedo-battery, mines 
and air defence. Amazingly, as we saw above, he found himself as gunnery officer again, at 
the main battery at Sondre Kaholmen, 35 years later. To understand what happened in 1940 
we have to understand that the persons who distinguished themselves had experienced a 
totally different Weltanschauung. They had joined the force in days when military affairs 
really mattered; they had won their country its independence. ‘For the Norwegians in that 
time there was no doubt. The events in 1905 were the completion of ten years of struggle 
for independence. The political gambling of 1905 was secured by a strong national 
defence.’"'"" The coastal artillery, where Eriksen served, had in fact a particularly strong 
position in the first 20 years of his career."'"'® The experience from vigorous neutrality 
seiwice during the Great War was not insignificant either, but we have to go all the way 
back to 1905 to find a situation where both the politicians and the officers were determined 
to defend against an unambiguous thi'eat, at all costs. Norway’s undisputed greatest 
national hero, the arctic explorer Fridtjof Nansen, wrote several newspaper aiticles in the 
anxious spring of 1905. In one of theim he said something that again became extremely 
relevant: ‘A people who is satisfied with big words when their rights and sovereignty is 
violated, expose itself to ridicule for the entire world, and what is even worse; the people 
became demoralised; but a people who to the utmost defends its independence will thrive, 
even if they lose.’"'"'® Hence, ‘the few’ had seen better days, and in the Indian summer of 
their cai'eers they were again called upon, maybe not by their fellow citizens but by idols of 
the past. The ‘gamut’, as I have called it, was not adapted to the acute need for intensive 
command and control in 1940, but the generation of 1905 did not need much. They had 
‘been there before’. While the younger generation, which had been brought up to be 
bureaucrats, was in desperate need of supervision.
5.4 Conclusion - a deserved victory?
It will obviously be too easy to explain Eriksen’s behaviour as reminiscent o f  1905. Why 
did not all of the ‘lieutenants of 1905’ perform outstandingly? And a lot of those who
Holm Forsvaret og 1905, 32.
Odd Fjell, (ed.) Klar til strid, 89.
0ystein Serensen, Kampen om Norges sjel Norsk idéliistorie Vol III [Norway’s history o f  ideas] (Oslo, 
2001),415.
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distinguished themselves locally obviously had no memory of 1905. The experience of 
1905 is therefore not a sufficient explanation, but a partial one. To be in a position in 1940 
where your actions could have considerable consequences you had to be of a certain age. 
Hence you had to be bom in the 1880’s or earlier. Furthermore the ability to 
counterbalance the deprofessionalisation that shattered the force in the 1930’s was partly 
dependent on some personal experience -  a mental ballast for stormy waters. General 
Torkel Ho viand writes about General Fleischer: ‘This spectacular event [the crisis 
management of Prime Minister Christian Michels en in the summer of 1905] aroused a 
patriotism and devotion in Fleicher that lasted all his life. It created a deeper understanding 
for the Aimed Forces function in national crises.’ Robert Jervis supports such a view:
[Dramatic historical events, especially wars and revolutions] have a 
particularly strong impact upon the thinlcing of younger people whose 
opinions about the world are still highly impressionable. Images foimed 
by adolescents and young adults can still shape their approach to 
international problems years later when they may occupy important 
positions of authority.
Eriksen, the ‘hero’, and Laake, the ‘failure’, were actually bom in the same year, 1875, and 
consequently they had went through the same tumultuous events. Why did one end up with 
foreign and national decorations, while the other disappeared into oblivion? Why did 
Eriksen shoot, while another silently pretended that he did not see? I cannot tell. The 
experience of 1905 is of itself insufficient to explain Eriksen’s actions. But it is reasonable 
to thinlc that the sentiment of 1905 saved at least some of the militaiy vigour through the 
upheavals of the 1930’s, which someone with an inexplicable virtue could use in the 
moment of tmth.
The only way to find the answer as to why Birger Eriksen sank the Blücher might 
have been to ask him, but Eriksen died in 1958. It is impossible to ask him now, and even 
if we could it is not clear that he himself had the answer. Eriksen did not leave any 
memoirs behind. But he wrote a statement in a newspaper in August 1945, as a response to
Ho viand, General Carl Gustav Fleischer, 18
Lebow paraphrasing Robert Jer\ds Perception and Misperception in International Politics in Between 
Peace and War, 104.
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all the boasting and bragging that followed the victory.' '^^  ^Not even there did he say why he 
did it/'^^ He affirmed that he was responsible for bending the rules of engagement by 
skipping the required warning bursts. He shot ‘to kill’ immediately, though he Icnew that 
the formation had passed the main naval base at Horten without any opposition.' '^^^ He also 
violated the order that Commanding Admiral Dies en had issued after his conversation with 
Koht. Eriksen did not know for sure that the ship was Gemian, not until he heard 
‘Deutschland fiber allés’ fi’om the burning ship."^ "^  ^ Worthy of note, he ends his statement 
by a gi'eeting to the ‘old chaps’ who where stationed with him at Oscarsborg in 1905. - 
‘ When we all were young’
In the euphoria that followed the victory, a question such as tins would probably not 
be decent, as it could make an isolated heroic action the personal achievement of certain 
officers, and not a feat of the whole military establishment. ‘In the many liberty speeches 
that were held the first year after 1945, it was often stated that we had managed so well not 
because of luck or coincidences. It was ‘effort’, a conscious achievement o f  idealistic 
goals. In other words, it was a deseiwed victoiy.’
Until this day, nobody has seriously asked the question, why did he shoot? 
Apparently it is common sense that military officers are there to protect the country. Maybe 
it is still too painful or embarrassing to look into this almost uniform helplessness and 
impotence. Or maybe the reason is that by focusing on the wrongdoers all the others go 
free. A process o f ‘scapegoating’ needs scapegoats, not heroes
As a conclusion, the Noiwegian government before 1940 was not politically 
‘unconscious’. It obviously Icnew that something unpleasant could happen. But strong 
counterforces worked against them. The antagonism betw^een the labour politicians and tlie 
officers precluded any constructive cooperation. Additionally, Halvdan K oht’s and Fredrik
The one-upmanship started almost immediately after the incident and appai'ently created some hard 
feelings between broüiers in arms.
Arbeiderbladet 4 August 1945
Ibid. He suspected that the composition of the formation, with the flagsliip in front, was done to give the 
impression of a friendly visit of naval units. See Eriksen's report, 5 August 1940. National Archives Krigen i 
Norge box 180
Ibid. Eriksen himself claims that he never got the order that only German ships should b e  engaged. 
Aftenposten 6 June 1945. (Microfilm at the National Library, Oslo)
Arbeiderbladet ^ August 1945
Hans Fredrik Dahl, De store ideologoienes tid. Norsk idéhistorie Vol V [Norway’s history of ideas] (Oslo, 
2001), 269.
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Monsen’s image of crisis dynamics told them that the best way to cope with the difficulties 
was to stay out of the way. If Norway managed to be almost politically ‘invisible’, the great 
powers might forget all about it. But if Norway made a big fuss about a minor violation of 
its neutrality, or reanned heavily, the gi'eat powers could unwan*antedly start to treat it as a 
competitor."^^  ^Sparse state funding also restricted Noiway’s fi-eedom of action, but it was 
not decisive. If the relationship between the officers and the politicians had been a bit more 
congenial, the extra money that actually became available in the late 1930’s could have 
been put to a much better use. In the background the fate of Belgium continued to linger: 
would not it be better to accept some infringements than to risk everything in a futile 
military escapism?
All this, put together, made a cognitive consistency that worked against all those 
signs of hostile intentions that poured into Oslo in early April. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is almost unbelievable that the government could miss the danger signals 
invoked by intelligence reports, the international press, the Norwegian chief of staff, 
shipwrecked Geiman soldiers allegedly on their way to Bergen, etc. However, to prepare 
for war would cause a severe cognitive dissonance by people who had used the better part 
of their life to ridicule the wannongers and turn the anned forces into a joke. In Lebow’s 
words: ‘This means tliat policy-makers are more responsive to infoimation that supports 
their existing beliefs than they are to information that challenges them. When confi*onted 
with critical infonnation, they tend to misunderstand it, twist its meaning to make it 
consistent, explain it away, deny it, or simply ignore it [...] Under these conditions even the 
most negative feedback may have little impact upon the policy-maker.
Had the Norwegian command and control structure been any ‘better’, if it had 
provided Koht with a situational awareness, and enabled him to micromanage, which is the 
usual response of any politician in any crisis, Blücher would probably have survived the 
meeting with Oscarsborg, Due to an almost non-existent command and control stiucture, 
the Norwegian Goveimnent did not manage to extend their wobbly authority over distance.
A statement in the military committee in the Parliament indicates the view: ‘Our country’s location outside 
the military main stream will in itself ensure a low probability of been drawn into a wai', if w e ourselves are 
not foolish enough to invoke the danger of wai' by keeping military forces that under a certain situation could 
be tempting for one power to use against the other’, Innst S. . nr 2. 1933 Quoted in 0rvik, Solidaritet eller 
noytralUet, 93 .
Lebow, BetM>een War and Peace, 105 and 114.
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For instance, there were so few telephones in the Foreign Office that the ministers who 
were gathered there on the morning of 9 April had to queue up and wait their turn before 
calling their respective departments to tell them that a war had broken out. Trygve Lie went 
over to the General Staff with the Minister of Defence, to call his wife, finding it a bit 
embarrassing to elbow his way with such a profane errand. Symptomatically, there was no 
hurry there.
What eventually saved the day was that poor command and control equipment left 
an open breach in the miserable and accidental leadership, where an almost forgotten 
inspiration, the birth of a nation in 1905, could unfold.
Bj0msen, Det uti^olige dognet, 68. (Lie himself turns this story around, saying that he primarily wanted to 
help ’ tire Minister of Defence in the General staff, and occasioirally phoned home. Lie, Leve eller do, 20)
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6 Conclusion
'The m e j o t  causes  o f a l i  t ypes  o f  s ur p r i s e  a r e  r ig id  concept s
a n d  closed percept ions .  " 
■ Michael  Handei
Sir John Monash, the commander of the Australian Corps, quite naturally disliked the bad 
reputation of his soldiers, and produced a statement about command and control that still 
stands out as an important reminder to eveiyone dealing with it, even if that phrase was not 
yet invented.
Veiy much and very stupid comment has been made upon the 
discipline of the Australian soldier. That was because the very 
conception and puipose of discipline have been misunderstood. It is, 
after all, only a means to an end, and that end is the power to secure 
co-ordinated action among a large number o f individuals for the 
achievement o f a definite purpose. It does not mean lip service, nor 
obsequious homage to superiors, nor servile observance of forms and 
customs, nor a suppression of mdividuality...the Australian Army is 
a proof that individualism is the best and not the worst foundation 
upon which to build up collective discipline.'^^^
‘A means to an end, and that end is the power to secure co-ordinated action among a large 
number of individuals for the achievement of a definite purpose’, is as a good definition of 
‘command and control’ as any. The problem is that it is wrong.
There is an anecdote about General Bernard Law Montgomery when he dined at 
Buckingham Palace with the Prime Minister and King George VI. The bellicose general 
dominated the conversation, delivering a lecture on politics, and how Britain should be 
governed in peacetime. Churchill was not amused, and the story wants us to believe that 
the following words where uttered: T thinlc he’s after my job,’ Churchill rumbled. ‘Oh, th- 
thank heavens,’ the King replied, ‘I th-th-thought he was after mine.’"^ ^^ Whether the story 
is true or not, is not important. It demonstrates the archetypal quandary of command and 
control: how to enjoy the advantages of division of labour ‘for the achievement of a
4 5 5 Monash quoted in Terraine, Haig, 218. (Italics added)
Quoted in Gerald Suster, Generals, The Best and Worst Militaiy Commanders (London, 1997), 233. 
Geoffrey Regan has a similar story in his Great Military Blunders, but now it is the Chief o f  the Imperial 
General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, who confides his won'ies about Monty’s ambitions to tlie king. Geoffrey 
Regan, Great Militaiy Blunders (London, 2000), 103.
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definite purpose’ and still keep the political hierarchy intact. Consequently, command and 
control must serve two masters, which sometimes pull in two different directions. One 
direction, brilliantly indicated by Monash, goes towards military effectiveness, or the 
organisation’s ability to reach goals. The other is towards preseiwation of the organisation 
itself.
6.1 Squaring the circle
According to the sociologist Jon Elster, the main task of institutions is to ‘keep society 
from falling apait’.'^ ’^^ An institution is a rule-enforcing mechanism that ‘govem[s] the 
behaviour of a well-defined gi'oup of persons, by means of external, formal sanctions 
The rules change over time, as people’s expectations change, and under some conditions 
sudden substantial changes mpture the whole social fabric, as the French revolution. But 
sometimes outsiders try to change the constitutive niles by the use of force, as when in 
1940 invasion turned Noiway into a German protectorate. Norwegians were to follow 
different mles. In order to defend the institution, as for instance the state itself, the 
institution sometimes has deliberately to change its own rules, in order to enhance its 
efficiency. The losing side in the Great War, for instance,.did not manage to change internal 
mles fast and adequately enough, and the state eventually collapsed."^^  ^But you camiot 
sacrifice all mles without sacrificing the institution itself. The agility and resilience of a 
swarm of bees is tmly impressive. However, even if their ‘doctrine’ were technically 
viable, soldiers could not adopt it. If Britain had turned into an anarchy in 1918, the word 
‘winning’ would have lost much of its meaning. If a soldier explicitly refuses to abide by 
the hierai'chy by not following legal orders, he will be convicted, regardless o f  his military 
efficiency. Hence: the tension between efficiency and preservation is a generic feature of 
command and control, and in both our two cases there was an acute imbalance betw^een the 
efforts spent on efficiency and the efforts spent on preseiwation.
Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts fo r the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass., 1989), 147.
Ibid.
‘While the British and French governments held out to their populations the enticements o f civilian 
democracy and reform, all that the German leadership offered was military dictatorship and ’patriotic 
instruction’. The failure to offer a carrot in tire form of political reform contributed to the German crisis in 
moral, which in 1918 played a significant role in determining the result of the war.’ Sheffield, Forgotten 
Victor)!, 47.
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6.1.1 Haig and Eriksen reconsidered.
The Norwegian Labour party was predominantly concerned with conserving its domestic 
political power. When it suddenly realised that the most dangerous tlueat to its mounting 
hegemony did not come from the bourgeoisie and middle-class officers, but from abroad, 
the derelict and dilapidated anned forces had virtually no efficiency left, other than in the 
bones of some old soldiers, on the verge of oblivion. Colonel Eriksen at Oscarsborg 
disregarded the conventions almost completely by turning a blind eye to the government’s 
tacit strategy, by bending the admiral’s instruction, and by viiiually acting as a subaltern on 
the parapet. He vigorously traded preservation of order with efficiency. Even General 
Fleischer and Colonel Ruge broke long-standing rules by virtually usuiping power by 
unauthorised decentralising from below. It caused tremendous friction when the 
government, on solid ground in Great Britain, restored business as usual.'^^^
Haig cautiously watched any attempts to tear him down from the military surmnit. 
The king himself, George V, was, for instance, Haig’s main bulwark against Lloyd George. 
During the fume of the Calais Conference in 1917, Haig addressed the King: ‘At this great 
crisis in our Histoiy, my sole object is to serve my King and Country wherever I can be of 
most use, and with full confidence I leave myself in You Majesty’s hands to decide what is 
best for me to do at this j u n c t u r e . B y  duping the king into making a commitment on his 
behalf, Haig would be immune to politicians.^^^ Wlien Ludendorff s sledgehammer 
eventually struck him in March 1918, those around Haig suddenly realised that his 
autocratic generalship had come with a price. The way out of the quagmire was to ‘usurp’ 
his power fi*om above. Milner and Clemenceau went outside the established rules when 
they placed the king’s general under supervision of a foreigner, to enhance the common 
effort. Neither Haig nor the Norwegian government had found the right balance between 
effectiveness and preservation of the hierarchy before it was too late. Others had to step in
In fact General Fleischer committed suicide in 1942, allegedly because the Labour Government in exile 
chose to appoint Major Wilhelm Hansteen to Norwegian Chief of Defence, instead of him. Fleischer was then 
a member of a very exclusive ‘club’ of allied generals, who had actually defeated German forces on the 
ground, however strategically insignificant.
Haig to George V quoted in Terraine, Haig, 273.
After the armistice Haig suggested that he publish George V ’s telegram of congratulation, together with his 
own reply. Buckingham Palace, though, advised against it: ‘[Stamfordham] is afraid that the Government, and 
Lloyd George in particular, might object to such a wire as the King's being sent to a Commander-in-Chief m 
the field as unconstitutional.’ Blake, Haig, 344 (16 November 1918).
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and save them. Furthennore, it is perhaps only in a genuine crisis that people have the 
ability to let go of the acquired privilege of interests vital to them, as Haig eventually did.
6.2 A little learning
It is a dangerous self-delusion to treat the tension between efficiency and preservation as a 
malfunction of command and control; it is an immanent feature of the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it is not only kings and generals that want to preseive the pecking order. Even 
at the platoon level lieutenants will guard their prerogatives, possibly at the expense of the 
platoon’s efficiency. Moreover, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to tell whether an 
action aims at enhanced efficiency or the preseiwation of the stiuctui*e. For instance, when 
Haig told Birdwood in 1918 that ‘I won’t have anyone criticising my orders’, did he do it to 
enhance efficiency or to preserve his own position?"^^^
Richard Ned Lebow wamed against wishful theoretical thinlcing within crisis 
management: ‘Our evidence indicates that those interested in crisis resolution have 
probably paid too much attention to crisis m a n a g e m e n t . T h e  point is that the underlying 
conditions for good decision-maldng, as for instance a consensus with respect to 
fundamental political values within the policy-malcing elite, and a fi'eedom from 
compelling pressure, are beyond the control of the decision-makers, as ‘they are almost 
invariably the result of fortuitous historical and political c i r c u m s t a n c e s I n  my opinion 
the same is tme of the cuiTent theoretical thinking about command and control. Users of 
buzzwords like ‘unity of command’, ‘OODA-loops’ and ‘C^ I^SR’ habitually overlook the 
‘underlying conditions’ of command and control, hi this thesis I have merely demonsti*ated 
that there is more to command and control than meets the eye.
A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again."^ ^^
Haig quoted in Simkins ‘Haig and the Anny Commanders’ in Bond and Cave (ed.) Haig, 95. 
Lebow, Between War and Peace, 305.
Ibid. 305.
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (1711)
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Note on Sources
This thesis is largely based on documentary collections in the Public Record Office (Kew), 
the National Libraiy of Scotland (Edinburgh) and the National Archives of Norway (Oslo). 
In addition, I have got invaluable help, first and foremost from my supervisor at the 
University, Professor Hew Strachan. I have also gathered infonnation, connected to the 
Norwegian case, from Commander Jan Egil Fjortoft, manager at the museum at 
Oscarsborg, who also kindly gave me access to the museum’s archives, Tom Kristiansen at 
the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Captain Odd T. Fjeld (Retired) editor of the 
Norwegian coastal artilleries history {Klar til strid: Kystartilleriet gjennom ârhundrené) 
and Captain Magnar Toiwaldsen (Retired), fonner commandant at Oscarsborg.
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